During World War I the Imperial Japanese Navy's direct involvement with carrier aviation was limited to the brief deployment of the Wakamiya Maru during the operations against Tsingtao in 1914. Of much greater import for future indigenous carrier developments were the observations and analyses of the Royal Navy's experience with aircraft at sea and carrier operations by Japanese naval officers attached to the Grand Fleet. Their recommendations led to the inclusion of an aircraft carrier in the 1918 "8-6 Fleet Expansion Program" as one of six auxiliary vessels proposed (the other five were oilers, which has led to a common misconception that this first Japanese carrier was a conversion rather than designed as such from the outset). The Hosho was the world's second carrier designed as such from the keel up and the first to complete. The Hosho's small size and simple design, plus considerable assistance from the British Aviation Mission to the Imperial Japanese Navy led by Colonel the Master of Semphill, resulted in its completion within just over three years from keel-laying, compared with well over five years required to construct the Hermes, the first carrier laid down as such.

The design for the Hosho's hull and machinery owed much to those of contemporary light cruisers for the fleet, though with reduced power. The aircraft stowage arrangements were unusual. There were two separate hangars. One was amidships 225 feet long, 30 feet wide, with overhead clearance of 13 feet. At the stern there was a two-level hangar the full width of the hull. The upper level was 150 feet long and had 18 feet overhead clearance, the lower level was 90 feet long and 15 feet high. Two elevators linked the hangars to the flight deck, the after elevator serving both levels of that hangar. Japanese designers consulted the British Aviation Mission on the design of the flight deck and its arrangements. As a result, it featured the forward downward slope and longitudinal arresting gear of contemporary British practice. As completed, the Hosho carried a small island with a large tripod mast to starboard but these were removed very shortly after commissioning since they interfered too much with operations and also caused stability problems, and the ship was conned thereafter from a bridge at the front of the forward hangar beneath the flight deck.

The provisions of the Five-Power Naval Limitation Treaty signed at Washington on February 6, 1922, allowed Japan to convert the incomplete hulls of two large warships scheduled for disposal under the treaty's terms into large aircraft carriers. Two 40-percent complete battle cruisers, the Akagi and the Amagi, were selected for conversion and design work began, led by Constructor Captain Fujimoto Kikuo. Before construction work could begin, however, the Amagi's hull was irreparably damaged by the great Kanto Earthquake on September 1, 1923, and the incomplete hull of the battleship Kaga, another vessel schedule for scrapping, took its place. The two aircraft carriers that resulted were based on the same design but there were significant differences between them, due largely to the different hull forms on which they were based.

The common design featured two long hangars built on top of the original hull's upper deck with a short shallow hangar built into the hull itself at the after end of the main hangars to accommodate spare dismantled aircraft. A long flight deck stretched from the extreme stern to the front of the main hangars, stopping about one-quarter of the ship's length short of the bow. A pair of flying-off decks projected forward of each hangar, staggered so that there was clearance for aircraft to take off from both decks simultaneously (while other aircraft flew off or landed on the main flight deck at the same time), and the arrangement also obviated the need to raise aircraft to the flight deck with the elevators from the hangars below. The design also featured very heavy antiship armament in the form of ten 8-inch guns disposed in two twin turrets and six single casemates, along with twelve 4.7-inch antiaircraft guns in twin mountings.

The Akagi and the Kaga differed in some important respects. The Akagi's flight deck, at 624 feet overall, was some 65 feet longer than that of the Kaga. It sloped slightly down toward bow and stern from a point about 325 feet from the after end to improve the airflow over the deck. The Akagi also was fitted with British-style longitudinal arresting gear that occupied almost the whole of the after sloping section. The Kaga's flight deck was flat and fitted from the outset with Schneider-Fieux transverse wire arresting gear purchased from France. The two carriers also differed in their arrangements for exhausting furnace gases. The Kaga used very long flues trunked to the stern along the side of the upper hangar, while the Akagi used a large stack that vented downward on the starboard side, supplemented by a smaller vertical stack abaft it.

In service the unusual triple deck arrangement on these carriers proved much less useful than anticipated, especially as aircraft increased in size and weight and thus required longer takeoff runs. Aircraft growth also emphasized the disadvantages of the short main flight decks. Japan therefore reconstructed the two carriers, expanding their hangars, removing the auxiliary decks and extending the main flight decks from bow to stern, fitting islands, improving smoke disposal, upgrading their antiaircraft defenses, and, in the case of the Kaga, replacing the machinery and lengthening the hull in a not very successful effort to raise the ship's speed. These changes increased aircraft capacity by 50 percent and greatly increased their operational capabilities. Since the carriers were expected to operate together as a koku-sentai (carrier division), the Akagi's island was fitted amidships to port. The Imperial Japanese Navy's practice for landing operations was for aircraft to orbit to one side of the carrier, peeling off and landing as ordered by the air operations officer. When a koku-sentai operated in formation, the carriers were abreast one another, each carrier's aircraft were orbiting outboard of the formation, and it was considered advantageous to locate the islands to suit. In practice, this island location proved to have serious disadvantages: it limited the landing space, caused excess air turbulence over the flight deck, and obstructed the normal path for aborted landings. Consequently, by the time the carriers of the Shokaku class were fitting out for service, this island arrangement was abandoned in favor of the conventional position forward of amidships on the starboard side.

The provisions of the Washington Treaty greatly influenced planning for new aircraft carrier construction by the signatories (Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and the United States) throughout the period before World War II. Nowhere was this more obvious than in Japan, where planners found the combination of both qualitative and quantitative limitations on the size and composition of the navy's carrier fleet to be major obstacles to the creation and maintenance of a balanced powerful force, especially in view of its treaty-imposed inferiority to its likeliest opponent, the United States. Because the Hosho was under construction in 1922, it was classed as experimental and its tonnage did not count within Japan's total. The carriers Akagi and Kaga, however, consumed two-thirds of Japan's allocation of 81,000 tons, leaving only 27,200 tons for further construction, barely more than the maximum tonnage permitted for a single carrier. The Ryujo, Japan's first new carrier subject to the treaty restrictions, therefore was also designed so that its tonnage was not counted against Japan's total allocation, taking advantage of the treaty's definition of an aircraft carrier as a vessel with a displacement in excess of 10,000 tons standard by constructing a vessel under that size.

The Ryujo's initial design envisaged a cruiser-type flush-decked hull carrying a long single hangar over the midships three-quarters of its length, topped by a flush flight deck that terminated at the forward end of the hangar. The limitation this concept imposed on the size of the carrier's air group soon was realized and the design was recast very rapidly by adding a second hangar level, thus doubling the aircraft capacity. The furnace uptakes were trunked to the starboard side and vented through downward inclined stacks; the bridge was located immediately below the forward edge of the flight deck; and the main antiaircraft battery carried in twin mounts sponsoned to just below flight deck level, which gave these weapons excellent sky arcs. The combination of changes, however, had a drastic impact. The design's tonnage increased substantially, and most of the added weight was high in the ship, especially as all armor protection was eliminated to restrict growth. Within eighteen months of commissioning, the Ryujo had to be modified to compensate for its inherent problems and in reaction to a fleet-wide concern about the stability of vessels constructed under the limitations of the Washington Treaty. The changes (bulges, hull strengthening, and topweight reduction) largely succeeded in correcting its deficiencies, but only at the cost of increasing tonnage by over 25 percent and cutting antiaircraft armament by a third.

The Washington Treaty limited both the maximum size and each nation's total tonnage of aircraft carriers. The Ryujo's design was an effort to circumvent the tonnage restriction. The provisions of the later London Five-Power Naval Limitation Treaty, signed on April 22, 1930, extended the total tonnage limitations to cover cruisers and eliminated the loophole exploited by the Ryujo. It also included a clause allowing up to 25 percent of a nation's cruiser tonnage to be made up of ships with flight decks. This provision prompted Japanese designers to investigate the possibilities of creating "cruisercarriers," vessels with both powerful gun batteries and useful aircraft capabilities. In the summer of 1932 design "G6" proposed a vessel similar to a scaled down Akagi minus the forward flying-off decks and with three superimposed twin 8-inch gun turrets in their place on the foredeck. The double hangars were 420 feet long and 60 feet wide under a 625-foot long flight deck. Aircraft capacity was similar to that of the Ryujo at forty-eight machines. The designers, however, failed completely to accomplish this project within the 10,000-ton size limitation applicable to cruisers-the design would actually displace some 17,500 tons. A second effort, "G8," followed the next year. The designers reduced the gun armament to five 6.1- inch weapons in a twin and a triple turret on the forecastle, moved the hangars forward, extended the flight deck to cover the full length of the ship and included a very large overhang at the stern to bring its total length to 850 feet, and proposed a large vertical stack for the furnace gases, for the first time in Japanese carrier design. This project, too, greatly exceeded the permissible individual cruiser tonnage, and also was abandoned, although it became the basis for work leading to the pure carrier design constructed as the Soryu.

The Soryu and the Hiryu were half-sisters and the models for all subsequent fleet carriers. The Soryu design evolved from the earlier cruiser-carrier studies but rejected all the larger caliber weapons featured in those designs in favor of six twin 5-inch dual-purpose mounts. The hull was very long and narrow and the powerful cruiser-type machinery made the new design exceptionally fast. The double hangars that characterized earlier Japanese fleet carriers also featured in this design, although this was not apparent externally, since the lower hangar was constructed within the hull itself. Hangars were 65 feet wide and the lower hangar was about 100 feet shorter than the 520 feet of the upper hangar, due to the narrowing of the hull forward. Three elevators linked the hangars to the full length flight deck. The Soryu had very light passive armor protection, only 1.8 inches thick on the sides and 1 inch on the deck over the machinery spaces, with 2.2 inches of deck armor over the magazines. The heavy antiaircraft weapons were supplemented by fourteen twin 25mm mountings for close-in defense and the small island was to starboard.

By the time the Hiryu was ordered, Japan decided to abrogate the Washington Treaty. The Soryu's design was modified to increase the beam and widen the flight deck, raise the forecastle by one deck to improve sea-keeping, and strengthen the hull structure, all probably as a result of the lessons learned from the storm damage suffered by the Fourth Fleet during maneuvers in September 1935. The designers took advantage of the lack of tonnage restrictions to enhance side armor protection substantially. Belt armor rose to 3.5 inches with 5.9 inches abreast the magazines. The Hiryu, like the Akagi after its major modernization, carried its island amidships on the port side for the same reason-to facilitate operation within a koku-sentai with the Soryu.

In the design of its interwar carriers the Imperial Japanese Navy placed a premium on high speed, long range, and large aircraft capacity (measured by stowage within the hangar). Its carriers had fine lines, light structure, capacious bunkers, powerful machinery, and capacious hangars. With the exception of the Akagi and the Kaga, armor protection was limited to save weight. All Japanese carriers proved very vulnerable to action damage since their designs featured enclosed hangars with very limited flash protection or ventilation combined with wooden flight decks that offered little resistance to bombs. While the navy was very cognizant of the importance of quickly launching large numbers of aircraft, enclosed hangars, the lack of facilities for arming or fuelling aircraft on flight decks, and the almost complete absence of catapults on Japanese carriers potentially inhibited this goal. Equally anomalous is the fact that relatively few Japanese carrier aircraft incorporated folding wings that could maximize hangar stowage, despite the imperative for the largest possible embarked air group.

Imperator Nikolai I in building.

Plan and side view of Imperator Nikolai I.

Battleship Imperatritsa Ekaterina Velikaya. Previous BB class.

A Japanese 11-inch (280 mm) gun fires on Port Arthur.

Manual (1), and Mitscherlich's optical (2) goniometers for use in crystallography, ~1900

The Russo-Japanese War witnessed a massive use of artillery, but it was not a revolutionary step in the development of this branch. While the amount of usage and the centralization of control during the war were without precedent, field artillery reached maturity only during World War I. The use of goniometers for measuring angles, panoramic sights, field telephones (especially by the Japanese), and even aerial observation by balloons allowed the commanding officers in the field to use their artillery firepower against targets outside the line of sight of the batteries used. These technological advances, together with the increase in the range and effectiveness of the guns, made it possible to concentrate the fire of a whole army corps on a single target. At the battle of Liaoyang, for example, medium and heavy artillery were massively employed. On the Japanese side alone there were 56 heavy guns and mortars and a total of 470 guns. During the battle of Sha-ho, 48 Russian guns fired 8,000 rounds in 40 minutes; at the battle of Tashihchiao, a battery fired 500 rounds per gun.

The battle of Sha-ho may furnish a further instance of successful concentration of the fire of dispersed batteries. The concealment of batteries in action began to be more fully realized and the impracticability of close support by guns pushed forward into the infantry firing line under the enemy's small-arms fire was demonstrated on many occasions. The advances of technology, achieved already in the 19th century, made the use of artillery and indirect fire in the battlefield safer and simpler, and during this war indirect fire at last became the norm. All in all, the two armies used unprecedented quantities of artillery ammunition. The Imperial Russian Army, for example, spent about 900,000 artillery rounds during the entire war, a tiny proportion of the 65.3 million manufactured and imported by Russia during World War I, and a fraction of the 360 millions shells and bombs Russia alone manufactured during World War II.

Still, the Imperial Japanese Army appeared to be more adapted to the modern use of artillery during the Russo-Japanese War. It used screens of artillery shelling to cover the advance of its infantry with very accurate and close support, through the extensive employment of field telephones and flag signaling. The tactics of advancing, positioning, and deploying the artillery forces evolved as well. The Japanese used camouflage and batteries to conceal the positioning of their guns from the Russian troops, and they watered the roads on which they moved them to prevent dust clouds that would have given away their position and movements. Until the Russo-Japanese War, shelling would stop when the attacking troops were still far from their target to prevent their being harmed, but now Japanese artillery officers often continued shelling almost up to the Russian trenches and ceased only moments before the assault began. During the war the Russians displayed improved gunnery performance and innovation as well. In the fortification of Port Arthur, for example, they placed most of their guns in batteries outside the forts of the main perimeter, contrary to common practice, thus eliminating "dead" ground and forcing the attacker to disperse his fire. Altogether, the use of artillery in the Russo-Japanese War inaugurated the era of mass bombardment and close support for the advancing troops, a fact that did not attract much attention of military observers.

Enhanced accuracy and communications apparent during the war having made close support an actual option, the Japanese and the Russians alike started using heavier guns with recoil systems. Japanese artillery corps were equipped with the Arisaka Type 31 gun as their main field gun until 1902, although they were occasionally equipped also with a small number of the 105-millimeter Model 38 field gun. The Imperial Guards, the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 6th Divisions, and their k么bi brigades were issued the field version of the Arisaka gun. It was capable of firing high-explosive or shrapnel shells up to 4,500 meters. But it lacked a recoil system and was replaced at the end of the war by an improved model of the same gun, which incorporated this and other new improvements known at that time. The 5th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th Divisions were issued the mountain-gun version, similar to the field version and based on it, but with a shorter range of 4,300 meters.

During the Russo-Japanese War the distinction between guns and howitzers gradually disappeared and both sides employed successfully a small number of howitzers. Both sides used an increasingly large number of 120-millimeter [4.7-inch] Krupp-design howitzers purchased before the turn of the century, as well as a small number of 150-millimeter [5.9-inch] Model 38 howitzers (only in Japan). Only the Japanese, however, made full use of this type of gun by mobilizing 18 gigantic Krupp-made 280-millimeter [11-inch] howitzers at Port Arthur. Their firepower was exploited to the utmost during the siege of the fort and was instrumental in razing the Russian defenses. The Russian artillery corps were equipped with superb quick-firing Putilov M-1903 76.2-millimeter [3-inch] field guns, which replaced the older M-1900. Even though these guns were most up-to-date, they were still heavier and less maneuverable than the Japanese guns. In addition, both sides made use of various older guns of 90 to 120 millimeters, and the Russians also employed during the siege of Port Arthur naval guns, mainly of 152 millimeters [6 inches] and smaller, which were removed from the warships of the Pacific Fleet. Both sides made some limited use of heavy mortars, especially in mountain engagements and around Port Arthur against nearby targets protected by hills or other obstacles. They were of 90-150 millimeter caliber and could fire up to 30-kilogram [66-pound] shells a short distance.

The SU-85 was a Soviet self-propelled gun used during World War II, based on the chassis of the T-34medium tank. Earlier Soviet self-propelled guns were meant to serve as either assault guns, such as the SU-122, or as mobile anti-tank weapons; the SU-85 fell into the latter category. The designation SU-85 is derived as follows: 'SU' stands for the Russian: Samokhodnaya Ustanovka - self-propelled carriage, while "85" signifies the bore of the vehicle's armament, the 85 mm D-5T gun.

Contents:
1. Development history
2. Description
3. Production history
4. Service history
5. Variants
6. References
7. See also
8. External links

SU-85 SU-85 tank destroyer in Polish Army Museum. Type Tank destroyer Place of origin Soviet Union Service history In service 1943 - ? (out of service) Production history Designer Lew S. Trojanow Designed 1943 Produced mid-1943 - late 1944 Number built 2,050 Variants See Variants section Specifications Weight 29.6 tonnes (65,256 lbs) Length 8.15 m (27 ft) overall 6.10 m (20 ft) hull only Width 3.00 m (9.84 ft) Height 2.45 m (8 ft) Crew 4 (commander, driver, gunner, loader) Armor 45 mm(1.77 in) Primary armament 85 mm (3.34 in) D-5T gun Secondary armament none Engine V-2 12-cylinder diesel 503 hp (375 kW) Power/weight 17 hp/tonne (12.7 kW/tonne) Suspension Christie Ground clearance 400 mm (1.31 ft) Fuel capacity 540 l 810 l - 900 l (with additional fuel tanks) Operational range 400 km (248 mi) (road) Speed 55 km/h (34 mph) (road)

• • T-34 tank T-34 variants · SU-122 · SU-85 · SU-100 · T-43 · Type 63 Prague monument · Mandela Way tank

1. Development history

Early in World War II, Soviet tanks such as the T-34 and KV-1 had enough firepower to destroy any German tank then available. However, in the fall of 1942, Soviet forces encountered the new German Tiger tank, with armor too thick to be penetrated by the 76.2 mm guns used in the T-34 and KV tanks at a safe range. By spring 1943, the Soviets had also received reports of the new Panther tank, although the Panther was not seen in combat until July 1943, during the battle of Kursk. This new generation of German vehicles meant the Red Army needed a new and more powerful tank destroyer.

In May 1943, work was begun on both a new anti-tank gun and a redesign to the armament of the SU-122. Developers of the former put their efforts to adapting an 85 mm gun, one of two types identified as best against the Tiger (the other being the 122 mm A-19). The SU-122, meanwhile, was rearmed with an existing 85 mm gun, the S-18, which was itself improved in the process. The production factory at Uralmash, which received the SU-122 design, attempted to reject the design as too expensive, since the larger gun breech meant that the entire hull would need to be modified, but it was required nevertheless to put the design into production.

Of the SU-85, several prototypes were rejected for design flaws, but after several changes, which included changing the gun to a D-5T, one was put into service as the SU-85. [1] At the same time, the 85 mm D-5S, which had proven both effective and reliable, was modified to include a telescopic sight and a new ball mantlet design and retitled the SU-85-II. [1]

2. Description

The SU-85 was a modification of the earlier SU-122 self-propelled howitzer, essentially replacing the 122 mm M-30S howitzer of the SU-122 with a D-5T high-velocity 85 mm antitank gun. The 85 mm gun was effective against Panther and Tiger tanks at long range. The vehicle was small, highly mobile and well armored.

3. Production history

SU-85 production started in mid-1943, with the first vehicles reaching their units by August. When the up-gunned T-34-85 medium tank entered mass production in the spring of 1944, there was no point in continuing production of a tank destroyer without superior firepower, so SU-85 production was stopped in late 1944 after 2,050 vehicles had been produced. It was replaced on the production lines by the SU-100 tank destroyer, armed with the more powerful 100 mm D-10S gun.

There were two versions: the basic SU-85 had a fixed commander's cupola with a rotating periscope and three vision blocks; the improved SU-85M had the same casemate as the SU-100, with a commander's cupola as used on the T-34-85.

4. Service history

SU-85 tank destroyer of the Polish 13th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment. This vehicle is missing its right first road wheel and its front fenders.

The SU-85 entered combat in August 1943. It saw active service in Soviet, Polish and Czechoslovak forces on the Eastern Front until the end of the war. It was obsolescent by 1945, and was withdrawn from active service not long after the war, to be exported to many Soviet clients states in Europe and elsewhere.

The SU-85 remained in service longer in North Korea and Vietnam. The similar SU-100 remained in service much longer, and some SU-85 and SU-100 were converted and used as command and recovery vehicles.

5. Variants

5. 1. Former Soviet Union

• SU-85-I - First SU-85 prototype, rejected for space concerns. Armed with 85 mm S-18 gun. [1]
• SU-85-IV - Second prototype also with a standard hull of the SU-122 but it had a larger ball mantlet, different from the one used in SU-85-I. Armed with 85 mm S-18 gun. [1]
• SU-85-II - Third SU-85 prototype with the new 85 mm D-5S gun, a new TSh-15 sight and a new ball mantlet design. [1]
  • SU-85 - Main production model armed with 85 mm D-5T gun.
    • SU-85M - SU-85 with the casemate from the SU-100 tank destroyer, which was larger and could carry up to 60 rounds instead of 48. It also had the same commander's cupola as the one used in the T-34-85. [1]
    • SU-85T - SU-85 converted into an ARV.
• SU-85-III - Fourth SU-85 prototype with a modified commander's cupola, with direct vision slots and covers.

5. 2. Poland

• WPT-34 (1960s) - Polish repair and maintenance vehicle with a superstructure replacing the casemate, a crane, a large-diameter telescoping snorkel for deep fording operations as well as a large-spade type earth anchor in the rear. It was converted from SU-85 tank destroyers as well as T-34 medium tanks and SU-100 tank destroyers.

6. References

• Perrett, Bryan (1987). Soviet Armour Since 1945, London: Blandford. ISBN 0-7137-1735-1.
• Zaloga, Steven J., James Grandsen (1984). Soviet Tanks and Combat Vehicles of World War Two,London: Arms and Armour Press. ISBN 0-85368-606-8

The German R-boats were pressed in to service as minelayers and convoy escorts. Although they received increasingly powerful diesels they could rarely manage much more than half the maximum speed of an S-boat. An R-boat is shown off the Norwegian coast, where the Germans ran so many convoys that they constructed a purpose-built convoy escort based on the R-boat design. By 1944 R-boats bristled with guns, carrying a 37-mm (1.45-in) cannon and up to six 20-mm mounts. Many were fitted with Voith Schneider propellers, which increased manoeuvrability at the expense of some speed. The R-boats were originally 60-ton craft armed with a couple of 20-mm cannon plus depth charges or mines, as appropriate. From R17 on they grew to S-boat size, and mounted an increased armament- necessary on the vital Norwegian iron ore route.

R채umen is the German verb 'to clear or 'to remove', hence the Raumboot or R-boat type of coastal minesweeper. These craft were of such a useful size, however, that they also did duty as minelayers and, suitably rearmed, as escorts to convoys, in which guise they were involved in frequent brushes with British craft.

The original group, R1-16, was constructed in the early 1930s. Like the S-boats, they were built of wood on metal framing with round bilges. They were, however, of only 60-ton displacement and 26-m (85.3-ft) length. Propulsion was by twin-screw diesels for a modest 17 kts although one unit, R8, was fitted with Voith-Schnider cycloidal propellers, which made for great manoeuvrability at the cost of some speed. This experiment was deemed successful, and over 100 R-boats were eventually so fitted.

From R17 onwards dimensions were very similar to those of the S-boats, though with extra beam, and increased draught by virtue of their greater displacement. Even with progressively improved diesels, the average R-boat never much exceeded 20 kts and, when not actually involved in the minesweeping for which the type had been designed, was employed defensively. The exceptions were the dozen so-called GR-Boote (G for Geleit, or escort), R301-312, built to a stretched 41-m (134.5-ft) design displacing 175 tons. They had triplescrew propulsion for 24 kts and were fitted with a pair of torpedoes. Though used in something like the role for which the British employed MGBs, their firepower was little enhanced, and 88 more projected craft were cancelled.

Their construction did suggest the need for a true multi-purpose escort for the many coastal convoys that the Germans ran around North European waters, The result was the hybrid, steel-built MZ-Boot design (Mz for Mehrzweck, or multi-purpose) which, while having a heavy surface armament including two 88-mm (3.46-in) guns and two torpedo tubes, were of only single-shaft propulsion. Only Mzl was ever completed, not proving sufficiently satisfactory to warrant further priority being given for completion of the remaining 11.

Boat Classes

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(16 October 1883 - 20 January 1951) was a German engineer.

Culemeyer was born in Hanover in 1883 and, in 1936, he became a director of the Deutsche Reichsbahn and in that capacity was responsible for the construction, procurement and running of road vehicles, railway wagons and heavy transporters.

As early as 1931 he had designed a transportation system which was subsequently named after him, the "Culemeyer heavy trailer". This heavy road trailer enabled the transportation of goods wagons on the road. These trailers initially had four axles with 16 solid rubber wheels. From 1935, a six-axle, 24-wheel version was also produced.

Under the slogan Die Eisenbahn ins Haus ('The Railway to Your Door') goods wagons were brought to factories and other places that did not have their own railway links from the nearest loading station. It was patented on 29 November 1931 under the name Fahrbares Anschlussgleis ('Rail Link on Wheels') and demonstrated to the public for the first time on 24 April 1931 at the Anhalter Bahnhof in Berlin.

In the Deutsche Bundesbahn the trailers were hauled by Kaelble tractors; the Deutsche Reichsbahn (GDR) in East Germany used Tatra tractors.

Whilst Culemeyer heavy trailers have been largely superseded on the roads by lorries, in some factories and firms they are still used occasionally.

On 4 November 1976 a private road belonging to the management of the former Reichsbahn authority (VdeR) in Berlin-Marienfelde (Tempelhof) was named after Johann Culemeyer. The road is open to public traffic and is a cul-de-sac with several industrial sites along it, including the Berliner Werk der Converteam Deutschland that in 1984 moved there as the AEG-Stromrichterfabrik. In the vicinity, there is also the Schwechtenstrasse, named after the architect of the Anhalter Bahnhof.

Culemeyer died in 1951 in Nordholz, Cuxhaven, in north Germany.

TH-1 Mount with 500mm Howitzer

T-1-180 railgun

305mm railgun (T-3-12)

1917 railgun

203mm mount (T-8)

Railroad 500mm gun

Railroad 356mm gun

Railroad 305mm gun

305 mm/52 (12") Pattern 1907

They were built to a Russian design and many were also used as coastal artillery and railway guns - TM-1-12 railroad guns. In addition to the Naval version of the gun, there was also a Coast Defense version which differed in having a larger chamber volume and used different ammunition, although it could also fire the naval rounds. By 1927 all of the coast defense guns had been changed over to using only naval ammunition. These were mainly mounted in twin coastal defense turrets that were designed in 1913. A total of 14 of these coastal defense turrets were built. Single open mountings were also produced for the coastal defense fortresses. There were four four-gun batteries around the Baltic, two four-gun batteries around the Black Sea and two five-gun batteries in the Far East. After the battleship Poltava was damaged by fire in 1924, her turrets were removed and then installed as coast defense batteries, two near Vladivostok in the 1930s and two near Sevastopol in the 1950s. Both batteries were in active service until 1996 and the turrets still survive.

356 mm/52 (14") Pattern 1913

During World War II, six of these weapons were used as Railway Guns TM-1-14. These were concentrated into two batteries, the first in Estonia for the defense of Leningrad while the second was used in the Far East and did not see any action. Another gun was used in a proofing mounting having an elevation of +60 degrees and during the war this gun was used to fire at the Germans around the Leningrad area.

TG-1(500mm L/28) and TP-1(356mm L/55)

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150-MM SELF-PROPELLED PROJECTOR (15 cm Panzerwerfer 42). The Germans have mounted this ten-barreled rocket projector on the rear of a lightly armored half-tracked vehicle with a Maultier suspension. Two horizontal rows of five barrels are mounted on a turntable with a 360-degree traverse. The weapon is fired electrically by a gunner who sits in the body of the vehicle immediately below the platform, his head protected by a shallow cupola. It is probable that the rate of fire of this weapon is higher than that of the Nebelwerfer 41, since the crew remains behind armor near the weapon and can reload in less time. That sequence is for the six barrelled ground mounted Nebelwerfer and was so that the mounting wouldn't turn itself over during firing. According to "Field Rocket Equipment of the German Army 1939-1945" by Terry Gamnder the practicable traverse was 270 degrees, it could rotate in a full circle but you can't fire it directly backwards as the back blast from the rockets would harm the vehicle/crew.

The first winter of the war in the USSR (1941-2) demonstrated to the German army that most of its wheeled transport was completely unable to deal with the dreadful muddy conditions produced during the freeze-thaw weather that marked the beginning and end of the Russian winter. During these conditions it was only the halftracks that could make any headway, but to divert the precious halftracks from their operational purposes to carry out the mundane day-to-day supply functions was obviously uneconomic, so it was decided to produce low-cost halftrack trucks. This was done quite simply by taking Opel and Daimler-Benz trucks from the production lines and removing their rear axles. In their place went new dnveshafts connected to tracked assemblies made from PzKpfw II running wheels and tracks. In itself this was a considerable economic advantage since the PzKpfw II was then going out of production and existing capacity could be retained, making the truck conversion an even more cost-effective venture.

The new halftrack trucks were provided with the name Maultier (mule). In the end the conversions used mainly Opel Typ S/SSM trucks, and in service they were generally a success although they tended to lack the overall mobility of the 'proper' halftracks. Not surprisingly, their use was confined to the Eastern Front, and the vehicles were used mainly for routine supply purposes.

Not content with a good thing, the Germans as ever were forced to employ the Maultiers for yet another purpose, The German Nebelwerfer (rocket) batteries had become an established part of the army artillery system by late 1942, and it was decided that the Panzer formations should have their own dedicated rocket units. At that time most Nebelwerfer units used towed launchers, so in order to keep up with the Panzers a self-propelled version was required. The halftrack was the obvious choice as a starting point, but as none could be allocated the Maultier was pressed into use.

The basic truck was provided with a fully armoured cab, engine cover and hull. On the hull roof a 10-barrel launcher known as the 15-cm Panzerwerfer 42 was placed. This launcher had 270째 of traverse and 80째 of elevation, and it fired the 10 rockets in a ripple. The army ordered 3,000 of these conversions with the understanding that production would eventually switch to the sWS when production totals of the latter allowed, which they never did (apart from a small batch of prototypes). The first of these Maultiers was used during 1943, and had a crew of three. The rockets were carried in the launcher, with reloads in compartments along each side of the lower hull, A machine-gun was usually carried. Some of these armoured Maultiers were produced without the launcher and were used to carry extra rockets for the launcher vehicles, and some of these were used by units other than the Nebelwerfer batteries as front-line ammunition supply vehicles, although their armour was proof only against small arms projectiles and shell splinters.

Specification

Maultier (rocket launcher)

Crew: 3

Weights: 7100 kg (15,653 lb)

Powerplant: one 3.6-litre 6-cylinder petrol engine

Dimensions: length 6.0 m (19 ft 8.2 in); width 2.2 m (7 ft 2.6 in); height 2.5 m (8 ft 6 in)

Performance: maximum road speed 38km/h (30 mph)

Armament: see text

Youtube Film

Soviet APCs did far more than merely transport infantry to the battlefield. Their BMP series (Boevaia Mashina Pekhoti, or Combat Vehicle Infantry) was the first infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) in the world. Infantry could now fight from within the vehicle, and some BMPs mounted a powerful gun and carried antitank missiles, enabling them to provide effective close infantry support.

The BMP-2 IFV has lived up to its reputation in various armed conflicts due to its high combat efficiency, simple design, and reliability. A modernisation programme for the BMP 2 IFV is offered in accordance with contemporary requirements to combat efficiency. The programme is aimed at improving main specifications of the combat vehicle: fire power, protection, mobility, and operational efficiency by making full use of long-term expertise in developing and manufacturing IFVs and their derivatives, as well as their combat employment.

The modernisation programme envisages introduction of the following systems:

• BPK-3-42 gunner's sight with a laser illuminator, or the gunner's sighting-observation system with thermal imaging unit and the TKN-AI commander's vision device with laser active pulse illuminator, which considerably increases target detection range especially at night and in poor visibility conditions;

• AG-17 automatic grenade launcher;

• upgraded fire control system;

• additional armour protection, add-on skirt, and anti-mine belly panels;

• Iney automatic fire-fighting system;

• UTD-23 multi-fuel turbo-charged engine;

• TVK-1 versatile driver's device;

• fitting the KBM-2 air-conditioning sytem. The IFV modernisation can be carried out either at the manufacturing plant or customer's repair facilities with the assistance of the manufacturer's skilled experts. The upgraded vehicles are provided with corresponding warranty and service maintenance, performed by the manufacturing plant for mass production vehicles.

Basic specifications

Combat weight, t 14.46+2%

Crew + troops 3 + 7

Maximum speed, km/h 65

Cruising range, km 550-600

Power plant type multi-fuel turbo-charged diesel designation UTD-23 power, hp 360

Armament: main 30mm 2A42 cannon auxiliary 30mm AG-17 automatic grenade launcher 7.62mm PKT machine gun missiles Konkurs-M

Ammunition allowance, rds: 2A42 cannon 500 in two belts AG-17 automatic grenade launcher 250 in one belt PKT machine gun 2,000 in one belt Konkurs-M missiles 4

Armament stabiliser 2E36-5 in two planes

VARIANTS

A number of product improvements were made to the BMP-2 in the late 1980's.

• BMP-2D: Variant with add-on plate armor, but which cannot swim
• BMP-2E: Variant with 6-mm steel plates added and track skirts
• BMP-2K: Command variant with additional radio
• BVP-2: Czech production BMP-2

Is the BMP-2 a match for Western IFVs?

Since Marder, Warrior&BradleyA2 are immune to 30mm API frontally while the improved versions of these ICVs have all-round immunity to this round ...the BMP-2 can only use ATGMs which can only be used stationary and take a long time to hit the target.

The main guns on each of these ICV can destroy the BMP-2 armor at long range and fire very fast, so they can defeat this weapon before ATGM reaches them.

The question whether the BMP2 is a match of Western IFVs is only applicable if the vehicles were being misused as light tanks instead of troop carriers!

The role of the IFV was (originally) to support its dismounted ground troops in the assault, but the battlefield's become so lethal to light vehicles that there is some question whether a commander would place his precious IFVs into a position where they could profitably deploy their weapons. That's why the Marder and Bradley both lost their rifle ports- it'd be insane to be that close to the enemy and have the troops still packed inside.

After saying that, considering that Western MBTs now top 70 tons and only the French have a serviceable cannon-armed light tank (though with wheels), the poor oversized IFV could find itself pressed into duty as a light tank because no alternative was available. In those circumstances battles between BMP-2s and Bradleys could happen with unpredictable/unpleasant results.

Basic frontal armor for Bradley and Warrior is about 3-5cm while the Russian 30mm gun could do 20mm@ 60° @ 700m so they would be vulnerable but the upgraded versions were 6-12cm KE resistance and the Brits and Americans don't send their ICVs into battle without the add-on ...even the AIFV features 4-6cm KE armor.

The up graded 30mm APDS could do 25mm @ 60° @ 1500m so the front of the AIFV and the sides of the upgraded Brads Warriors & Marders should be vulnerable at short range....

The problem is there's little add on armor for the BMP to boost it to counter the increasing power of western ammo , only 10mm spaced steel around the flanks of the vehicle ...that's all!

As for BMP-1 armour they have tested 20mm AP at point blank range in Sweden. No penetration in the front.

The Russians have sent the BMP into battle and have hardly upgraded it at all except for a thin spaced plate over the side armor...it's not a big priority for them.

The Marders 20mm gun could penetrate BMP front armor @ 1km. must be better ammo I guess.

For the western 20 mm, we have in fact five # ammo (20x82; 20x102; 20x110; 20x128 and 20x139) and two levels of performances. The 20x82/20x102/20x110 API can't go thru 15 mm RHA at 400 m but the 20x128/20x139 APHC can defeat 50 mm at the same distance. So the frontal armor of the BMP can survive a 20x102 API, but not a 20x128.

And the 30 mm APDS "kerner" round is a Navy round and not usable in the BMP2/3 gun. So much for upgrading...

Steven Zaloga quotes Russian sources as being able equal to 30mm RHA frontally and the armor is reportedly equal to BMP-1 .

The 20-30mm guns in NATO could penetrate 40-60mm armor @ 1 km making the BMP vulnerable to every hit.

The innovations in electrical engineering that Edwin Howard Armstrong created were so essential that several of his inventions are still used in radar and radio equipment. His most important achievement was the invention of wide-band frequency modulation (FM) radio.

Edwin Howard Armstrong was one of radio's more prolific inventors, developing the regenerative, superheterodyne, and frequency modulation (FM) circuits. On active service in World War I, he made his several patents freely available for American military use in both world wars.

Born in New York City on 18 December 1890, Armstrong was attracted to radio as a boy. He had built sophisticated receivers by the time he graduated from high school in 1909. He studied electricity with Michael Pupin at Columbia University, graduating in 1913 (the same institution awarded him an honorary doctorate of science degree in 1929). In 1912 he developed the radio regenerative, or "feedback," circuit for signal amplification using three-element vacuum tubes. This initiated two decades of patent litigation with inventor Lee de Forest, which ended with the Supreme Court finding for de Forest in 1934. Despite the ruling, most engineers concluded then and since that the invention was clearly Armstrong's.

During World War I, Armstrong served in the Army Signal Corps, beginning as a captain in mid-1917 and promoted to major early in 1919. He was stationed in France, working on intelligence and aircraft radio. Just prior to the armistice of 1918, he invented and later patented what became known as the superheterodyne circuit to tune high frequency spectrum bands. For each of his key inventions, Armstrong conducted countless laboratory experiments to work out the kinks in his circuits. He strongly favored physical evidence over mathematical theory.

In 1920 Armstrong invented the superregenerative circuit that would make twoway mobile radio systems possible. During the late 1920s and through the 1930s, Armstrong developed a system of FM radio, patented in 1933 and first offered to the Radio Corporation of America (RCA) for further development. When RCA focused instead on television, Armstrong and a small band of followers experimented with and perfected FM (thanks to his considerable income from his earlier invention royalties and his dividends as the largest RCA individual shareholder). Commercial FM broadcast service began in the United States in 1941.

Armstrong began work for the Signal Corps again in 1939, developing an FM mobile radio. He undertook further projects at no salary in 1940-1941. With America's entry into World War II, Armstrong waived royalties on his inventions for any equipment manufactured for military use. He continued to work on FM two-way radio systems and radar research during and after the war. Armstrong's research helped to develop and perfect circuits and equipment to help in detection and identification; strategic and tactical ship, short, and air communications systems; and weapons control and guidance systems. In the early 1950s he perfected a system of FM multiplex communications. During his career Armstrong published a score of technical and many general audience papers on all aspects of radio communication. But despite a lifetime of awards and honors, frustrated by the costs of an extended patent battle (chiefly with RCA) over rights to FM circuits, Armstrong took his own life in New York City on 31 January 1954.

Sources

Armstrong, Edwin H. 1940. "Evolution of Frequency Modulation." Electrical Engineering (December): 485-493.

Lessing, Lawrence. 1956. Edwin Howard Armstrong: Man of High Fidelity. Philadelphia: J. P. Lippincott.

Lewis, Tom. 1991. Empire of the Air: The Men Who Invented Radio. New York: Harper-Collins.

Morrisey, John W., ed. 1990. The Legacies of Edwin Howard Armstrong. New York: Radio Club of America.

Ragazzini, John R. 1954. "Creativity in Radio: Contributions of Major Edwin H. Armstrong." Journal of Engineering Education 45 (October): 112-119.

About Me and this Blog.

My name is Chris Ballance. I am a Georgia Tech grad working for a biomass boiler OEM in Norcross, Georgia. I started this blog in August 2005 as a writing experiment. I had an urgent need to confirm all the engineer stereotypes about the bad spelling and grammar. This blog has given me no end of opportunities to do that.

War brings out the absolute worse and best in human beings, and screen writers, directors and actors are no exception. The research required to write a blog about "Hollywood" tanks has forced me to watch some of the worst films ever made. I am not a film critic. I have no desire to be film critic, but I reserve the right to cast stones when required. Having written this, you will find that I am surprising forgiving and generally silent when it comes the accuracy of armored vehicle props and related phyical and visual special effects work. I must state again that this blog is just a writing experiment. In time something may become of this work, but I already have a day job.

Truck AMO-F-15 (АМО-Ф-15), first Soviet-made truck

After the First World War and Russian Civil War, it was 1924 before truck production of any kind restarted in Russia, and then on a very small scale at Moscow's AMO factory and at Yaroslavl (outside Moscow). These first vehicles for the red Army were:

AMO-F-15 a 1.5 ton light truck

Ya-3 a 3 ton medium truck

By 1941 most of the truck park of both the Soviet military and the Soviet Union in general was distinctly American in origin. In the late 1920s and early 1930s, US engineers, particularly from the Ford and Hercules Motor Companies, helped to design and build the largest of the USSR's automobile and truck factories, particularly the plants at Gorkiy ("Gorkiy Auto Zavod", or GAZ) and the expanded AMO plant in Moscow, which became ZIS. These two factories produced the Ford AA light truck, which became the GAZ-AA, and the American Autocar 10-ct Lorry, which became the ZIS-5. These "second generation" trucks were both 6x2 configuration: that is, they had a total of six wheels on 3 axles, but only the front axle was powered. In the late 1930s both trucks were redesigned as 6 x 4 vehicles, as the GAZ- AAA and ZIS-6, with four-wheel drive. A small number of the ZIS-32 4x4 light car, a sort of Russian jeep, were also produced.

In June 1941 the Red Army had 272,600 trucks of all kinds, almost all of which were one of the following:

GAZ-AA 6x2 1.5 ton capacity

GAZ-AAA 6x4 1.5 ton capacity

AMO-3 4x2 2.5 ton capacity

ZIS-5 6x2 3 ton capacity

ZIS-6 6x4 3 ton capacity

YaG-4 6x2 5 ton capacity

Since by far the majority were the distinctly American-looking GAZ and ZIS types, the Germans took to referring to the "Russki Ford" or "Fordski" enemy trucks.

The other large group of vehicles in the Soviet formations were fully tracked cargo or towing vehicles collectively referred to as "tractors". The Soviet army was the only army in the world that planned or attempted to have so much of its heavy equipment towed by tracked vehicles in the 1930s. Unfortunately, the tractors in question were almost all variants of the US Holt designs, which were commercial vehicles designed for farm or construction work. As such, they were very slow, unarmored, and not really rugged enough to survive combat conditions. In addition, the majority of the tractors were used in the civilian economy, largely on the collective farms, and only to come to the military on mobilization. In 1941, many of these vehicles never showed up, or showed up just in time to be overrun by German advances. The chronic lack of hauling vehicles led directly to the huge losses in artillery and tanks in 1941: damaged vehicles and guns simply could not be moved.

Once the war started for the Russians, the big truck factories converted almost entirely to tank production. This meant that all Russian motorized and mechanized units suffered from shortages of trucks and transport until late 1943, when the flood of US lend lease vehicles virtually re- equipped the entire Red Army. By 1945, the American vehicles were so commonplace that "Studebekker" had practically entered the Russian language as a generic word for "military truck"!

The Best Artist of Soviet Vehicles Found HERE

Soviet trucks

Fedorov "Avtomat" - the first practical SELF-LOADING-RIFLE ever adopted

The earliest attempts to make a Russian SLR were similar to those elsewhere: a standard bolt-action rifle was modified to enable gas pressure to operate the bolt. Like other designs, the Roshchepei rifle used many parts of the original, and the gas operating system was grafted onto the weapon. A somewhat questionable source described his rifle as follows:

The rifle of Roshchepei reportedly excelled in its simplicity and compactness, and in this sense evoked great interest. But the incompetent Tsarist officials, bending low before the West without faith in the ability of the Russian people, did not appreciate the talented originality of this simple soldier who worked as a regimental blacksmith. The Russian warriors were not fated to hold the rifle invented by Roshchepei in their hands.

In actual fact, if the weapon had any commonality with other designs of the time, it was heavy, awkward to operate, and probably prone to breakages, all of which would probably have ruled out service use in any event, with or without the intervention of the "incompetent Tsarist officials" who were the scapegoats for the Communists for many years.

The real originator of the SLR in Russia has to be Vladimir Grigorevich Federov (1874-1966), who, unlike many gun designers and gunmakers, had significant military training. He was initially trained at the Mikhailovsky Artillery School, then served as a platoon commander in the First Guards Artillery Brigade (1895-1897), at the end of which he was selected for training at the Mikhailovsky Artillery Academy. Part of the course was concerned with ballistics. Following graduation he went on to join the Weapons Section of the Main Artillery Commission, where new weapons were both designed and examined.

He also had the opportunity of working with S. I. Mosin, director of the Sestroretsk Weapons Factory in St. Petersburg, and it seems that it was then that Simonov converted a Mosin-Nagant rifle to semiautomatic operation. Publication of his book on SLR theory and design appeared in 1907. Initial work concentrated on activating a bolt, but he then progressed to a design with a recoiling barrel with two locks that engaged in lugs in the breech block. This was the 1907 model, which had some serious faults. Despite this, there was enough in the design for the authorities to recommend that Federov and his coworker, Vasily Alekseyevich Degtyarev (1879-1949), later a famous weapon designer in his own right and creator of the Degtyarev range of machine guns, move permanently to Sestroretsk, where much improved working conditions were available.

By 1911 Russia was well in advance of the rest of the world in the development of the SLR, and a competition was arranged in which the Federov rifle was to be tested against the Tokarev rifle and against designs from FN of Liège (the Karl A. Brauning weapon) and from AB Svenska Vapen och Ammunitionsfabriken of Stockholm (the Carl Axel Theodor Sjogren design). The Federov prevailed, based upon the fact that the weapon had fired thousands of rounds with only minimal problems.

Like many others after him, Federov did not rest on his laurels, and by 1912 he had made up his mind that the 7.62mm x 54mm R Model 1891 cartridge was far too powerful for use in an SLR. He opted for a less potent load, to reduce recoil (and improve operation from the point of view of the user), increase barrel life, improve feeding, and most importantly improve fire control. Rather than design a cartridge specifically for the purpose, he looked around until he chose the Japanese 6.5mm x 51SR round, a reduced charge round. The new weapon, which was issued from 1916 onward, was known as the Model 1916 Avtomat, and it was used for troop trials by the 189 Izmail'skiy Infantry Regiment.

The weapon weighed 9.7 pounds, was 40.9 inches long, and fired the Japanese cartridge at 2,664 fps, a package that was remarkable for its time. The rifle was fed from a 25-round magazine and operated on the short recoil system. The locking system was very similar to the original 1911 design.

After the Russian Revolution of 1917, Federov was still in favor, and the Soviet leadership wanted no fewer than 9,000 of his new Avtomat rifles. Production was impossible, but he made every effort, as did Degtyarev, to get the order fulfilled. The two finally decided that the only way to get the job done was to partly machine, partly hand finish the weapons; the powers that be authorized this method and reduced the initial demand to 150 weapons. Once a total of 200 had been reached, a further order for 300 more was issued. By almost superhuman effort, Federov and Degtyarev managed to get production flowing, and by the end of 1920, production was running reliably at 50 rifles per month. Production was finally stopped on 1 October 1925 after 3,200 Federov Avtomats had been produced.

The Federov was well in advance of its time, being easily handled, reliable, and effective as a military weapon. Unfortunately it was also too delicate for military operations in the long term, as dirt soon caused jams, and fully automatic fire accuracy was poor. Nevertheless the weapon was reissued in the Russo-Finnish War of 1939-1940, so it proved to be the father of all subsequent military assault rifles.

The real secret lay in the correct choice of cartridge. The secret of controlled automatic fire lay in the weight of the weapon: too light, and there would be no control of where the second and subsequent rounds went (see "U.S. Self-Loading Rifles" and the M14); too heavy, and the weapon could not be readily carried and used by the soldier whose weapon it was intended to be. However, very few people really appreciated what role the weapon had in battle. Infantry officers were accustomed to firing at ranges up to 1,200 yards (a range at which even snipers are inaccurate and at which the bolt actions of the time could only deliver vaguely aimed mass fire), which led to the same situation in Russia as happened in the United States nearly half a century later. The true value of the small-caliber weapon was not really appreciated in Russia until experience in World War II taught the Russians that assault rifles were intended to provide covering fire at medium ranges (up to 300 or 400 yards at most) and killing fire only at short range. The day of the long-range, individually sighted shot was to pass, but it took a long time in coming.

Federov and Degtyarev combined their efforts in the years 1921 and 1926 and produced a number of automatic weapons, none of which were adopted for service, but this effort laid down the principle of a family of weapons that the Russians would embrace wholeheartedly in ensuing years. The man who benefited from this idea was Mikhail Timofeyevich Kalashnikov (1919-), whose family of weapons has gone down in history.

Russia has produced a number of exceptional rifle designers, and following Federov came Tokarev, who was master armorer of the 12 Don Cossack Regiment in the late 1880s. By 1907 he was training at the Officer's Rifle School in Oranienbaum and then in 1908 went to Sestroretsk, where he must have come into contact with Federov and Degtyarev. His first rifle design was tested against the Federov rifle in 1911. By 1921 his rifle design had been modified, and it came to the attention of the Main Artillery Commission, which was "of the opinion that the proposed Tokarev system and its further development for the small calibre cartridge is desirable." However, despite the mention of the small-caliber round, Tokarev was looking at full-caliber (chambered for the 7.62mm x 54mm R cartridge) SLR designs at the time.

The Artillery Commission set up a competitive testing of the available SLR designs, of which the survivors after the first cut were Federov's 7.62mm version of his 1916 rifle, Degtyarev's modified 1916 design, and the Tokarev recoiling-barrel design. All three weapons could be loaded directly into their magazines by the standard five-round Mosin-Nagant cartridge clip. The result of the test was that all of the rifles were too complicated and were lacking in strength and reliability for military consideration. Six months was allowed to the three designers to improve their offerings and to make up two identical weapons for testing.

The next series of tests was held in June 1928. Federov led a group of designers known as the Inventor's Collective (consisting of F. V. Federov, V. A. Degtyarev, D. V. Uraznov, A. I. Kuznetsov, and I. I. Berukov) to present an improved recoil-operated Federov rifle and two other rifles with the Degtyarev gas-operated system. Tokarev persisted in offering his recoil-operated weapon. The test results were considered, and all four weapons withstood the main phase of the tests. However, no order for production could be given, as none of the rifles was in finished form. The collective also brought into question Tokarev's action, suspecting that it might be vulnerable to barrel bending during combat operations.

By the time the third set of tests took place the competitors were reduced to the Degtyarev and Tokarev rifles. Degtyarev offered a design with a fixed five-round magazine. Tokarev's rifle came with detachable five- and 10-round magazines. As both weapons were still demonstrating previous faults, they were rejected. Furthermore, it was then ordered that recoiling-barrel weapons were unsuitable for the military, and so Tokarev was forced to start work on the design of a gas-operated rifle that included a new bolt and bolt carrier system.

The collective decided that the Degtyarev model was to be put into production, and eventually 500 rifles were ordered. This was to be known as the 7.62mm SLR Model 1930, and troop testing was done in 1933 by the Moscow Proletarian Rifle Division. At the same time Sergei Gavrilovich Simonov (1894-) appears on the scene.

Simonov had presented his first SLR design for the 1926 trials and was rejected. He had made a significant error in mounting the gas-operating system on the side of his rifle, resulting in a wide weapon that was difficult to strip in operational conditions. He redesigned the weapon and in 1931 offered a gas-operated system with a bolt locked by a vertical sliding wedge. In no time this weapon became the favorite to replace the Model 1891 Mosin- Nagant rifle for the Russian Army.

It was adopted on 22 March 1934 as the 7.62mm Simonov Automatic Rifle Model 1936 (or the AVS36). By 1938 the weapon was in mass production, and in 1938 and 1939 a total of 34,681 of these rifles were made.

The ways of bureaucrats are always hard to fathom, and nowhere more so than in the decision of the Soviet People's Commissar for Defense to announce another SLR competition. The reasoning behind it seems to have been that the Simonov was overly complicated, easily jammed by dirt and powder residue, and prone to mishandling by soldier users. There may have been some persuasive lobbying by Tokarev, because when the latest tests were over, although none of the weapons submitted were ready for adoption, the Tokarev might be reworked quickly enough to make it a viable proposition. Tested again (against the Simonov and a weapon designed by one Rukasishnikov), the Tokarev was declared the winner, and the rifle was adopted in early 1939 as the Model 1938 Tokarev SLR (SVT38).

There can be little doubt that Stalin was acting behind the scenes in this matter, for he was a devotee of the SLR. The Simonov- Tokarev conflict has all the hallmarks of political infighting, and the production comparison between the two weapons is quite striking. The Tokarev needed much more workplace area for its manufacture, many more machines, more manufacturing time and increased costs; was heavier and needed more raw materials for its production; and had 25 more parts than the Simonov. Vannikov wrote that

Simonov had created a lighter model with the nest automatic mechanism. But, as a consequence of carelessness by the designer himself in manufacturing the rifle, it showed somewhat poorer results than Tokarev's design. Being a member of the commission, I was in charge of accepting new designs into the arsenal of infantry weapons-an exacting and responsible matter. For example, as opposed to other types of equipment, a rifle is usually accepted for use over many years, since subsequent changes in its design unavoidably require both complicated measures in organising combat training in the army . . . and also long and expensive technological reequipping of industry. This is especially true as it relates to the self loading rifle, and it was therefore clear to me that the best of the models was Simonov's. It had not failed because of design failures, but for production reasons . . . which could be eliminated completely.

So despite its obvious manufacturing shortcomings, the SVT38 was accepted by the Russians, with the approval of Stalin himself. In the field there were problems, partly due to dust and sand, especially with new weapons from the factory heavy with protective grease. These problems occurred at high and low temperatures, which meant most of the year in central Russia. There were also reports of gas regulation, and the magazine was not well locked into the rifle and could fall out. Although a redesign was planned, the sudden invasion by the Germans meant that the SVT40 was on issue for the rest of the war. Nearly 1.4 million SVT40s were produced (of which 51,000 were the sniper rifle version), and it was only in 1945 that production was discontinued.

The problems with the rifle and the cartridge led to a number of studies of alternatives, one of which looked at a rifle firing the 7.62mm x 25mm Tokarev pistol cartridge, and another looked at the possibilities with the 7.62mm x 39mm M43 cartridge. The prospects with the latter cartridge looked good, but the question of its origin has puzzled many historians and weapons experts for years. The first argument is that the Russian cartridge developed from the German 7.62mm x 39mm kurz cartridge, which was fired by the StG44 range of weapons. Russian sources, however, argue that they had started design work on the new cartridge as early as 1939. Whatever the truth of the matter, they had certainly looked at a 5.45mm cartridge in 1939, a project that was shelved for the duration of World War II.

The problem facing all designers of small-caliber cartridges is that of balancing caliber and propellant charge to produce a cartridge with better ballistics than a pistol cartridge but with less recoil than a full-blown rifle cartridge. Further, in 1939, and even in 1945, the value of the smaller calibers was not yet known, with most armies being fond of the cartridges at about .3 inch in caliber. Further, most armies were still wedded to the concept of aimed shooting out to 600 or even 800 yards, which seemingly demanded a big cartridge. These full-load cartridges were utterly unsuitable for the assault rifle concept, being uncontrollable on automatic.

Once the decision had been made to go ahead with the 7.62mm x 39mm cartridge, Sergei Gavrilovich Simonov (1894-1986), who had designed a weapon to fire the 7.62mm x 25mm cartridge, now designed and produced his SKS45 carbine. Earlier versions had been produced but were not field-tested until about 1944. The new cartridge, however, was perfect for the basic design, which was to be used at ranges of up to 400 yards. Some of the new rifles were sent to the front, and reports were favorable. This resulted in adoption as the SKS45. The one problem was that the magazine capacity was only five or 10 rounds, so the SKS45 was not an assault rifle, merely an SLR.

At the same time that the SKS was being field-tested, Kalashnikov appeared on the scene as well. After an apprenticeship during which he must have been in contact with Degtyarev, Simonov, and Sudayev, or at least their weapon designs, he produced a 7.62mm self-loading carbine that was tested in 1944. The SKS45, however, won the contest, and Kalashnikov's design was rejected. At the time Kalashnikov was only 25 years old, and as is the case with all good engineers, he went back to his drawing board to rethink his idea.

The result was the AK47, a weapon that is still in service, albeit somewhat modified today. It has spawned a family of arms based on the original design, and the success of the basic design is due to a number of factors. Perhaps the first is the ease of use, which appeals to all soldiers who are armed with the weapon. It handles well, is easy to strip and assemble, and is (assuming there is a basic regime of cleaning applied) very reliable. There is criticism of the noise made by the safety catch/change lever, but this is offset by the heavy bolt, which goes a long way to ensuring that every round is properly seated in the chamber. Further, the fitted cleaning rod and a strict regime of cleaning that was standard in the Soviet Army ensure that jams are a rarity.

Various modifications were made to the original AK47, including a folding stick version, but the main changes were in the manufacturing process. The Russians experimented with machined receivers but went back to the original sheet metal receiver quickly, and the new design was known as the AKM. In the early 1970s a new cartridge was developed (the 5.45mm x 39.5mm M74), which may have been due to studies made of the U.S. 5.56mm x 45mm round (otherwise the U.S. .223 Remington). So the AKM was redesigned to fire this cartridge, and the new weapon became the AK74. If anything, this rifle is more reliable than the AKM, because the cartridge rim of the M74 round is thickened to allow the even heavier bolt of the AK74 to extract the round without tearing through the rim, another problem with the M16.

The Russians had thus arrived at the same conclusion as the European and U.S. military: the smaller caliber round did more damage out to its optimum range of about 300 or 400 yards and allowed assault rifles to be built that could fire the round on full automatic. By the late 1960s all modern armies were equipping, or planning to equip, with small-caliber rifles, and the Russians had taken the lead in producing a rifle that today is still regarded by combat soldiers as the most reliable weapon available. It is this reliability that causes many soldiers to comment that they would rather have an AK74 or even an AK47 or AKM in preference to their issue rifle-be it a variant of the M16, the Israeli Galil, the German G3, or the British SA80.

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HNLMS De Zeven Provincien of the Royal Netherlands Navy in Hamburg, Germany. This frigate is is the first ship of the De Zeven Provincien class of air defence and command frigates.

Netherlands

Laid down: 1 September 1998

Launched: 8 April 2000

Commissioned: 26 April 2002

General characteristics

Class and type: De Zeven Provinciën class frigate

Displacement: 6,050 tonnes (full load)

Length: 144.24 m

Beam: 18.80 m

Draft: 5.18 m

Propulsion: 2 propeller shafts, controllable pitch propellers

2 Wärtsilä 16V6ST diesel engines, 8.4 MW each

2 Rolls Royce Spey SM1C gas turbines, 18.5 MW each

4 GEC Alsthom Paxman diesel-generators, 1650 kW each

Speed: 30 knots

Complement: 174 (202 incl. command staff)

Armament: 5×8 Mk41 vertical launch system with 8 cells each

Standard armament: 8×4 Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile and 32 SM-2 IIIA surface-to-air missiles

Another 8 cell MK41 VLS can be added

2 Goalkeeper CIWS guns

2 quadruple Harpoon anti-ship missile launchers

1 Oto Melara 127 mm/54 dual-purpose gun

2 Oerlikon Contraves 20 mm machine guns

2 twin MK32 Mod 9 torpedo launchers with Raytheon MK46 Mod 5 torpedoes

The De Zeven Provinciën class frigates are highly advanced air-defense frigates in service with the Koninklijke Marine (Royal Netherlands Navy). This class of ships is also known as LCF (Luchtverdedigings- en commandofregat, air defense and command frigate). These ships were built for air-defense but they also have weapons onboard to attack surface and submarine targets, for example: the Harpoon Missile and Mk. 46 Torpedoes. The ships are similar to the German Sachsen class frigates. For anti-air the ships are equipped with several weapons. The primary weapon is the Mk41 Vertical Launch System, each with 32 Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile and 32 SM-2 IIIA. During ballistic missile tests in the Pacific ocean near Hawaii, the SMART-L long-range air and surface surveillance radar proved its range capability: 2000 km max.[citation needed] Because of these results, the Dutch Government has decided to equip all four ships with about 8 Standard SM-3 per ship.[citation needed] Plans to equip some of the Zeven Provinciën-class frigates with a total of 32 BGM-109 Tomahawk cruise missiles have existed but these were shelved in May 2005.

The ships are classified as frigates by the Netherlands Navy but internationally are classified as destroyers as this better fits their armament and role. In most Dutch websites and books they are referred as frigates but in international websites and books referred as destroyers.

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Development of the SD-1400X started in 1939, led by Dr. Max Kramer of the DVL (German Aviation Research Institute / Deutsche Versuchsansalt fuer Luftfahrt). While the PC 1400X shared the FuG-203 Kehl III / FuG-230b Strassburg guidance package, it had a unique gyro package for roll stabilisation, and an entirely different airframe design.

Kramer's early experiments with a SC 250 and annular tail surfaces were sufficiently successful, that funding was made available for the adaptation of the PC 1400 Fritz, a 3,000 lb class armour and concrete piercing bomb. The new SD-1400X used a cruciform wing, angled at 28 degrees, and a segmented annular tail, with electromagnetically activated spoilers for pitch and yaw control. Experiments with pneumatic actuators are claimed to have caused problems at low ambient temperatures. The annular tail arrangement was intended to introduce drag at high speed and thus limit weapon terminal velocity, which proved an early impediment to accurate aiming - nevertheless the weapon's terminal velocity was transonic. Part of the tail was electrically insulated to act as a conformal antenna for the radio link.

The spoiler arrangement was situated between boundary layer fences, and six pairs were used, two pairs in the guidance control loop for pitch/yaw steering, and one pair for roll stabilisation, controlled by the rate gyro. Claimed trial Circualr Error Probable was 100 ft.

The machined steel bomb penetrator casing contained three internal tubes with 320 kg of Amatol explosive, impact fused. The weapon was usually carried on a ETC 2000/XII rack.

The SD-1400 delivery profile involved typically overflight at 20,000 ft AGL, bomb release after throttling back, with the bombardier then using a joystick to steer the bomb until impact. The operator tracked the weapon through the standard Lofte 7 bombsight, using a smokeless white/blue tail mounted flare or lamp, after problems with flare smoke plumes and green or red flares. Flare reliability is claimed to have been a problem. The guidance package was powered by a 24 Volt battery, this including the command link receiver, roll stabilisation loop and actuators. The weapon was to designed to be compatible with a range of FuG-203/FuG-230 datalinks up to the Kehl IV variant. An attempt to adapt the Duran/Detmold FuG 208/238 wire guidance system was abandoned. The guidance package was externally heated by air from the launch aircraft's deicing system prior to launch.

The Fritz-X proved to be a devastating weapon when used effectively. During the September Salerno landings, the Brooklyn class light cruiser USS Savannah was hit by a Fritz X, killing nearly 200 crew members and putting the ship out of use for 12 months. Shortly after, the Queen Elizabeth-class battleship HMS Warspite sustained heavy damage after taking three hits by Fritz X rounds, which caused the penetration of six decks and blew a hole in the hull, putting the ship out action until the Normandy landings and killing nine crew. The 42,000-ton Italian Vittorio Veneto class battleship Roma sank after fires caused by two Fritz-X hits ignited her magazines, killing over 1600 sailors, including the CIC Admiral Carlo Bergamini. Other casualties included the Brooklyn class light cruiser USS Philadelphia, which lost several crew to a Fritz-X attack, and the Bellona class light cruiser HMS Spartan off Anzio after a Fritz-X attack. The Fritz-X was also claimed to have been used to destroy the bridge at Pontaubault, to stop the advance of the US 6th Armoured Division, in August 1944 [click for more ....]. .

Most reported deliveries of the Fritx-X were flown by Do-217K-3 or He-177 aircraft of KG 40 and KG 100.

The Fritz-X was a far more effective weapon than the Hs-293, but was shorter ranging and demanded higher operator skills. Around 1400 Fritz-X rounds were build, with around half expended in trials and training.

VBCI Armored Personnel Carrier
(GIAT Industries)

GIAT demonstrated the latest VBCI prototype at Eurosatory 2006. The 8x8 VBCI infantry combat vehicle developed by GIAT will replace the AMX-10P in French Army service and will operate as part of the medium weight force with other wheeled vehicles, such as the VBL and AMX-10RC. The VBCI will equip heavy forces, accompanying the Leclerc tanks. By 2008, GIAT is scheduled to deliver the first batch of 85 vehicles. The complete program calls for the production of 700 vehicles (550 VCIs and 150 VPCs). Two versions of the vehicle are currently under production - the VCI Infantry Fighting vehicle, equipped with a manned turret with a GIAT 25mm M811dual feed cannon and 7.62mm coaxial machine gun. The VPC will be armed with an FN Herstal Arrows-300 class remote controlled weapon station mounting a 12.7mm machine gun and the SIR regimental information system. Also installed are a gunner's thermal sight provided by Thales and a panoramic sight for the commander, delivered by Sagem and Galileo.

The command vehicle is the second version of VBCI. It is fitted with SIT-V1 information consoles, linked to the Army Tactical Information Network and Regimental Battle Management System (BMS) manufactured by EADS and Thales. The vehicle is equipped with an Arrows-300 remote controlled MG turret operated from within the vehicle. A consortium set by GIAT and Renault, which also provides the engines, is producing the first 85 from planned 700 vehicles on order for the French Army. The first five vehicles (four IFVs and one command vehicle) is undergoing qualification trials since March 2005, the process is scheduled to complete by the end of 2007. Three versions are produced for these trials. In 2004 the VCI Rank infantry carrier was completed and in 2005, the VPC command vehicle and VCI ERYX/Milan anti-tank and mortar vehicle variants. The vehicles are currently undergoing tests in urban and cross country environments. Production will start in 2007 and peak with 100 vehicles per year. The VBCI is equipped with Michelen tires with run-flat systems.

Other versions of the VBCI are also considered by GIAT, including an anti-tank missile carrier, mobile gun system (armed with a 120mm smoothbore gun and autoloader), and a 40mm CTA International cannon, firing the 40mm Case telescope Weapon System which is also considered the weapon of choice for the futuristic EBRC electric-drive wheeled vehicle.

In April 2009 the Spanish engineering company GTD has teamed with the French company Nexter to modify the French VBCI, proposed a future replacement for the BMR-600 currently in service with the Spanish Army. The Spanish Army plans to phase out the 6x6 BMRswith a new 8x8 platform. The BMR was built by Enasa (currently owned by Iveco) since 1979. The vehicle will be designed for a basic gross vehicle weight of 28 tons. It will be able to carry 11 soldiers including the crew. The vehicle has also been offered to Greece, during a visit of a high ranking French delegation in April 2009.

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A SECTION OF THE MOLOTOV LINE IN PLAN VIEW

Almost immediately after the defeat of Poland in October 1939 Stalin set in train plans to fortify the new border with Hitler's Third Reich, defences that were later to become known as the Molotov Line. One of the most important sections of the new line was around the Bialystok salient that jutted into German-occupied Poland. This was extremely vulnerable to attack and as such was heavily fortified. The defences were constructed all along the border and often in full view of the Germans. The lower lip of the salient ran along the River Bug and on the far bank a series of fortifications were built as part of the Brest Fortified Region.

A typical section of the line ran north from the historic town of Drohiczyn, and is shown here. At the leading edge along the river were a series of outposts and passive anti-tank and anti-infantry obstacles including tank traps and barbed wire. Behind these were a number of 'centres of resistance' (before 1938 these were referred to as battalion defence regions) along the main defence line that consisted of as many as five strongpoints in a chessboard pattern. Each strongpoint was 2-3 km wide and a similar depth. These were made up of a series of mutually supporting bunkers and field works armed with a mixture of machine guns, anti-tank guns and artillery.