Foot soldier throwing 1528 grenade.

Part of the grenadier drill, showing how to sling the musket and throw the grenade.

Italian soldier throwing hand grenade in 1917.

Modern Soldier throws a grenade.

The crowd lining the streets of Sarajevo was in a festive mood. Archduke Franz Ferdinand (the heir to the throne), was visiting, and the weather was perfect on July 28, 1914. The mayor of Sarajevo, proud as a peacock, rode by in the first car. The next car was the archduke's. He sat in the back seat, next to his beloved Sophie, the woman he married against the wishes of the emperor himself. As the royal car approached, a young man named Nedjelko Cabrinovic took what looked like a whiskey flask from a pocket, unscrewed the top, and struck it against a lamp post. Spectators heard a pop, then they saw Cabrinovic hurl the flask at the Archduke. Franz Ferdinand saw out of the corner of his eye what looked like a rock flying toward Sophie. He threw up his arm and blocked the missile. It fell on the street and exploded with a loud bang. People screamed. Several bystanders were wounded. Franz Ferdinand ordered the car to stop. He got out to make sure the injured spectators would get medical treatment, then got back in the car and proceeded to the city hall.

In a sense, the first shot of World War I had been fired. It was fired with a hand grenade.

Later, after a reception at the city hall, the archduke insisted on going to the hospital to visit people wounded in the attack. On the way to the hospital the chauffeur suddenly learned that he was going the wrong way. He stopped so he could turn around. He stopped right in front of another young man named Gavrilo Princip, who was, as Cabrinovic was, a member of the assassination conspiracy. Princip pulled out a pistol and shot and killed the archduke and his wife.

Princip used a Browning automatic pistol, a weapon so popular that "browning" became a synonym for automatic pistol in several European languages. But Cabrinovic's weapon was a Serbian army hand grenade. A description of the Serbian grenade shows how these little bombs had declined from being a major weapon of war from the 15th through 18th centuries to being mainly an assassination weapon in 1914. The Serbian grenade was flat, not as convenient a shape for throwing as later grenades, but a shape that let it fit in a pocket without causing suspicious bulges. Under the screw top of the "flask" was a percussion cap. Striking that on a hard surface ignited a short fuse. In short, the Serbian grenade was a weapon for clandestine use, not the battlefield.

The hand grenade had seen some battlefield use in the Russo-Japanese War and somewhat less by defenders of forts in the America Civil War and the American Revolution, but most military authorities saw little use for it before World War I. That's somewhat surprising, because the hand grenade was probably the earliest of all gunpowder weapons. The Chinese were using bamboo joints filled with gunpowder before anybody had guns. European records mention the use of grenades in the 15th century, when the principal missile weapons were the longbow and the crossbow. The grenade at that time was an iron sphere filled with gunpowder with a fuse projecting from a hole. A picture in La Pyrotechnie, a book published in 1620, shows a grenade filled with gunpowder and pistol balls. The bullets were packed like seeds in a pomegranate, and is why it was called a "grenade," which is Middle French for pomegranate.

Those early grenades weighed about 3 pounds. Both garrisons of fortresses and besiegers tossed grenades over walls at their enemies. Because few men could throw a 3-pound ball far enough to be out of range of those lead "seeds," grenade throwers liked to have a wall between themselves and their target. In the 17th century, when all European war revolved around capturing enemy strong points and supply depots, the grenade became a most important weapon. To use it, European armies picked tall, strong men. They had to have strong throwing arms, and they had to be able to lug sacks of grenades, which weighed between a 1 1/2-3 pounds each. These "grenadiers" were most impressive-looking on parade, which some rulers such as Frederick William of Prussia seemed to think was an army's most important function. Grenadiers wore high, brimless hats so the brims wouldn't interfere with their throwing arms and to make them look even taller. The big, strong grenadiers were essential to the rapid storm tactics the Duke of Marlborough devised. They threw grenades to demoralize the enemy, then finished him off with musket and bayonet. Occasionally, though, they couldn't use their grenades. In 1710, Marlborough sent his grenadiers through neck-deep water to attack a position outside Bouchain. After that immersion, the grenade in the grenadiers' bags were as useful as so many sacks of stone. The water not only soaked the powder in the grenades, it extinguished the slow match every grenadier carried in a perforated metal case.

That slow match was one of the reasons the grenade was almost abandoned shortly before the Revolution. It made the grenadiers' job as dangerous as that of the matchlock musketeer. If a spark fell on a grenade fuse, the grenadier would become a human bomb, wiping out himself and anybody near him. Sometimes a sharp jar would set off a grenade. In addition to that, the weight of a sack of grenades detracted from mobility. So the grenade was largely abandoned. But the grenadiers were not. They looked too good. They became an elite corps, just as paratroopers have in modern times (even though the parachute is obsolescent and mass parachute jumps like those on D-Day in World War II will probably never happen again). Even countries with hardly any airplanes have parachute troops.

What brought the hand grenade back was trench warfare. The Western Front in World War I was a massive siege-the longest siege line in the history of the world with the most besiegers and defenders (each side had both). In the kind of close-quarters fighting that characterized struggles in the zigzag trenches and dugouts of the Western Front, the hand grenade was sometimes the only weapon that would work. The front-line infantrymen adopted the grenade before the military authorities. They filled old cans with TNT or gun cotton, sometimes with nails taped to them, sometimes with scraps of metal in the can with the explosive. To get more range when throwing the explosive, some soldiers taped their home-made bombs to wooden handles. Later, the German government issued its famous "potato masher" grenade with a wooden handle. Through World War I and later World War II, all nations continued to develop types of grenades.

There were incendiary grenades and gas grenades, smoke grenades and antitank grenades, offensive grenades and defensive grenades.

Defensive grenades were designed to be used from cover: They sprayed the area with metal fragments, covering distance farther than most men could throw.

Offensive grenades relied on concussion: they would kill only at a short distance, although at a somewhat longer distance they might temporarily disable an enemy. An attacker in the open could safely throw them. Antitank grenades had some sort of tail- fabric fins, bundles of hemp, or cloth streamers to make them fly point-first. They had to strike point-first because they had armor-piercing shaped charges in the nose. One Soviet antitank hand grenade was the RPG 43. "RPG," obviously, did not stand for "rocket propelled grenade" on this arm-propelled bomb any more than it does on the well-known RPG 7, a Soviet antitank weapon, which uses a recoilless gun to launch a rocket-assisted shell and has become every guerrilla's favorite hardware. Some incendiary grenades used thermite to create an intensely hot fire. Thermite could burn anything and could not be extinguished by water. Pushed down the barrel of a cannon, the thermite fire would weld the breechblock to the barrel and render the gun useless. Another type of incendiary grenade used white phosphorous, known to World War II and Korean War veterans as Willy Peter. White phosphorous ignites when exposed to air. When the grenade bursts, fragments of burning phosphorous filled the air. Willy Peter could inflict horrible burns on anyone it touched, but its primary purpose was to create a smoke screen.

The hand grenade was a favorite weapon of Orde Wingate, the maverick British general who invented new tactics in Palestine, Ethiopia, and Burma. Wingate favored the grenade for night fighting, when a rifle could not be aimed, because there was no way an enemy could tell from where the weapon had come. In World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, grenades were widely used as the basis for booby traps, as well as for attacking pill boxes and bunkers.

Some "military experts" have expressed doubt that hand grenades are worth their weight in modern warfare (such as Ray Bonds, author of Advanced Technology Warfare). One wonders if such experts have ever studied war from the vantage point of a front-line infantryman.

In World War I and later wars, there were frequently situations in which soldiers wished they could throw the grenade a little farther. That led to the rifle grenade. There were several ways of throwing a grenade with a rifle. One way was to place the grenade in a cup on the muzzle of the rifle and fire a blank cartridge. The gas blast armed the grenade and threw it toward the enemy. Another way used a long rod attached to the grenade. This was pushed down the barrel of the rifle, then propelled with a blank cartridge. Grenades especially designed to be fire from rifles were then issued. These usually had a hollow tail with fins that fitted over a device called a "grenade launcher," which was attached to the muzzle of the rifle. Again, a blank cartridge was the propelling force. After World War II, some grenades were made that could be launched with a regular cartridge. These had a steel block in the base of the grenade that stopped the bullet.

Presently, the United States and other forces use "grenade launchers" that are really separate guns. These use a 40 mm cartridge that has a small grenade instead of a bullet. The earliest models of this type of gun looked like a short, fat single-barrel shotgun, but now the U.S. grenade launchers are minimal guns that fit below the barrel of the standard rifle. NATO and Warsaw Pact countries also had automatic grenade launchers that looked like machine guns on steroids and fired a more powerful 40 mm grenade cartridge.

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"In 1805 the Russian arm underwent a revamping along lines similar to Gribeauval's in France. Under the "System of 1805" the guns were standardized in 6 pound and 12 pound cannon, and 10 pound and 20 pound "licornes." A 3 pound licorne was initially used but later dropped after the Battle of Friedland as being "ineffective." The licorne [unicorn] was a unique Russian gun, being a hybrid howitzer with a longer barrel and different chambering that gave it a flatter trajectory, greater range and accuracy than conventional howitzers. "

Russian Artillery Units

The artillery was the most important branch of the Russian army. Its weaponry included the Licorne, a long-barreled howitzer that had a greater range and more accuracy than the howitzers used by the other European armies. In 1805 the Russian artillery had been standardized by Count Arakcheyev in order to provide the army with a uniform selection of 6-pounder guns, 12-pounder guns, 10-pounder Licornes and 20-pounder Licornes. Russia also had the most advanced gun-sight of the period, the Karbanov system that used a screw mechanism to elevate the gun. European armies by contrast elevated their guns by means of wedge blocks.

The Russians had three types of batteries. The light and horse batteries corresponded generally to those of the Franco-Allied armies. The third type was the position battery, which consisted of four 20pdr Licornes, four medium 12pdrs and four heavy 12pdrs. The position battery was twice the size of European armies, with twice the frontage. They devastated the advancing French infantry with canister. All Russian batteries were guarded by a unit of support troops. The artillery commander advocated, "Conceal your guns and their number, and then increase the quality in action as the combat goes on". The Russians were very adroit in masking their guns until the last moment, then removing their covering troops and opening up with canister at short range. The support troops then counter-attacked.

In artillery the Russian's almost always had a preponderance over the French. The army was completely re-equipped with new cannon in 1805, from 3 pdr to 6 pdr up to the 12 pdr heavy pieces as well as the 10 and 20 pdr 'licornes' which were howitzers with a flatter trajectory than the smaller caliber cannon. The name, 'licorne' derived from the lifting handles on the top of the gun barrel, which were formed in the shape of prancing unicorns. Counting the 3 pdr guns, of which there were one or two per battalion, the Russian's fielded over 400 cannon as well as a vast wagon and ammunition park of over 4,000 vehicles.

The Russians treated their guns with greater reverence than the French did their eagles. It was considered more than a disgrace to lose a gun. The reason for this situation has a historic basis. In 1701, Peter the Great was in desperate need for artillery. In June he issued his historic decree:"From the whole of Tsardom, in leading towns, from churches, and monasteries, a proportion of the bells are to be collected to make guns and mortars". This was considered sacrilege by the people as, having been blessed, the bells were considered as holy as the churches themselves. Over the years, the guns had been melted down to produce newer models, and to the Russian soldier they had a sacred dimension that was little understood by Westerners, but explains the superhuman efforts made by Russians to safeguard their guns and, if captured, the ferocity of the counter-attack to retake them."

After the 1812 Russian artillery got their chops and were quite good- on one occasion under Captain Nikitin after shooting at advancing French, the artillerists mounted draft horses and charged wavering French to chase them off.

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The Lodya bore the large, richly ornamented canvas sail. Rowers were concealed from the sun under the shed.

For long voyages the Kievan Rus built a light, open vessel called a lodya. The Byzantines called it in Greek monoxile because it was made from a single tree, usually the hollowed-out trunk of an oak or linden. Layers of planking were secured to the hull to increase its height and oars were affixed to the planking. A single mast with a square sail made the lodya seaworthy, and it was light enough, when the need arose, for portage. Although it seldom exceeded twenty metres in length, a lodya often held a crew of forty.

In 907AD Kievan Grand Prince Oleg, with a fleet of lodyas, launched an attack against Constantinople, called Tsargrad by the Slavs. His victorious campaign proved the might and independence of Kievan Rus. According to the Chronicles, Prince Oleg "hung his shield upon the Gate of Tsargrad" and sailed back to Kiev with the treasures of his conquest.

(Top) HMS Hermes served in the FarEast for most of her career. This photograph clearly shows her unusually large island superstructure. Purpose-built, she carried almost as many aircraft as Eagle, a ship of twice her displacement.

(Bottom) HMS Hermes sinks off Ceylon (Sri Lanka) after a Japanese carrier aircraft attack in April 1942. Symptomatic of British handling of the war in th eFar East at this time, she had no aircraft aboard and no means of signalling for help if attacked.

HMS Hermes of the Royal Navy of United Kingdom was the world's first purpose-built aircraft carrier to be launched, although the Imperial Japanese Navy's Hōshō was the first to be commissioned. The design of Hermes preceded and influenced that of the Hōshō, and she was launched before Hōshō was laid down but her commissioning did not occur until more than six months after that of the Hōshō.

Hermes was laid down by Sir W. G. Armstrong-Whitworth and Company at High Walker on the River Tyne in January 1918 and was launched on 11 September 1919. She was not commissioned until 1923.

Like Hōshō, Hermes was based on a cruiser-type hull, and the design incorporated lessons learned from the operation of the earlier carriers such as HMS Furious and HMS Argus. Notably, this included a full-length flush flight deck and an island superstructure and funnel to starboard. The latter innovation allowed the ship to be conned effectively but did not interfere with air operations. The logic behind placing it to starboard was that early aircraft were powered by rotary engines that rotated in a clockwise manner (when viewed from the rear). The whirling mass generated considerable torque, and aircraft tended to yaw to their left upon take off. It was therefore desirable that they would turn away from any potential obstructions. An interesting identification feature was the tripod mast, which had two forward and one rear leg, a unique arrangement. However, operational experience with Hermes demonstrated that her air complement was too small, her protection and endurance limited, her speed was not sufficient for fleet operations and that her stability was poor, especially in high seas.

During World War II she served briefly with the Home Fleet before being assigned to the southern Atlantic from October 1939. She worked with the French navy based at Dakar until the Vichy government came to power, following that her aircraft took part in a strike against the French vessels at Dakar. In July 1940 she collided with a merchant vessel and was repaired at Simonstown, South Africa. Following repairs she continued patrols but this time in the Indian Ocean as part of the Eastern Fleet.

During the Indian Ocean raid, Hermes was in harbour at Trincomalee, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), undergoing repairs. Advance warning of a Japanese air raid allowed her to leave port, but as she returned following the raid on 9 April 1942, she was spotted off Batticaloa by a Japanese reconnaissance plane. Lacking planes of her own, she was defenceless when she was attacked by 70 Japanese bombers. Hit 40 times, Hermes sank with the loss of 307 men. Her escorts - the destroyer HMAS Vampire and the corvette Hollyhock - and two tankers were also sunk. 590 survivors of the attack were picked up by the hospital ship Vita and taken to Colombo. Some survivors were taken to Kandy where they spent 10 days recuperating at the Queens Hotel.

The wreck of the Hermes is located in the Indian Ocean off Batticaloa, Sri Lanka.

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Hōshō, converted from an oiler, was commissioned as a carrier in 1922 following the visit of a British technical mission. Originally equipped with an island navigating bridge, within a year she was flush decked, and provided the Imperial Japanese Navy with valuable early experience in carrier operations.

Hōshō (meaning "flying phoenix") became the first flat-deck aircraft carrier of the Imperial Japanese Navy in 1921, and was the first purpose-designed aircraft carrier in the world to be commissioned.

Her predecessors in the Imperial Japanese Navy were seaplane carriers such as the Wakamiya (converted in 1920 to an aircraft carrier with forward launch platform), or the Notoro.

Development

The hull of the Hōshō was based on a cruiser design, but it was not a conversion. She was built from the keel up as an aircraft carrier. Hōshō was commissioned on 27 December 1922, thirteen months before the Royal Navy's first purpose-built carrier Hermes, which was designed before Hōshō. The Hōshō however was originally conceived as a mixed aircraft carrier and seaplane tender and only during construction was her design modified to a dedicated carrier. She was the first purpose-designed aircraft carrier, but not the first purpose-designed dedicated aircraft carrier.

Her design was originally based on a cruiser-style hull, a flight deck with a depressed fore-part to accelerate lift-off, a starboard island, and three starboard funnels that were reclinable during flight operations. After trials she was improved by removing the island and flattening the flight deck, giving her a flush-deck design.

Operations

Being the first of its kind in the navy, Hōshō was actively used to develop the aircraft carrier operational methods and tactics of the Japanese Navy during the 1920s. She was preceded by the 1913 early aircraft carrier Wakamiya, which contributed to the development of the carrier techniques used in the Hōshō.

She served during the Shanghai Incident (bombing of Shanghai on January 28, 1932) and Sino-Japanese War in 1937. In August-December 1937, Hōshō supported land operations of the Japanese Army in China, as part of Carrier Division 1 with Ryūjō. Her aircraft complement consisted of nine Nakajima A2N fighters and six Yokosuka B3Y1 attack planes.

By the beginning of World War II, Hōshō had been superseded by other models: she was too small and too slow to accommodate the newest types of carrier planes such as the Mitsubishi Zero. She saw action however during the battle of Midway in June 1942, offering modest air support to the main fleet. Her aircraft complement consisted of eight Yokosuka B4Y1 'Jean' torpedo bombers.

For most of the postwar years, the assumption was made in English-language publications that the ship had been equipped with a 'modern' aircraft complement by the time of the Midway operation, on the basis of minimal translations published in English. However, beginning in the 1980s English-language researchers realized that this was a bad assumption, as Japanese official histories and air orders of battle began to appear. It has now become clear that at the time of Midway, Hōshō still carried a complement of the fixed landing gear biplane torpedo planes, the Yokosuka B4Y1 'Jean'. It was one of these aircraft which took the photos of the burning, drifting Hiryu in the late afternoon of June 4, 1942.

Efforts were made to lengthen and widen her flight deck, but the overhang weakened her stability and ocean-going capability. She was relegated to training duty in Japan's Inland Sea after 1943.

Post-War fate

After the war, she was used as a transport to repatriate Japanese personnel from abroad until June 1946. Hōshō was one of four carriers of the Japanese Navy to survive the war, but would be scrapped in 1947.

Hōshō air group:

• 1932: 9 fighters A1N1 (Type 3), 3 bombers B1M2 (Type 13), 3 reconnaissance aircraft C1M (Type 10) (15 aircraft)
• 1937: 9 fighters A4N1 (Type 95), 6 bombers B3Y1 (Type 92) (15)
• 1941: 11 fighters A5M4 'Claude', 8 bombers B4Y1 'Jean' (19)
• 1942: 8 bombers B4Y1 'Jean' (8)

Commanding Officers

Chief Equipping Officer - Capt. Ryutaro Kaizu - 13 November 1921 - 27 December 1922

Capt. Jiro Toshima - 27 December 1922 - 1 April 1923

Capt. Heizaburo Fukuyo - 1 April 1923 - 1 December 1923

Capt. Ryutaro Kaizu - 1 December 1923 - 15 April 1925

Capt. Seizaburo Kobayashi - 15 April 1925 - 1 November 1926

Capt. Giichiro Kawamura - 1 November 1926 - 1 November 1927

Capt. Kiyoshi Kitagawa - 1 November 1927 - 10 December 1928

Capt. Goro Hara - 10 December 1928 - 30 November 1929

Capt. Hideho Wada - 30 November 1929 - 1 December 1930

Capt. Eijiro Kondo - 1 December 1930 - 14 November 1931

Capt. Rokuro Horie - 14 November 1931 - 1 December 1932

Capt. Teizo Mitsunami - 1 December 1932 - 20 October 1933

Capt. Rokukichi Takeda - 20 October 1933 - 15 November 1934

Capt. Seigo Yamagata - 15 November 1934 - 12 June 1935

Capt. Kokichi Terada - 12 June 1935 - 15 November 1935

Capt. Munetaka Sakamaki - 15 November 1935 - 16 November 1936

Capt. Rynosuke Kusaka - 16 November 1936 - 16 October 1937

Capt. Takatsugu Jojima - 16 October 1937 - 15 November 1939

Capt. Kaku Harada - 15 November 1939 - 20 August 1940

Capt. Ushie Sugimoto - 20 August 1940 - 11 November 1940

Capt. Tomozo Kikuchi - 11 November 1940 - 5 September 1941

Capt. Kaoru Umetani - 5 September 1941 - 1 August 1942

Capt. Bunjiro Yamaguchi - 1 August 1942 - 15 November 1942

Capt. Katsuji Hattori - 15 November 1942 - 5 July 1943

Capt. Takeo Kaizuka - 5 July 1943 - 18 December 1943

Capt. Yoshi Matsuura - 18 December 1943 - 1 March 1944

Capt. Kiyoshi Koda - 1 March 1944 - 6 July 1944

Capt. Yujiro Takarada - 6 July 1944 - 5 March 1945

Capt. Shuichi Osuga - 5 March 1945 - 18 May 1945

Capt. Keiji Furutani - 18 May 1945 - 20 September 1945

Capt. Kunizo Kanaoka - 20 September 1945 - 31 August 1946

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A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy (1941-1945)

By Paul S. Dull

PaK 97/38 (7.5 cm Panzerabwehrkanone 97/38) was a German anti-tank gun used by Wehrmacht in World War II. The gun was a combination of a barrel from the French Canon de 75 modèle 1897 and a carriage of the German PaK 38.

Development history

During the invasions of Poland and France Wehrmacht captured thousands of 75 mm guns model 1897, built by the French arms manufacturer Schneider. These guns were adopted by Germans as 7.5 cm F.K.97(p) and 7.5 cm F.K.231(f) and used in their original field artillery role.

Soon after the German invasion of the USSR in 1941, Wehrmacht units encountered new Soviet tanks, the medium T-34 and the heavy KV. Thick sloped armor of these vehicles gave them good degree of protection against German anti-tank weapons. The situation led to requests for more powerful guns that would be able to destroy them from long range. Since Germany already had a suitable design, the 7.5 cm PaK 40, it entered production and in November 1941 first pieces were delivered. Until enough of those will be manufactured, some expedient solution was required.

It was tempting to adopt the easily available French gun to the anti-tank role. In the original configuration those guns were ill suited for fighting tanks because of their relatively low muzzle velocity, limited traverse (only 6°), and lack of suspension (which resulted in transport speed of 10-12 km/h). It was decided to solve the traverse and mobility problems by mounting the 75 mm barrel on the modern split trail carriage of PaK 38. To soften a recoil, the barrel was fitted with large muzzle brake. The gun was to fire primarily HEAT shells as anti-armour performance of this type of ammunition doesn't depend on velocity.

Interestingly, another major user of the French gun, the US Army, created and briefly adopted a similar expedient design, known as 75mm Anti-tank gun on Carriage M2A3.[1].

Production

In 1942, 2,854 pieces were delivered; 858 more followed in 1943. In addition, 160 guns on 7.5 cm PaK 40 carriage (PaK 97/40) were built in 1943. The manufacturing cost of one piece was 9,000 reichsmarks, compared to 12,000 for PaK 40. Production was stopped because of sufficient supply of more powerful anti-tank guns.

Employment

PaK 97/38 reached the battlefield in summer 1942. Despite moderate effectiveness and a violent recoil, it remained in service until the end of the war. The scale of use can be illustrated by the ammunition used: 37,800 HEAT shells in 1942 and 371,600 in 1943. There is photo evidence of this gun being used in 1944. On 1 March 1945 Wehrmacht possessed 145 Pak 97/38 and F.K.231(f) guns though only 14 were employed by frontline units.

Ten barrels with shields were experimentally mounted on the Soviet T-26 light tank chassis, resulting in vehicles designated 7.5 сm Pak 97/38(f) auf Pz.740(r). These self-propelled guns served with 3rd company of the 563rd anti-tank battalion before being replaced by Marder III on 1 March 1944.

The gun was also employed by the Finnish Army in Continuation War. Finns purchased the 75 mm field guns from France in 1940, became disappointed with their performance and in 1943 reached an agreement with Germany about upgrading to PaK 97/38. 46 pieces were converted in March-June 1943. Seven of the guns were lost in combat, the rest remained in service after the war and only in 1986 were retired.

A number of pieces were supplied to Romania and saw combat with the Romanian Army on the Eastern Front.

Summary

PaK 97/38 could be produced using captured barrels and could fire captured French and Polish ammunition. Together with light weight, good mobility and sufficient anti-armor performance with HEAT shell (enough to penetrate T-34 in most situations; side armor of KV could also be pierced), it made the gun decent anti-tank weapon.

It had shortcomings, particularly low muzzle velocity. Although it didn't affect armor piercing characteristics of HEAT ammunition, it meant insufficient performance when firing regular AP shells and - because of difficulties in hitting small mobile targets - low effective range of about 500 m even with HEAT. The gun also had quite violent recoil, especially with AP shells. It must be also noted that in the World War II the technology of manufacture of HEAT shells was crude, so many shells had armor penetration characteristics significantly below the supposed ones.

Ammunition

It is not clear if German AP shells for PaK 97/38 were produced. Polish AP shells were used in limited numbers.

The Finnish Army used locally produced ones designated 75 psa - Vj4 and possibly old French ones designated 75 pspkrv 59/66-ps. The 75 psa - Vj4 penetrated 92 mm at 300 m, meet angle 90°.[2]

The HEAT projectiles penetrated about 90 mm at meet angle 90° or about 75 mm at meet angle 60°.

Notes

[1] Zaloga, Delf - US Anti-tank Artillery 1941-45, p 8.

[2] Finnish Army 1918-1945.

[3] Shirokorad A. B. - The God of War of the Third Reich.

References

Gander, Terry and Chamberlain, Peter. Weapons of the Third Reich: An Encyclopedic Survey of All Small Arms, Artillery and Special Weapons of the German Land Forces 1939-1945. New York: Doubleday, 1979 ISBN 0-385-15090-3

Hogg, Ian V. German Artillery of World War Two. 2nd corrected edition. Mechanicsville, PA: Stackpole Books, 1997 ISBN 1-85367-480-X

Shirokorad A. B. - The God of War of the Third Reich - M. AST, 2002 (Широкорад А. Б. - Бог войны Третьего рейха. - М.,ООО Издательство АСТ, 2002., ISBN 5-17-015302-3)

Ivanov A. - Artillery of Germany in Second World War - SPb Neva, 2003 (Иванов А. - Артиллерия Германии во Второй Мировой войне. - СПб., Издательский дом «Нева», 2003., ISBN 5-7654-2634-4)

Isaev A. - Antisuvorov. Ten Myths of World War II - M., Eksmo, Yauza, 2004 (А.Исаев. Антисуворов. Десять мифов Второй мировой. - М., Эксмо, Яуза, 2004., ISBN 5-699-07634-4)

Kolomiets M. - Anti-tank Artillery of Wehrmacht 1939-1945 - "Frontovaya Illustratsiya" magazine, no. 1, 2006 (М.Коломиец. Противотанковая артиллерия Вермахта 1939-1945 гг. - журнал «Фронтовая иллюстрация», No1, 2006)

Zaloga, Steven J., Brian Delf - US Anti-tank Artillery 1941-45 (2005) Osprey Publishing (New Vanguard 107), ISBN 1-84176-690-9.

Finnish Army 1918-1945: 75 PstK/97-38 "Mulatti"

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