BY Major RICHARD W. ROAN USMC
Roebling's Amphibian: The Origin of the Assault Amphibian
The amphibian tractor played a decisive role in contributing to
the United States Marine Corps' amphibious victories in World War
II. In a letter sent from Okinawa in 1945 Marine Major General
Roy S. Geiger called amphibian tractors, "the work horses of the
Marine Corps." He went on to state, "Except for the 'amtracs' it
would have been impossible for our troops to get ashore on
Tarawa, Saipan, Guam or Pelelieu without taking severe, if not
prohibitive losses." In 1944, then-Commandant of the Marine
Corps, Lieutenant General Alexander A. Vandegrift wrote, "Our
success in the bitter fighting at Tarawa was due in a
considerable measure to the magnificent performance of the
amphibian tractor."
Since World War II, the amphibian tractor, now known as the
assault amphibian vehicle, has become a mainstay of the Marine
Corps' amphibious arsenal and will remain in the vanguard of
amphibious assaults well into the twenty-first century. Despite
the assault amphibian vehicle's significant role in Marine Corps
history and modern operations, the story of the origin of this
venerable amphibian remains largely untold. The purpose of this
study is to examine the earliest years of the assault amphibian
vehicle and identify those factors that led to the vehicle's
fortuitous introduction to the Fleet Marine Force in 1941.
This study of the origin of the Marine Corps' amphibian vehicle
begins with a general overview of the Marine Corps' development
of the amphibious doctrine during the two decades preceding World
War II. The study then turns to the remarkable story of the
eccentric inventor of the amphibian tractor, Donald Roebling. The
diverse factors that influenced the pioneering efforts that led
to Donald Roebling's achievement are reviewed. The narrative then
concludes with a discussion of the joint efforts of the Marine
Corps and Donald Roebling to produce the vehicle that would
eventually spearhead the Marine Corps' march across the Pacific
in World War II.
INTRODUCTION
The United States Marine Corps' assault amphibian vehicle stands
today as the world's only seaworthy battlefield transport. There
is no more obvious symbol of the Marine Corps' unique capability
of maneuver on a battlefield including open sea, plunging surf
and the entire spectrum of land terrain. The course of the United
States' victorious march across the Pacific in World War II would
have been decisively more difficult and prolonged without the
assault amphibian vehicle's predecessor, the amphibian tractor.
And, it is difficult to imagine a modern exercise of the Marine
Corps' primary task of amphibious assault without the routine
participation of assault amphibian vehicles. The assault
amphibian vehicle has become a commonplace and reliable workhorse
of amphibious operations. Yet, the history of the assault
amphibian vehicle, particularly the vehicle's remarkable origin,
remains largely untold.
The purpose of this study is to focus on the origin of the
assault amphibian vehicle in an attempt to fill in the many gaps
in the story of the earliest years of one of the Marine Corps'
most venerable performers. It is hoped that this story will help
to provide a special historical perspective that may contribute
to the ongoing debate over the future of amphibious vehicles.
In addressing the origin of the Marine Corps' amphibian, a
remarkable and unlikely tale unfolds. The factors leading to the
arrival of the first amphibian tractors on the beaches of
Guadalcanal in 1942 include some of the same developments that
placed United States Marines, and not U.S. Army soldiers, in the
vanguard of amphibious warfare. The Japanese seizure of central
and southern Pacific islands at the close of World War I made
Japan the primary focus of United States naval war planning and
study. These efforts led to the recognition of the requirement to
aggressively seize advanced bases for the United States Navy.
Prior to this recognition the Navy's primary emphasis had been on
the traditional task of defending the Navy's overseas facilities.
The Japanese threat shifted the emphasis from defense to offense.
At the same time, the United States Marines emerged from World
War I searching for a meaningful and unique mission worthy of
ensuring the Corps' continued institutional existence. Evolving
from a decade of threatened army encroachment, skeletal budgets
and vigorous, sometimes rancorous, Corps-wide conflict and
debate, the unique mission of offensive amphibious warfare became
the Marine Corps' proprietary domain and primary task. The newly
focused Marine Corps spent the 193Os developing and practicing an
amphibious doctrine that until the last months before World War
II dangerously lacked the hardware to transform theory into
reality.
Joining Japanese imperial expansion and the U.S. Marine Corps'
proprietary acceptance and development of amphibious warfare as
factors leading to the origin of the amphibian tractor was an
enigmatic personality totally unrelated to the Pacific, the
Marine Corps or the business of war. The story of the robust
eccentric millionaire Donald Roebling, inventor of the amphibian
tractor, adds one of the most unusual chapters to a Marine Corps'
history full of unusual characters. Finally, the amphibian
tractor would never have been conceived without the disastrous
Florida hurricane of 1928. Japanese aggression, Marine Corps
innovation born of institutional paranoia, an eccentric
millionaire and a devastating hurricane; these were the diverse
ingredients that joined to produce the Marine Corps' amphibian
vehicle.
CHAPTER 1
Assault From The Sea
The Japanese threat in the Pacific and the U.S. Marine Corps
could not have been further from Donald Roebling's thoughts as he
handcrafted his first amphibian Alligator in 1935. Reobling's
efforts were directed at creating a land-sea hybrid capable of
negotiating swamps and flooded areas to rescue hurricane
victims.1 Yet, when the Marine Corps fortuitously discovered
Roebling's Alligator in 1937 it appeared as an unsolicited and
hitherto unconceived solution to one of the most basic problems
of the Corps' newly developed amphibious doctrine. Marine Corps
thinkers had not seriously sought a truly amphibian vehicle like
Roebling's Alligator. The emphasis of innovation and progress had
been on the development of surf-capable landing boats.2 But, the
unexpected arrival of Roebling's amphibian vehicle perfectly
complemented the existing landing boats and provided an ideal
tool to help support the Marine Corps' amphibious doctrine. This
doctrine that awaited the addition of the Alligator in the late
1930s grew from two decades of U.S. Navy and Marine Corps
historical and strategical innovation and evolution.
A new world order emerged from the First World War. The central
European powers were defeated and the eyes of America shifted
westward to the threat of Japanese expansion in the Pacific.
Japan had seized Germany's central Pacific islands in the
Marshalls, the Carolines and the Marianas and threatened
territorial expansion in China, Southeast Asia and the South
Pacific. Japanese expansion clearly challenged United States
Pacific influence and threatened exposed American trade routes to
China and the Philippines. By 1920, Japan had become the primary
focus of United States Navy war planning.3
A Pacific Ocean war with Japan had been considered by the United
States War Department prior to World War I in a contingency plan
entitled War Plan ORANGE, one of a series of color coded global
plans. By 1921 the Navy Department had thoroughly reviewed War
Plan ORANGE and drafted a new plan for war with Japan that
envisioned the Japanese using her island territories and a
powerful new Navy to challenge the U.S. Navy in the Central
Pacific. A key element of the new War Plan ORANGE was the
recognition by Navy Department planners that the defeat of Japan
would require the offensive seizure of island bases held by the
Japanese as well as the more traditional task of defending the
Navy's advanced Pacific bases. This shift from the exclusive
consideration of defending naval bases to offensive seizure of
new bases was a conceptual watershed that naturally suggested a
significant new role for the Marine Corps. In January 1920 Chief
of Naval Operations Robert E. Coontz advised the Marine Corps
Commandant, Major General George Barnett, that War Plan ORANGE
had become the primary target of Navy planning and suggested that
the Marine Corps develop plans, programs and forces to support
the plan for war with Japan. The Admiral urged General Barnett to
focus particularly on the roles of advanced naval base seizure
and defense.4 However, General Barnett was reluctant to throw his
Marine Corps on the War Plan ORANGE bandwagon. Despite the
Commandant's reservations the leaders of the U.S. Navy as well as
a growing number of progressive Marine Corps officers continued
to urge the Marine Corps' full participation in the advanced base
issue, with particular emphasis on offensive amphibious
operations.
Much like the amphibian tractor that would unexpectedly appear in
1937, the United States Marine Corps in 1920 was a solution
waiting for a problem, an answer waiting for the right question.
Upon General Barnett's end of tour as Commandant of the Marine
Corps in June 1920, the progressive thinking John A. Lejeune
assumed the Marine Corps' top post. General Lejeune was keenly
attuned to the Marine Corps' traditional requirement to fight for
institutional existence and believed that the development of
unique (from the U.S. Army) capabilities and the assumption of a
unique task or mission best addressed this requirement. This
theme was expressed by Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak in his
book, First To Fight as he wrote, "The continuous struggle for a
viable existence fixed clearly one of the distinguishing
characteristics of the Corps."5
General Lejeune saw the Marine Corps' service with the U.S.
Fleet, and particularly the role of supporting War Plan ORANGE
requirements for advanced naval base seizure and defense, as the
key to ensuring the Corps' institutional survival. In 1922,
Commandant Lejeune wrote to the General Board of the Navy
concerning the Marine Corps' peacetime duties and wartime
missions and asserted that, "the primary war mission of the
Marine Corps is to supply a mobile force to accompany the fleet
for operations on shore in support of the fleet." He called this
wartime role the, "real justification for the continued existence
of the Marine Corps."6 General Lejeune's views were contested by
many of the Marine Corps' senior leaders, including the
Commanding General of the Marine Corps' base at Quantico,
Virginia, Brigadier General Smedley D. Butler. General Butler
believed that the Marine Corps' future was best directed as far
away from the Navy as possible.7 Throughout the decade of the
1920s (Lejeune was Commandant from 1920 to 1928) General Lejeune
exercised his persuasive leadership to shift a growing number of
Marine officers to his belief on the primacy of the mission of
service with the Navy. He generated annual fleet landing
exercises during the 1922 - 1925 period and gradually increased
the emphasis on landing operations at the Marine Corps Schools at
Quantico. The Commandant's efforts set the stage for the Marine
Corps' development of the amphibious doctrine during the 1930s.
Among General Lejeune's many contributions to the development of
the Marine Corps' role as the nation's arm of amphibious power
was his inspiration of the eccentric prophet of amphibious
warfare, Lieutenant Colonel Earl Hancock Ellis, USMC. Born in
Luka, Kansas in 1880, Ellis graduated from high school and
enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1900. His exceptional
intelligence and professional zeal led to his commissioning as a
second lieutenant in 1901. Remaining unmarried and totally
immersed in his Marine Corps duties, Ellis soon gained a
Corps-wide reputation as a brilliant staff officer and a driven
workaholic. These qualities earned him the respect and protection
of senior officers willing to overlook his alcoholism, fiery
temper and impatience.8 Captain Ellis attended the Naval War
College during the 1911 - 1912 term and was invited to remain as
an instructor on the staff of the college. While serving at the
Naval War College, he condensed a series of lectures into a paper
entitled "Naval Bases; Location, Resources, Denial of Bases,
Security of Advanced Bases." This 1913 study addressed one of
Ellis' principle passions, the problems and techniques of
offensive and defensive amphibious operations against the
Japanese in their Pacific island strongholds. Ellis' paper helped
to establish his reputation as one of the Corps' leading
theorists. He joined a handful of progressive Marine Corps
officers, including John H. Russell and Eli K. Cole, already
noted for their pioneering work in operations with the fleet.
Major Ellis later served with distinction in France in World War
I, receiving a Navy Cross for his duty with the 4th
Marine Brigade. In 1921, the recently appointed Commandant of the
Marine Corps, John A. Lejeune, summoned Major Ellis to the newly
formed Division of Operations and Training at the Marine Corps
headquarters and tasked him to study and write about the Marine
Corps' role in the Navy's War Plan ORANGE.10
Major Ellis' response to General Lejeune's assignment was a
document that became a prophetic beacon for modern amphibious
warfare doctrine. Revising his 1913 Naval War College study,
Ellis concentrated on the tactics of seizing advanced coaling and
repair stations for the Navy in the Japanese-held coral atolls
and volcanic islets of the Caroline, Marshall and Mariana
Islands. His conclusions marked a break with tradition in that no
longer would the primary role of Marines be to defend advanced
naval bases; instead Marines would attack and seize these bases
from a determined enemy.11 The mission of the Marine Corps would
be offensive amphibious operations.
As the result of the wholesale failure of the British amphibious
campaign at Gallipoli in the Dardenalles during World War I, the
majority of the world's military theorists largely discounted
amphibious assaults as being too difficult, indeed almost
impossible.12 Major Ellis confidently insisted that amphibious
operations against the Japanese could be successful and provided
the theoretical tactical blueprint for these operations. While he
underestimated the fighting qualities of the Japanese soldier (he
wrote, reflecting the values of his time, "Our advantages over
the enemy will be those generally common to the Nordic races over
the Oriental; higher individual intelligence, physique and
endurance"),13 Ellis prophetically sketched the Marine Corps'
Pacific island battles of World War II with uncanny accuracy. The
product of Ellis' study, entitled "Advanced Base Operations in
Micronesia, 1921" was accepted in total by General Lejeune, and
later, the Navy Department. The study was approved as Operation
Plan 712D, an annex to the Navy's War Plan ORANGE.14 Earl Ellis'
far-sighted work would become the blueprint for the Marine Corps'
amphibious warfare planners of the 1930s.
Shortly after completing his work for General Lejeune in 1922,
Major Ellis' services were requested by the fledgling Office of
Naval Intelligence (ONI). ONI earmarked Ellis to join a team
being formed to spy on the Japanese in the Far East. The team
members would be posing as participants in scientific and
photographic expeditions. Earlier in his career, Ellis had
performed intelligence work for the Marine Corps in Central
America. General Lejeune granted Ellis a leave of absence to work
for ONI and Ellis headed for the Pacific. Soon breaking away from
ONI's control, Ellis made several failed personal attempts to
penetrate the Japanese-held islands in the central Pacific via
Australia, posing as a merchant for the Hughes Trading Company in
New York. After being hospitalized in Yokohoma, Japan, in August
1922 for "severe nervousness" (probably alcoholism) and
generating genuine concern from U.S. Navy and diplomatic
officials because of his boasting and erratic behavior, Ellis
disappeared sometime in the autumn of 1922. Earl Ellis
mysteriously died at Parao in the Caroline Islands on 12 May
1923. Most authorities attributed his death to excessive
alcoholism; some accused the Japanese in the Carolines of foul
play. The U.S. Navy pharmacist mate sent to Parao to investigate
and recover Ellis' remains, Lawrence Zembsch, was later killed
along with his wife in an earthquake that devastated Yokohama,
Japan, on 1 September 1923.15 In his history of the Marine Corps,
Semper Fidelis, Allan R. Millett reports that Earl Ellis'
mysterious death made him a, "martyr in the eyes of World War II
Marines and gave his studies the historic glow of prophecy."16
It would be a mistake to assert that General Lejeune and Earl
Ellis immediately and radically redirected the efforts of the
Marine Corps toward amphibious warfare during the 1920s. More
correctly, they provided the intellectual foundation for the
fruition of the amphibious doctrine in the 1930s. The Marine
Corps did, however, execute limited tests of Earl Ellis' theories
during the 1920s. Under the progressive leadership of amphibious
warfare pioneers Colonel Eli K. Cole, USMC, and Colonel Dion
Williams, USMC, Marines participated in fleet landing maneuvers
in the Caribbean during the years 1922 through 1924 and in Hawaii
in 1925. These exercises were invaluable in providing an
opportunity for most of the Corps' field grade officers (senior
leaders during World War II) to experiment with amphibious
tactics and equipment. Ironically, the primary benefit of these
exercises was to demonstrate that Earl Ellis' amphibious concepts
remained woefully theoretical and that the equipment of the day
(particularly landing craft) fell short of the minimum
requirements of amphibious assaults.17 By 1926, the Marine Corps'
involvement in Haiti, China and Nicaragua consumed the energy and
manpower of the Corps and postponed serious progress in the
development of amphibious doctrine to the next decade.18
In 1933 the institutional existence of the Marine Corps was
challenged by the U.S. Army under the leadership of General
Douglas MacArthur. Like generations of soldiers before and after
him, General MacArthur coveted the funds provided to the Marine
Corps while questioning the need for a separate service whose
land combat role appeared similar to that of the Army.19 Like
General Lejeune before him, the Marine Corps' fifteenth
Commandant, General Ben H. Fuller, responded by touting
amphibious warfare as a unique and meaningful raison d'ĂŞtre
for the Corps. Fuller was vigorously supported and encouraged by
his assistant, General John H. Russell, a long-time visionary and
proponent of amphibious warfare as the Marine Corps' primary
mission. The result of this joust with the Army was the Navy
General Board's first-time official recognition of the seizure
and defense of advanced bases as the Marines' most important job.
Equally important, General Russell successfully spearheaded the
approval by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of
the Navy of a new official designation for the Marine Corps'
forces operating with the Navy fleet - the Fleet Marine Force.20
The Fleet Marine Force became a nominal reality on 7 December
1933 with Navy Department Order 241.21 With exactly eight years
left before Japanese bombs would fall on Pearl Harbor, the Marine
Corps had a basic amphibious theory (Ellis' plan) and a new name
for its amphibious forces. But the Corps still lacked the
detailed doctrine, specialized equipment and manpower to make the
amphibious idea a reality.
Commencing in 1931, a special committee of staff members from the
Marine Corps' Field Officers School at Quantico, Virginia, began
work on a much needed manual addressing the doctrine of
amphibious operations. Work on this ground-breaking manual
proceeded slowly through late 1933 when progress was interrupted
by the mobilization of the 7th Marine Regiment for
duty in Cuba. The mobilization brought the departure of several
of the key officers on the manual writing committee. Major
General James C. Breckinridge, USMC, then the Commanding General
of the Quantico base, recommended to the Commandant that all
instruction at Quantico's officer schools be discontinued and
that the schools' staff and students join together and devote the
entire 1933-1934 academic year to the production of a manual for
landing operations. The Commandant agreed with General
Breckinridge and classes were discontinued on 14 November 1933.
Banding together in a dynamic confluence of creativity and
teamwork, the assembled officers of the Marine Corps Schools
produced a landmark manual. Guided by many of Earl Ellis'
prophetic concepts, they codified the basic doctrine, tactics and
equipment of amphibious warfare into a document that, almost in
its original form, continues to guide the amphibious doctrine of
the modern Marine Corps. By June 1934, the "Tentative Manual for
Landing Operations" was essentially complete. A mimeographed copy
of the Tentative Manual was used as a training manual at the
Marine Corps Schools during the 1934-1935 academic years. During
subsequent years, the Tentative Manual experienced numerous minor
revisions and was officially published as the "Landing Operations
Doctrine, U.S. Navy 1938," in November 1938.22
By 1938 the Marine Corps had produced, in the "Tentative Manual
for Landing Operations," a solid doctrinal manual for amphibious
warfare. This manual supported the Corps' primary mission of
amphibious warfare, approved by the Navy Department in 1933. But,
the Marine Corps still lacked the basic amphibious tools to make
the amphibious doctrine a reality. In 1935, the Marine Corps
commenced a series of Fleet Landing Exercises (FLEX's) designed
to test the theories of the newly codified amphibious doctrine as
well as to provide practice in landing operations desperately
needed by both the Navy and the Marine Corps. Each year from 1935
through 1941, elements of the Fleet Marine Force joined with a
Navy task force to conduct landing operations in the Caribbean or
the Pacific.
In the excellent review provided by Lieutenant General Holland M.
Smith in several 1946 issues of The Marine Corps Gazette, General
Smith documented the activities, lessons learned and deficiencies
of the annual Fleet Landing Exercises of the 1935-1941 period. An
obvious highlight of General Smith's review is his repeated
emphasis on the major deficiency of the Marine Corps' amphibious
capabilities - the shortage and total inadequacy of landing
craft.23
By 1940, Andrew Higgins had provided a family of exceptionally
capable personnel and vehicle transporting landing boats that
began to partially alleviate the Marine Corps' landing craft
problems. However, even the remarkably capable Higgins boats
floundered in high surf, grounded on sand bars, avoided coral
reefs and debarked their precious cargo of Marines at the point
of greatest crisis, the water's edge. The Marine Corps clearly
required truly amphibious vehicles or craft to successfully
tackle the most obvious challenge of amphibious assaults - the
uninterrupted transition from sea to land. Despite this widely
recognized requirement, virtually no practical progress in the
development of amphibious craft was made by the Marine Corps
prior to the eve of World War II. There were two interesting
experimental amphibian tanks, one American and one British, that
were considered but rejected. In the 1924 fleet maneuvers at the
Caribbean island of Culebra, the Marines tested a seven-ton
amphibian tank, mounting a 75 millimeter gun, built by Walter
Christie of the Sun Shipbuilding Company of Chester,
Pennsylvania.24 Christie's tank was propelled in the water by two
boat-type screws and had an odd suspension system consisting of
both tracks and rubber tires. The vehicle had performed
impressively in demonstrations on the Hudson and Potomac Rivers
but proved to be unseaworthy and dangerous in the open sea and
surf at Culebra. The Christie Tank was discarded by the Marine
Corps and the concept was later sold to the Japanese.25 Walter
Christie subsequently gained considerable repute for his
innovative development of land tracked vehicle suspension
systems. In 1931 the British War Office tested an amphibian
vehicle similar to the Christie Tank. The Vickers-Armstrong Light
Amphibious Tank weighed 2.17 tons and mounted a 30 caliber
machine gun. The British amphibian was reliable and relatively
fast on land (27 mph) but slow (3.7 mph) and unsteady in the
water. It was rejected by the British and never tested by the
United States but purchased and successfully developed by the
Soviet Union as a river-crossing amphibian.26 The
Vickers-Armstrong Tank was the forerunner of the Soviet World War
II T-37 and modern PT-76 amphibious tanks.
The failure of the Christie Amphibian Tank and the
Vickers-Armstrong Light Amphibious Tank to meet the need of the
Marine Corps for a truly seaworthy and versatile amphibian
vehicle left a void that persisted almost to the final days
preceding World War II. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s the Marine
Corps' development of a true amphibian lagged as the result of
scarce military funding and more vigorous interest in the
development of landing boats, amphibious ships and modernization
of the Corps' basic land fighting weapons. While conflict with
Japan appeared increasingly imminent as war ignited in Europe in
1939, the Marine Corps still lacked a suitable amphibian vehicle
to support the amphibious doctrine it had developed over the
previous two decades.
By the end of the 1930s the United States Marine Corps had
claimed a solid foundation of institutional longevity with the
official acceptance and development of the amphibious mission.
Through the pioneering efforts of John A. Lejeune, Earl H. Ellis,
John H. Russell and a generation of young officers serving at the
Marine Corps Schools at Quantico, the Marine Corps faced the
threat of amphibious war in the Pacific with a clear, detailed
and valid amphibious doctrine. The Fleet Landing Exercises of the
late 1930s prepared thousands of Marines and sailors for the
unique challenges of attacking and defeating a determined enemy
from the sea. But, without decisive and rapid advances in the
tools of amphibious warfare, particularly amphibious landing
craft, the Pacific war against the Japanese promised to be
supremely difficult.
CHAPTER 2
Donald Roebling's Alligator
There could be no more unlikely Marine Corps hero than Donald
Roebling. The rotund, eccentric inventor of the amphibian tractor
is rightly credited for making a decisive contribution to his
nation's victory in World War II. Yet his creative success was
achieved totally beyond any military influence. For this reason,
Donald Roebling's gift of the amphibian tractor to the Marine
Corps just in time to spearhead the Corps' amphibious assaults in
the Pacific is often, and quite correctly, attributed to
fortuity, fate, or blind luck. But Donald Roebling's invention
was a product of a uniquely American experience. Donald Roebling
and his Alligator were progenies of eighteenth-century
immigration, the boom of American industrialism, entrepreneurial
capitalism, and Yankee ingenuity. The fortunate meeting of
Roebling's Alligator and the war-bound United States Marine Corps
was a uniquely American accident.
John Augustus Roebling, Donald Roebling's great grandfather,
immigrated to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania from Muhlhausen, Prussia
in 1831. Born in Prussia in 1806 and educated as a civil engineer
at the Royal Polytechnic Institute in Berlin, John Roebling soon
gained employment as an engineer with the state of Pennsylvania.
He rapidly built a reputation for dependability, industriousness,
and brilliant engineering innovation. By the early 1840s,
Roebling had embarked on a career as one of America's pioneer
builders of suspension bridges. Among others, he designed and
built highway bridges over the Monongahela River in Pittsburgh
and the Ohio River in Cincinnati as well as America's first cable
suspension railroad bridge over the Niagara River. John
Roebling's landmark contribution to the science of bridge
building was his invention of high strength steel wire. In 1848
he moved his family to Trenton, New Jersey, and built a factory
for the production of steel wire and other steel products.
Roebling became famous as the "father of the modern era of the
great suspension bridge," and represented the epitome of the
confident, enlightened American engineer. In 1869, Roebling,
assisted by his son, Washington A. Roebling, commenced his most
challenging project, the Brooklyn Bridge. In June of 1869, John
Roebling's foot was crushed when he was struck by a ferryboat
while surveying the Brooklyn Bridge site. Tragically, he died
several weeks later of tetanus as the result of the freak
accident.
Washington Augustus Roebling, Donald Roebling's grandfather, was
born in Saxonburg, Pennsylvania in 1837. He graduated from
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute in Troy, New York, in 1857 and
became his father's principal assistant. In 1861 he enlisted as a
private in the Union army. He soon gained a commission as an
officer and served most of the Civil War as a colonel of
engineers under Irvin McDowell. Throughout the rest of his life,
Washington Roebling enjoyed being called "The Colonel." Upon the
death of John A. Roebling, Washington Roebling assumed the
leadership of the Brooklyn Bridge project. He completed the
bridge in 1883 and is credited as the "Builder of the Brooklyn
Bridge." During the 1870s, Washington Roebling built his father's
Trenton wire rope manufacturing plant into an industrial giant.
The company, by then called John A. Roebling's Sons, became the
foundation of the fabulous wealth of the Roebling family.
Washington Roebling built a new factory for the expanding company
eight miles south of Trenton on the Delaware River and
established a model town around the factory. The town of
Roebling, New Jersey, remains today as a symbol of the height of
American industrialism.1
John A. Roebling II, Donald Roebling's father, was Washington
Roebling's most trusted son and assistant. He was born in 1867
and, like his father, was trained as an engineer at Rensselaer
Polytechnic Institute. Near the turn of the century, Washington
Roebling's health failed (the elder Roebling suffered from severe
decompression sickness, "the bends", resulting from extensive
underground work while building the caissons for the Brooklyn
Bridge) and John assumed direction of the Roebling family's
financial interests.2
The wartime contribution of the Roebling family during World War
I foreshadowed the decisive role that Donald Roebling would play
in winning the Second World War. In November 1915, the John A.
Roebling's Sons plant in Trenton suffered two fires in one week
with damages valued at over $1,000,000. The fires followed months
of threats from prominent Germans that American industrial plants
would be crippled. Immediately after the Roebling plant fires, an
American German-language newspaper, the Brooklyn Frei-Presse, ran
the headline, "RENDERED HARMLESS - Factory Building of Roebling
Company Reduced to Ashes - Was Used to Produce Wire for the
Allies." Actually, John A. Roebling's Sons' production capacity
was only briefly handicapped by the fires. The company soon
geared up and expanded to play a major role in the fight against
German submarines. During the war, the Roebling Company produced
over 95 million feet of steel rope and coupling devices to build
submarine nets for American and European harbors and the
framework for the 1918 North Sea Mine Barrage. The North Sea Mine
Barrage was credited with destroying at least twenty-three
U-Boats and putting an end to the menace of German subs. In 1931,
the German biographer, Wilhelm Anener, wrote of the Roebling
participation in the defeat of Germany, "To us it appears tragic
fate that this emigrant's cleavage of nationality exerts its
effect long after his time. With Roebling the Father- land not
only lost an engineering genius and a great industrialist; but
that which he created has worked damagingly against Germany in
that war materials in enormous quantities have been produced."3
By the end of World War I, John A. Roebling II had concentrated
his efforts on banking and the management of the Roebling family
fortune, leaving the leadership of the John A. Roebling's Sons
plants to other family members. John and his wife, Margaret,
built a sprawling estate called the Boulderwood Mansion in
Bernardsville, New Jersey, only thirty miles west of John's
office complex in New York City. He also built a lovely winter
home in Lake Placid, Florida, thirty-five miles northwest of Lake
Okeechobee in the Florida Everglades.4 By the 1920s, John A.
Roebling II had become a nationally noted financier,
entrepreneur, philanthropist, and humanitarian.
John Roebling's son, Donald, would never be accused of being a
conformist. Throughout his life Donald Roebling, the creator of
the amphibian tractor, would walk a singular path of sublime
eccentricity. Donald Roebling was born in New York City on 15
November 1908. Young Roebling, strong-willed, temperamental, and
overweight, spent his childhood in the luxury of his parents'
Bernardsville, New Jersey, mansion. Shipped off to the Stuyvesant
Prep School in Warrenton, Virginia, he demonstrated little
scholastic aptitude and, upon graduation, chose not to follow the
Ivy League college routine of his wealthy peers. In August 1927,
the nineteen year old Roebling enrolled in the Bliss Electrical
Academy in Washington, D.C. In April 1928, he was asked to leave
the Bliss Academy as the result of conflicts with his teachers.5
Finding life with his parents in New Jersey difficult, the
restless Donald Roebling travelled to Clearwater, Florida, in
1929 to live with his cousin, Margaret MacIlrane. A year later,
the twenty-two year old Roebling, undoubtedly subsidized by his
father, established the Roebling Construction Company, a business
specializing in the building of luxury homes. In 1930, Donald
Roebling purchased a choice seven-acre tract of beachfront
property in Clearwater. Inspired by his fiancĂŠe, Florence
Spottiswood Parker of East Orange, New Jersey, he built a
fifteen-room English Tudor mansion with a large outdoor pool and
surrounding gardens. The mansion, awkwardly named Spottis Woode
after Miss Parker, was of fortress proportions and strength and
for decades was considered to be the largest, best built
single-family dwelling on Florida's West Coast.6 Near the
mansion, Roebling constructed an expensively outfitted machine
shop to satisfy his personal passion for tinkering. This machine
shop and the nearby swimming pool and Gulf of Mexico would be the
birthplace of Donald Roebling's first amphibian vehicle, the
Alligator.
Once established in his new Florida home, Donald Roebling and his
bride (he married Florence Parker in October 1932) set-tled into
a pleasant life of wealth and leisure. Roebling loosely managed
his construction company while devoting himself to his hobbies:
stamp collection, HAM radio operation, and mechanical tinkering.
He quickly gained local repute for his eccentricities,
particularly his unusual physical appearance. Roebling was
addicted to candy and other sweets and his extraordinary physique
featured over 400 pounds of body weight primarily concentrated in
his enormous buttocks and thighs. Roebling was so large that the
local cinema created a special seat for the wealthy patron by
removing the armrest from two normal seats. In the early 1930s,
the rich and eccentric Donald Roebling could not have been more
removed from the world of the United States Marine Corps. He was
a most unlikely candidate to play a pivotal role in the momentous
years of worldwide conflict that lay ahead.
The initial catalyst for the chain of events that led to Donald
Roebling's invention of the amphibian Alligator was an act of
nature, the Great Lake Okeechobee Hurricane of 1928.7 As noted
earlier, Donald Roebling's father, the financier John A. Roebling
II, owned a lavish winter retreat in Lake Placid, Florida, just
thirty-five miles northwest of Lake Okeechobee.
Lake Okeechobee, 730 square miles of largely swampy water in the
central Florida Everglades, lies forty miles inland from West
Palm Beach, Florida. Throughout the 1920s, unscrupulous Miami
real estate speculators aggressively developed new towns on the
banks of Lake Okeechobee, promising the new residents, mostly
northerners, that the traditional flood control problems of the
region had been solved.8 On 16 September 1928, a monster
hurricane packing 128 m.p.h. winds crashed into the eastern
Florida coastline at West Palm Beach and rushed inland toward
Lake Okeechobee. Already, the same hurricane had left 600 people
dead in Guadeloupe and 300 people dead and 200,000 homeless in
Puerto Rico. The storm swept across Lake Okeechobee and drowned
the newly established lakefront hamlets. The boom towns of Belle
Glade, Pelican Bay, and Clewiston were demolished. 1,836 area
residents were drowned. Some particularly unfortunate folks were
killed by fatal water moccasin bites as the snakes and the people
struggled to reach the same trees and housetops.9 Nearly all the
loss of life and the $25,000,000 in damages occurred in the Lake
Okeechobee area.10
At the time of the hurricane a group of John A. Roebling's
employees were working at Roebling's estate at Lake Placid. These
men formed a team and for several days following the hurricane
assisted in rescue efforts in the nearby Lake Okeechobee towns.
Most likely because of the participation of his own workers in
the relief effort as well as concern over his own Florida
property, John A. Roebling became keenly interested in the
disaster. When his team of workers returned from their mission
they reported on the details of the rescue operation. They
highlighted the fact that many victims drowned in the hours and
days following the hurricane because rescuers could not traverse
the miles of flooded, muddy morass created by the storm. One of
the men suggested that a vehicle or boat that could travel on
land and through mud, and also negotiate deep water, would have
helped immeasurably. They all agreed that hundreds of lives could
have been saved if only the rescuers had been given the means to
reach the victims in time.
John A. Roebling, humanitarian, financier, and shrewd
businessman, recognized the need, and perhaps a potentially
lucrative market, for a land and water dual capability rescue
vehicle.11 Fourteen years before Marine amphibian tractors would
first crash through the surf at Guadalcanal, the concept of an
amphibian vehicle rose out of the hurricane flooded swamps of
Lake Okeechobee.
John Roebling's son, Donald, became the agent for transforming
the idea of an amphibious rescue vehicle into reality. It remains
unclear when or how the senior Roebling first suggested the
amphibian concept to Donald. But by early 1932 the twenty-three
year old Donald Roebling had completed his mansion in Clearwater
and possessed both the means and the time to address a serious
project. John Roebling clearly recognized the requirement to set
his eccentric and hitherto unproductive son to work on a useful
and possibly profitable activity. He challenged his mechanically
gifted son to build a reliable and commercially useful amphibious
rescue vehicle, a vehicle that, in his words, "would bridge the
gap between where a boat grounded and a car flooded out."12 He
offered to pay all the design, development, and production costs
and the father-son deal was sealed with a handshake. Donald
Roebling accepted his father's challenge with gusto. The
amphibious vehicle became the primary focus of young Roebling's
creative energy for the next eight years.
By January 1933, Donald Roebling had his amphibious vehicle
production project in full gear. He hired Earl De Bolt, Warren
Cottrell, and S.A. Williams as his technical staff and set them
to work in his personal machine shop at Spottis Woode, his
Clear-water estate.13 From the outset of the project, Roebling
focused on the two major problems of building a durable and
versatile amphibious rescue vehicle. First, the vehicle had to be
light enough to provide safe buoyancy in the water yet sturdy
enough for rugged land use. And second, the propulsion systems
for water and land could not be so complicated or space-consuming
as to render the vehicle useless. Donald Roebling's innovative
approach to these problems provided the conceptual point of
departure that resulted in the success of his vehicle where
previous attempts at amphibious vehicles had failed. He answered
the weight problem with a relatively new product, aluminum.
Aluminum was much lighter than steel yet provided adequate
strength and rigidity for land operations. The second problem,
the issue of dual propulsion, was addressed with truly
revolutionary imagination. Roebling proposed to devise a single
propulsion system for both land and water rather than trying to
somehow simplify and coordinate two separate propulsion systems.
The result was Roebling's creation of a paddle-wheel track
sys-tem, a commercial crawler type tractor track affixed with
cleats that would work much like the paddles of a paddle-wheel
boat when the vehicle was waterborne.
Roebling's innovations solved the most basic duality problems of
his amphibious vehicle but created new problems of their own.
Because aluminum was a new material, the technology of working
with aluminum was undeveloped. Metalworking tools proved
ineffective on the soft aluminum and traditional methods of steel
welding and riveting were not applicable. Roebling's crew
pioneered aluminum working methods as they designed new shapes
for aluminum rivets and discovered that woodworking machinery was
far superior to metalworking tools in manipulating the soft
metal.14 The cleated paddle-wheel tracks were equally
troublesome. While the track system on Roebling's first 1935
prototype produced 25 m.p.h. on land, it was heavy and flimsy and
quickly broke apart on rough terrain. And the straight
paddle-wheel cleats, set straight across the track, were
extremely inefficient in the water, producing only 2.3 m.p.h. in
the water in the 1935 prototype.15 These track problems would
require two more years of modification and experimentation before
the vehicle could approach an acceptable level of reliability.
Donald Roebling's original goal was to produce a useful
amphibious rescue vehicle in time for the 1933 hurricane season,
less then a year after he commenced the project.16 He soon
discovered that this goal was unrealistically optimistic.
Finally, by 1935, Roebling and his team loaded their first
vehicle aboard a flatbed truck to take it beyond the confines of
Spottis Woode for serious testing. So far, the vehicle had seen
only the rigors of Roebling's driveway and swimming pool. The
next proving ground would be a small lake nearby where Roebling
had built a work shed for housing and repairing his vehicles.
Donald Roebling and his men proudly called their invention the
"Alligator." All of Roebling's subsequent models of amphibious
vehicles would retain this apropos label. Later, generations of
amphibian tractor and assault amphibian Marines would proudly
claim the Alligator as their unit mascot and symbol.
As previously noted, Donald Roebling's original 1935 Alligator
was somewhat of a disappointment. The vehicle weighed 14,350
pounds, was 24 feet long, and was powered by a 92-horsepower
Chrysler engine. It would achieve 25 m.p.h. on land, but the weak
tracks invariably broke within just a few miles. And the biggest
disappointment of all was the Alligator's 2.3 m.p.h. speed and
lack of maneuverability in the water. Still, Donald Roebling
offered to sell his original model to both the U.S. Coast Guard
and the American Red Cross. Neither agency accepted his offer.17
Unwillingly to concede defeat, Donald Roebling stripped his first
Alligator, Model I, down to the ground and vigorously pushed
forward to the task of building an improved version, Model II. In
the many rebuilds of his Alligator, Roebling's free-wheeling
engineering philosophy encouraged maximum innovation and
creativity. Few blueprints or engineering drawings were made
during the development phase (1933-1937) of the first four models
Click here to view image of the Alligator.18 Donald Roebling and
his team of technicians preferred the workshop to the drawing
board. They used commercially available materials, hardware,
machinery, and engines whenever possible while focusing their
creative energies on making the vehicle simple and rugged.
The Model II Alligator was completed in April 1936. This vehicle
was a vast improvement over the Model I. The new Alligator
weighed 13,110 pounds, 2,240 pounds less than the Model I, and
was equipped with a lighter 85-horsepower Ford V8 automobile
engine. The Model II travelled at 18 m.p.h. on land, 6 m.p.h.
slower than the Model I, but its 5.45 m.p.h. water speed more
than doubled the performance of the Model I. The improved water
performance of the Model II was produced primarily by Donald
Roebling's idea of changing the paddle-wheel cleats to a diagonal
setting across the track. The new cleat angle also helped to
increase stability and steerabillty in the water.19 The Model II
Alligator demonstrated the mechanism's vast potential for
improvement and motivated the Roebling team to continue the quest
for a truly practical amphibious rescue vehicle. Almost as soon
as the Model II was built and tested, it was torn apart to begin
work on the Model III.
The Model III Alligator was finished and tested in September
1936. It was 310 pounds lighter (12,800 pounds) than the Model II
and went slightly faster on both land and sea. But the Model III
was still plagued with the same inefficient suspension system
that handicapped the original Model I. The tracks continued to
break after minimal land use and the Model III developed the
troublesome tendency to get hung up on the bank when entering or
Click here to view image exiting the water.20 A new track system
had to be found before the Alligator could reliably save lives in
Florida's hurricanes.
Finally in 1937, Donald Roebling and his dedicated assistants
produced an Alligator that came close to their expectations. The
Model IV Alligator was four feet shorter in length than the
earlier models, thus reducing the length and weight of the
tracks. And, most significantly, Roebling installed a totally new
suspension system. His new system featured roller bearings built
into the chain track rather than bogie wheels, and fixed idler
blocks to replace idler wheels. This new suspension system was
lighter, much more durable, and produced smoother performance on
embankments than previous models. In the Model IV Alligator
Roebling also replaced the straight paddle-wheel cleats with
curved cleats, producing enhanced water speed and
maneuverability. It was the diagonally affixed curved cleat and
paddle-wheel principle that produced the Alligator's only patent.
Several years later, at the height of World War II, Donald
Roebling patriotically turned over his patent, No. 2138207, with-
out fee, to the government.21 The 1937 Model IV Alligator was
lighter, faster in the water, more reliable on land, and more
maneuverable than any of its predecessors. The new Alligator
weighed only 8,700 pounds (5,650 pounds less than the 1935 Model
I) and had a water speed of 8.6 m.p.h. and a land speed of 18
m.p.h.22
Donald Roebling saw the Model IV Alligator as having real
commercial potential. He decided not to tear down this 1937
version of the Alligator like he had earlier models. He retained
the Model IV and commenced work on building a second copy. He
billed his father $100,000 for the first Model IV Alligator. This
fee covered the costs of the four years of development and
experimentation that produced the Model IV.23 The second copy was
a bargain; it eventually cost Donald's father only $18,000 (the
Alligator's distant descendant, the AAVP7A1, was produced in 1982
at approximately $815,000 per copy).
By the time Donald Roebling produced his Model IV Alligator in
1937, he had spent four years swimming his odd inventions
conspicuously around St. Joseph Sound in the Gulf of Mexico,
Clearwater Bay, and in the lakes and swamps of the Clearwater
area. The sporadic interest of the local press blossomed in the
autumn of 1937 with the arrival of reporters and photographers
from Life magazine. The resulting national publicity was a
dream-come-true for Donald Roebling. A two-page picture story
entitled "Roebling's Alligator for Florida Rescues" was featured
in the Science and Industry section of Life's 4 October 1937
issue. Of particular note, the Life article praised the
Alligator's versatile amphibious qualities, its ability to crash
through mangrove swamps, "grinding whole trees and shrubs to
matchwood," its 40-man capacity, its impressive land and water
speeds and its $10,000 production price.24 As a matter of
historical perspective, the superlative language of the Life
magazine article underscores the truly innovative and
revolutionary quality of Donald Roebling's achievement. The
Alligator was the world's first truly successful amphibious
vehicle.
The Life magazine article undoubtedly gave John A. Roebling II,
Donald Roebling, and his team of assistants good reason for
celebration. The article would surely produce willing customers
for their Alligator and a long awaited payoff for their labors.
They could not have imagined that their first customers would be
United States Marines.
CHAPTER 3
The Marine Corps' Amphibian
The Life magazine article telling the story of Donald Roebling's
amazing Alligator became the messenger of good fortune for a
Marine Corps desperately short of the tools of amphibious
warfare. The 4 October 1937 Life magazine article gained the
attention of Rear Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, Commander, Battle-
ships, Battle Force, U.S. Fleet in San Diego, California. At a
cocktail party Rear Admiral Kalbfus picked up the Life magazine
and showed the Roebling article to Major General Louis McCarty
Little, the Commanding General of the Fleet Marine Force, then
located in San Diego. Major General Little was greatly excited by
Donald Roebling's strange invention and mailed a copy of the
magazine article to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Major
General Thomas Holcomb, in Washington, D.C.1
The Marine Corps' remarkable fortuity of finding the Alligator in
the pages of a popular magazine came none too soon. The same Life
magazine issue that contained Donald Roebling's Alligator also
contained a shocking pictorial essay on the Japanese aerial
bombing of the Chinese city of Shanghai on 28 August 1934. In
four short years, Japanese bombs would devastate the U.S. Fleet
at Pearl Harbor. And in less than five years, amphibian tractors
would help the U.S. Marines whip the Japanese on Guadalcanal.
On 4 January 1938, the Marine Corps Commandant, Major General
Thomas Holcomb, forwarded the Life magazine article he had
received from Major General Little to the Marine Corps Equipment
Board at the Marine Corps' Quantico, Virginia, base. He directed
Brigadier General Frederick L. Bradman, the President of the
Equipment Board, to evaluate Donald Roebling's Alligator and make
a recommendation on the vehicle's use by the Marine Corps.2 Over
the course of the next twenty-four months the Alligator
negotiated a labyrinth of military committees and boards and
almost became a victim of the timeless governmental maladies of
bureaucratic negativism and insufficient funding. Except for the
personal advocacy and zeal of a few dedicated Marine Corps
officers, the Marine Corps' chance to add the amphibian tractor
to their amphibious team may have been lost.
During January 1938, General Bradman routed the Life magazine
article to the several committees of the Equipment Board for
comments and recommendations. After viewing the photograph of the
Alligator provided in the Life article, the Committee on
Transportation and Tanks concluded that the vehicle did "not
appear suitable for Marine Corps purposes ashore" and strongly
recommended against "its adoption by the Marine Corps for use in
operations ashore."3 The main problems noted were the Alligator's
light armor and unproven suspension system. The Marine Corps'
Committee on Boats of the War Plans Section agreed with the
Transportation and Tanks Committee that the vehicle had "no
particular use once it reached the beach," but conceded that a
few Alligators could have some limited use in small unopposed
flanking or covering force operations. The Committee on Boats
concluded that the Alligator issue should be dropped by the
Marine Corps and turned over to the Navy.4 Luckily, General
Bradman directed further inquiry into the Alligator before the
issue was passed to the Navy and forgotten.
On 3 February 1938, the Marine Corps Equipment Board sent a
letter to Donald Roebling requesting detailed information on the
Alligator. Within five days, Roebling enthusiastically responded
to all of the Marine Corps' questions. After describing his
vehicle with obvious pride and some exaggeration, he noted that
"the Alligator may be inspected and we will be glad to
demonstrate it to you at any time."5 Donald Roebling's positive
and timely response impressed the members of the Equipment Board
and on 28 February 1938, General Bradman wrote to the Commandant
of the Marine Corps requesting authority to dispatch a member of
the Equipment Board to Clearwater to personally inspect the
Alligator. Two weeks later, Major John Kaluf was enroute to
Florida.6
Major Kaluf's visit with Donald Roebling marked a significant
turning point in the Marine Corps' attitude towards the
Alligator. Kaluf meticulously inspected the vehicle and observed
its operation at sea, through the surf and in mangrove swamps. He
took 400 feet of 16 mm movie film of the Alligator in action and
personally drove the Alligator at sea and on land.7 He
immediately saw that the Alligator was a revolutionary vehicle
that represented the essence of what the Marine Corps was
striving to do: project military power from the sea to the land
in a smooth transition. Major Kaluf became a zealous believer in
the Alligator concept and helped to keep it alive until it became
a reality. Kaluf's glowing report on the Alligator led the
Commandant of the Marine Corps, on 18 May 1938, to formally
request funds from the Chief of Naval Operations to purchase one
Alligator for testing under military conditions. The tests would
take place during the Fleet Landing Exercises scheduled for the
winter of 1939 (FLEX No. 5).8 On 28 June 1938, the Commandant
received a disappointing response from the Chief of Naval
Operations. The Navy agreed that Alligators would be of some
value to the Marine Corps but the limited funds available for
landing craft would continue to be solely devoted to the
development of the Navy's landing boats.9
Meanwhile, Donald Roebling had been hard at work modifying his
Model IV Alligator to satisfy the comments and recommendations
made during Major Kaluf's inspection back in March. In January
1939 Donald Roebling sent photographs and a general description
of his improved vehicle to the Marine Corps Equipment Board. The
Commandant of the Marine Corps as well as leading members of the
Equipment Board recognized the importance of maintaining Mr.
Roebling's enthusiasm and cooperation despite the fact that the
Navy had, at least for awhile, declined to fund the Alligator.
Major Kaluf again visited Clearwater in February 1939 to review
Roebling's latest work and sustain the good will that the Marine
Corps had been able to cultivate with the eccentric inventor.10
Although the $18,000 price tag for the updated Alligator caused
Kaluf some alarm, his report following this second visit echoed
the enthusiasm of his first report. In this second report he made
the following interesting comment concerning Donald Roebling's
attitude toward cooperating with the Marine Corps:
"For the benefit of any officers who have any future dealings
with Mr. Roebling... it should be explained that the designer,
Donald Roebling, and his father, John Roebling, who furnished the
necessary funds, are very wealthy people and are not developing
this amphibian to make money and cannot be approached on a profit
basis. Any additional income would probably be an embarrassment
to them. Unlike the ordinary manufacturer who has something he is
anxious to sell, they can be appealed to only on the basis of
patriotic or humanitarian motives as far as this amphibian is
concerned."11
In October 1939, Donald Roebling was visited by a three-officer
committee headed by Brigadier General Emile P. Moses, USMC (the
new President of the Marine Corps Equipment Board). The committee
came to inspect the Alligator and assure Mr. Roebling of the
military's continuing vigorous interest in his invention.
Following General Moses' visit to Clearwater and his subsequent
glowing report on the Alligator, a second effort was made to
convince the Navy to relinquish the money to buy a pilot vehicle.
This time the Navy finally coughed up the requisite $24,492 for
one Alligator. Donald Roebling received his contract in April
1940 and the Marine Corps acquired its first amphibian vehicle in
November 1940.12 Click here too view image
The Alligator that Donald Roebling delivered to the Marine Corps
in October 1940 featured many military modifications resulting
from the visits of Major Kaluf and Brigadier General Moses. The
1940 Alligator was powered by a 120-horsepower Lincoln-Zephyer
engine with a Ford standard transmission.13 It could achieve 29
m.p.h. on land and 9.72 m.p.h. in the water.
The vehicle weighed 7,700 pounds (1,000 pounds less than the 1937
Model IV Alligator) and had a cargo capacity of 7,000 pounds. As
advertised in a glossy promotional leaflet produced by Roebling
in 1940, "in the open sea, or when landing on a beach through the
surf the Alligator is more seaworthy than a normal boat of com-
parable size. It will not sink, even with its 7,000 pound cargo
compartment full of water; nor will it capsize in a dive into
deep water off a six-foot seawall." 14
On 18 October 1940, at Clearwater, Flor