Bf-109 H being operational at Luftwaffe. Urban legend?

I know that old books like Warplanes of the Third Reich and German Aircrafts of the Second World War mentions some H models being operational. Till today I have not seen any photo or proof on several books dealing with the Bf 109 then I personally guess that ﾌ《 another "urban legend".

One ship served with recon unit for several months in Western front.

I do not know any evidence of Bf 109 H serving with fighter unit or operational test unit. But I do not say that it is non-existing.

This may help in solving the puzzle on the Bf 109H:

"Early in 1943, work began on a high-altitude development of thr F-series, the Bf 109H. The Bf 109H V1 was converted from a standard Bf 109F by the addition of a 2 m (6ft 61/2 in) wing section and the bracing of the tailplane. The machine underwent development trials at Rechlin and was later transferred to the Daimler-Benz factory at Stuttgart-Echterdingen where it was destroyed in an air raid in August 1944. A small batch of Bf 109H-0 pre-production aircraft was followed by a small number of BfH-1 machines. This variant was powered by a 1,3oo hp DB 601E engine and had one 30 mm MK cannon and two MG 17 machine guns.

Several developments of the basic design were proposed, including the Bf 109H-2 and H-3 with a Jumo 213 engine installed as a "power egg" and the Bf 109H-5 fitted with a DB 605L engine. The Bf109H series was proposed in two major variants, one fitted with three MK 108 and two MG 151/20 cannon, the other unarmed but carrying an Rb 50/30 or Rb 75/30 camera.

A small number of Bf 109Hs was delivered to a reconnaissance unit on the Channel coast in April 1944. The unit is reported to have been 3.(F)/121 based at Bernay under the command of Hptm Heinzel. In addition to the Bf 109H which could attain an altitude of 13,500 m (44,293 ft), the unit is also reported to have operated a captured Republic P-47 Thunderbolt."

So, it seems the Bf 109H DID exist.
I found reference on page 483, in the book "German Aircraft of the Second World War", by J.R.Smith&Antony Kay - Printed in Great Britain for Putnam & Company Limited 9 Bow Street, London, W C 2E 7 A L, by Fletcher & Son Ltd, Norwich. First Published 1972, Second impression 1975.
This really a great book. A wealth of information - IF YOU CAN FIND A COPY.

By the way, the same book (on page 489) says that...." there was no Bf 109I, and the Bf 109J was the German designation for a proposed variant to be built under licence in Spain."

It goes on to discuss the Bf 109K variations, the Bf 109L, Bf 109S, and Bf 109TL.

Smith and Kay book

I've have to say that, while their book is a bit more up to date in some of the data than the earlier big Green book, it still has some glitches and errors and I wouldn't use it or any single source with too much faith.

As for the Bf109H, it seems that a very few machines were built from G-5 fuselages. I suspect that they also had the simple constant chord wing root extension with a more or less unmodified '109 wing. There is also the confusion of a perhaps one-of machine that used what would have been the second set of wings built for the Me209II project (only the '209II V5 being completed and flown) along with all the paper concepts. From what I've seen of available data, if the advanced 109H had gone into real production, it was intended to use the '109K fuselage and wings with the root extension.

The J designation was not only proposed, it was indeed used on the Spanish manual. It says on the cover "Manual de instrucciones del avion Me 109J".

I am sure that the last word on the subject remains to be said, but it seems that one experimental aircraft (a G-5?) flew with the DB628 high-altitude engine, and another (ex-209V-6?) with the extended wing. The whole programme was cancelled because the G-10 provided most of the benefits with very little of the production cost, and the 152 was on the way.

I very much doubt that any saw service, but until the full story is cleared up then it is impossible to be definite. There is a quote that Classic Pubs have some information on the matter, so we await their publication in full time.

One Bf 109H might have been tested by 5.(F)/Aufklﾃ､rungsgruppe 123 during June-July 1944.

Some new and very interesting information on the Bf 109 H. Hopefully, a full accounting will appear in new revised and expanded edition of his earlier "Aufklﾃ､rer" book, originally published by Hikoki but now out-of-print.

Michael Holm shows a single 109H at 5(F)/123 between May and July 1944.

I do know that the increased length to the DB 628 caused severe longitudinal stability problems on the otherwise standard 109 fuselage, even with the planned, enlarged, squared fin and rudder.

In the era of the Second World War, twin engine fighter evolution in America took the form of twin-boom designs like the P38 and P-61, conventional layout like the too-Iate-for-combat F7F Tigercat, and-most radical of all two complete fuselages joined at the wing and tail, as was done with the XP-82 Twin Mustang. The Twin Mustang, although obviously related to the P-S 1, is not merely two conventional Mustang fuselages wedded by the factory. Longer than a P-S 1, the P-82 rested on two inwardly-retracting mainwheels and two retracting tail wheels one in the rear of each fuselage giving the Twin Mustang a four point tail-low stance on the ground. Simultaneously developed for Merlin or Allison engines, the P82 promised long range, heavy firepower, and two pilots to take turns on long escort missions. With the weight of two complete fuselages sharing less than two complete sets of wings, the Twin Mustang could be a handful on landing, with a formidable sink rate.

In January 1944, North American Aviation approached the Air Materiel Command with a proposal: NAA perceived the need for long-range escort fighters to accompany super bombers whose ranges were promising to stretch beyond that of current fighters. Negotiations that month led to a contract to procure two XP-82s powered by V-16S0 Merlin engines and two XP-82As riding behind Allison V-171 0-119 powerplants. Cost of the four airplanes, plus a static article and related items, was in excess of $4 million.

The two XP-82s led the way to a short production run of Merlin-powered P-82B versions. The Allison- engined XP-82As ultimately were canceled as prototypes because the intended production Allison-version, the P-82E (sometimes referenced as the P-82Z) was nearing completion before the V1710- 119 engines were available for the prototype XP-82As.

The P-82C was a Merlin-engined B-model (44-65169) converted to a night fighter by addition of SCR720 radar in the central pod; the P-82D was another converted B-model (44-65170) that was a night fighter equipped with APS-4 radar. The right-hand cockpit became home to the radar operator. Twenty Merlin powered P-82Bs were built before construction switched to 100 Allison- engined P-82E escort fighters, 100 P-82F night fighters with APS-4 radar, and 50 P-82Gs with SCR720 radar. The powerplants used were Allison V-1710143 and -145 variants in production aircraft. In June 1948, the designations of these Twin Mustangs were changed to the respective models of F-82 instead of P-82.

North American had a mock-up ready for AAF inspection from 1923 June 1944. Eleven months later, the engineering acceptance inspection on the first XP-82, number 44-83886, took place at the NAA plant. Engine accessibility for replacement was demonstrated, as noted in an Air Force summary: "During the course of the inspection the contractor was required to demonstrate removal and reinstallation of one powerplant. The crew used for this demonstration was unfamiliar with this installation and completely removed and reinstalled the powerplant in 28 1⁄2, minutes. When the engine had been removed, the oil tank and heat exchanger were removed and reinstalled in 15 minutes. Accordingly, the total operation of removing everything forward of the firewall and reinstalling same required 43 1⁄2, minutes with a crew of six engine mechanics.'' The lessons of the war had obviously been applied to the XP-82's design, making maintenance chores less onerous than on some older designs.

Vital statistics for the XP-82 included an overall length of 39 feet, a wingspan of 50 feet, 11 inches, and a total wing area of 408 square feet. Unlike the P-51, where the wings were joined under the centerline of the fuselage, the XP82 featured outer wing panels that mated to a center wing stub outboard of each fuselage. The wing center section was configured to carry internally six .50-caliber machine guns. Interconnected controls allowed the XP-82 to be flown from either cockpit; an early design premise said the pilots could take turns on long escort missions.

XP-82 number 44-83886, the Twin Mustang used for the acceptance inspection, first took flight on June 12, 1945, with an NAA pilot at the controls. An Air Force pilot flew it on July 6, 1945. These early sorties revealed the XP-82 to have satisfactory flight characteristics; following further tests by NAA, the Army Air Forces accepted this aircraft on August 30, 1945-after the cessation of hostilities in the Pacific, but a few days before signing of the official surrender treaty. At this point, the XP-82 was bailed back to the contractor, NAA, who conducted airworthiness and stability flight tests. For the next year and a half, NAA had this XP-82 on bailment before the aircraft was turned over to the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), who used this Twin Mustang at its Cleveland, Ohio, laboratory to conduct airborne tests of a ramjet, with the jet powerplant suspended beneath the wing center section. The next XP82, number 44-83887, first flew August 30, 1945, at a takeoff weight of 18,410 pounds. The left-hand Merlin engine was rough running on this and subsequent tests, prompting NAA to make engineering changes to correct a power surge problem. Beginning March 18,1946, Air Materiel Command Flight Test Division pilots went to the NAA plant to conduct performance tests on the XP-82.

As early as December 1945, the AAF asked North American Aviation to install M-3 guns in the wings of both XP-82s, as well as in the eight-gun armament nacelle mounted beneath the center wing section. By this time, the .50-caliber machine gun used in so many American warplanes had evolved to the M-3 version, with performance improvements and some external differences from the older standard M-2. Bailment of the number two XP-82 was extended to allow NAA the opportunity to install M-3 guns. Following this, the aircraft was flown to Eglin Field, Florida, for tactical evaluation. (Production F-82s did not use the centerline gun pod; radar was fitted on all-weather variants in place of the gun pod. Evidence also suggests older-style M-2 guns were retained by at least some production F-82s.)

The Allison-powered F82Es formed the U.S. Air Force's only escort wing. Fourteen F-82Hs were winterized from earlier F- and G models to serve in Alaska. (Unlike missions in temperate climates where aircraft might be exposed to cold temperatures at high altitude for a period of hours, and then return to moderate temperatures again, the environment of Alaska and other arctic regions demanded special configuring for aircraft that became "coldsoaked" by continuous exposure to freezing temperatures.)

The F-82s were acknowledged stop-gap cold-warriors. A February 1948 Air Force technical report noted: Following the end of World War Two, a production program was set up with certain fighters designated to be procured as interim fighters. The XP-82A (Allison-powered) fell in this category and were to be procured in limited quantities and designated P-82Z airplanes. The Allison F-82s ultimately filled the all-weather/night fighter role, relieving the older Northrop Black Widow until jets like the F-94 were ready for service.

The few Merlin-engined Twin Mustangs did not enter line service as operational fighters. One of these F-82Bs, christened "Betty Jo," showed off its long legs in a nonstop flight of more than 5,000 miles from Hawaii to New York, averaging more than 340 miles an hour en route. The advent of the Korean War saw Allison-engined Twin Mustangs step in to do what they were purchased fulfill in until the advent of jets with their all-weather capabilities. With a long loitering time, F-82Gs were useful early in the war. The first air-to-air victories by U.S. warplanes over North Korean aircraft occurred on June 27, 1950, when two F-82Gs of the 68th Fighter (All Weather) Squadron downed a Yak apiece.

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Meanwhile, during September 1943, the lessons learned from the disappointing debut of the Panther at Kursk led to further modifications to the last Model D tanks of the original 850-unit production run. Many of the last 37 Model D Panthers produced in September, for example, featured Zimmerit anti-magnetic mine paste, a substance that hindered Soviet infantry from placing magnetic ho}low-charge devices onto the tanks' surfaces. In addition, the late Model D tanks had two new features - a rain guard mounted over the gun sight on the turret mantlet to keep out driving rain, and improved tracks that sported chevron cleats for enhanced traction. As these last Model D tanks emerged, the Panther production firms completed their development work on a successor vehicle, the Model A Panther, which was a slightly modified Model D chassis with an improved turret design. By September the first Model A tanks were going into service alongside the 600 or so remaining Model D tanks.

Although production of the Model D stopped in September 1943 after the 850th vehicle had been completed as per the contract, these tanks continued to serve at the front - alongside their successor Model A and G tanks - right up until the end of the war.

Obviously, the number of Model D Panthers in service continually declined as losses ate into the numbers remaining, and so by 1945 only a handful of Model D Panthers remained. During autumn 1943, three new Panther units that fielded significant numbers of Model D tanks served in the East, including the II Battalion, SS Panzer Regiment 2 of the Das Reich Division. During September 1943, SS-NCO Ernst Barkmann joined the 4th Company, II Battalion, SS Panzer Regiment 2. This division had recently been re-equipped with Panther Model D tanks, and in bitter defensive battles fought around the Ukraine that autumn, Barkmann's Model D tank performed sterling service before eventually being knocked out. Subsequently, in early 1944, the S5 Das Reich Division redeployed to Bordeaux in southern France for refitting with new Model A and G Panthers after incurring heavy losses during recent bitter battles in the East. During this process, Barkmann - now commander of the 4th Company - received a new Model A command tank, vehicle number 424.

The discussion so far has centred on standard Model D combat tanks, hut it should be noted that throughout the nine months of the Model D Panther production run, German firms made about ten per cent of them into command tanks, or Befehls Panthers. These vehicles mainly served as commander's and adjutant's vehicles at company, battalion and even regimental levels. The Command Panther was simply a slightly modified standard Panther with ammunition stowage reduced from 79 to 64 rounds to make space for the powerful communications equipment and associated systems they carried. MAN alone completed 63 of these vehicles between January and August 1943. Model D, A and G Command Panthers came in two similar but distinct forms, although both versions shared many common features, such as an additional generator set, the absence of the co-axial turret machine gun, and the addition of three tubes fitted onto the hull sides in which spare antennae rods were housed.

The standard Sdkfz 267 Command Panther, irrespective of whether it was a Model D, A or G, featured the standard battle tank communications device, the Fu 5 10-watt transmitter and ultra-short wavelength receiver. Unlike on the combat tank, however, this device here worked through a two-metre-Iong rod antenna usually mounted on the right turret rear, adjacent to the commander's cupola, in addition to the standard rod antennae mounted on the left hull decking behind the turret. In normal tactical conditions, operators could expect to obtain a range of eight kilometres with this device. In addition, the Sdkfz 267 tank also mounted the powerful Fu 8 long-range device. This 30-watt transmitter and medium wavelength receiver operated on the frequency band 0.83-3.0MHz, and worked through a distinctive 1.4 metre star antenna normally mounted on the hull roof at the rear of the vehicle. The Fu 8 could communicate up to a maximum range of 65km, sufficient to secure effective communications with regimental and divisional staffs in almost every conceivable tactical situation.

In total, throughout the war, the Germans delivered 350 Sdkfz 267 Command Panthers, including roughly 75 Model D and 200 Model A versions. In addition, it should be remembered that front-line troops could convert standard Panthers to command versions in the field with a dedicated conversion kit if their command vehicles had been destroyed and no replacement was forthcoming. The Sdkfz 267 Command Panther proved highly effective; by retaining the standard Panther gun and armour, it could engage the enemy directly while simultaneously controlling the actions of the unit it commanded. Moreover, by looking like the standard Panther tank its battlefield survivability improved, as striving to knock out enemy command tanks had always been a preferred tactic of armoured warfare.

The much less common Sdkfz 268 'Flivo' Befehls Panther command variant was a dedicated air-ground liaison vehicle used for arranging tactical air support for Panther units. Rather than using the Fu 8, this vehicle mounted the Fu 7 device in addition to the standard Fu 5. The Fu 7 was a 20-watt transmitter and ultrashort wavelength receiver that operated on the frequency band 42.1-47.8MHz through a 1.4 metre rod antenna normally mounted on the rear hull roof. In theory, the two (or possibly three) rod antennae of the Sdkfz 268 easily distinguished this vehicle from standard Panther combat tanks (with only one rod antenna) and the Sdkfz 267 Command Panther with one star and either one or two rod antennae. However, pictorial evidence reveals that the Sdkfz 267 and 268 command vehicles often featured non-standard positioning of their aerials, making definite identification problematic. The 'Flivo' Command Panther remained a very rare vehicle, with only 40 being completed by the end of the war. Indeed, given the increasingly adverse strategic situation under which the Luftwaffe laboured during 1944-45, it remains unclear whether many such vehicles actually fulfilled their intended air-ground liaison role, as German tactical air support by this time was extremely limited at best. Moreover, as both the Command Panther variants carried two mounting devices onto which the Fu 7 or Fu 8 could each be fitted, it seems highly likely that the Germans refitted some Sdkfz 268 'Flivo' vehicles as much needed standard command tanks by simply replacing the Fu 7 device with the Fu 8 set.

The Panther made its operational debut on 5July 1943 during Citadel, in which the High Command expected the 200 Panthers to contribute decisively to the stunning victory it expected to secure. Citadel involved a double-pronged German attack from the northern and southern shoulders of a large Soviet salient that jutted west into the German lines around Kursk. The Soviets, however, had detected the German preparations and had built up awesome defensive strength to resist the attack. This build-up did little to perturb German confidence; after all, given the widespread German belief in the combat power of the Panther tank, they simply reckoned that the greater the Soviet force deployed against them, the greater the victory they would achieve once their double pincers had linked up at Kursk to form the largest encirclement yet achieved in the war. The Panther units employed in Citadel the 51st and 52nd Panzer Battalions - each fielded four companies of 22 Panthers, plus a further eight Model D tanks, to make a total unit strength 96 Panthers each. The two battalions came under the control of Major von Lauchert's improvised brigade staff, itself equipped with eight Panthers, which fought alongside the Panzergrenadier Division Grossdeutschland as part of the southern prong of the attack.

Major problems, however, dogged the contribution made by the Panthers even before the offensive began. Because the two Panther-equipped tank battalions were deployed in the East just a few days before Citadel commenced, the units had little time for acclimatisation training in situ. Moreover, 16 tanks broke down on the short journey between disembarking from their transportation trains and reaching the front. Things went little better once the offensive began. In the face of fanatical Soviet resistance, large numbers of Panthers fell by the wayside. By 7July 1943, the third day of the offensive, just 40 of the 184 Panthers that started Citadel were still operational, while by 10 July just 10 of them remained in front-line service. Of the remaining 174 Panthers that had begun Citadel, 23 had been lost due to 'brewing up' after enemy hits on their relatively vulnerable side armour, while two had burned after engine fires before combat had even been joined. Another 44 Panthers were being repaired after mechanical failure and a further 56 because of damage caused by enemy fire or anti-tank mines. German workshops had already repaired a further 40 Panthers with minor damage or mechanical problems, but these were still on the way to rejoin the brigade. The remaining nine tanks, which had been abandoned on the battlefield after sustaining damage, had still to be recovered.

The much vaunted debut of the Panther had proven to be a debacle. Admittedly the Germans could discern a few glimmers of hope from this serious setback. Post-combat reports from the fighting experienced at Kursk confirmed the anticipated combat power of the 7.5cm Panther gun; this weapon had accounted for many T-34 tanks, often at ranges of 1500m or more. In addition, the Panther's two machine guns had proven to be very reliable, with a very low incidence of jamming. However, most of the other aspects of the Panther mentioned in post-combat reports proved unfavourable. Troops observed, for example, that the Panther's turret grenade launchers soon became inoperative due to enemy small arms fire, that its engine regularly broke down, that its over-stressed transmission often failed, and that its road wheels sometimes fractured. In addition, crews complained about fuel pump leaks that often led to dangerous fires starting inside the tank, the dangerous build-up of gun exhaust gases inside the turret, and the problems caused when driving rain entered the turret through the mantlet binocular periscope. Further modifications were needed, the Germans concluded, before the Panther realised the potential it clearly possessed to be a potent tank on the future battlefield.

Meanwhile back in Germany, even as Citadel unfolded, the factories introduced further production simplifications designed to raise production rates. The new Model D Panthers that rolled off the production lines that month no longer had the circular communications hatch fitted to the left-hand side of the turret, and had only one headlamp (on the left) instead of two. From late July, in response to the lessons gathered at Kursk, some newly completed Model D tanks featured more resilient road wheels fitted with 24 rim bolts instead of 16. In addition, these vehicles sported an additional ring mounted on the commander's cupola onto which an anti-aircraft machine gun could be fitted. Yet at this time Panther production still remained hurried and poorly organised; consequently some of the 115 Panthers produced during August did not incorporate these modifications because of over-hasty production or shortages of parts at the factories.

Most of the 115 new Model D Panthers delivered in August - some 96 vehicles - arrived in the East at the end of the month to completely re-equip the 51st Panzer Battalion, which in the aftermath of Citadel had given up its few remaining tanks to reinforce the remnants of the 52nd Battalion. Between them these battalions had suffered 58 Panthers lost by the end of Citadel, excluding another 50 in short-term repair. Yet far worse was to transpire. In the desperate defensive battles the Germans fought to resist the Soviet counter-offensives that erupted over the following six weeks these battalions lost a further 98 Panthers; consequently, fewer than 44 of the original Model D tanks dispatched to Citadel remained operational by early September.

During late November 1942, the Germans embarked on general production of the V2 design, now designated the Panther Model D. Indeed, as far back as July 1942, the High Command had set a target figure of 250 Panthers to be delivered by 12 May 1943. Consequently, between November 1942 and January 1943, MAN produced the first four production Model D tanks. During 24-26 January 1943, three of these vehicles arrived at the Grafenwöhr testing grounds with the fourth going to Kummersdorf. The Model D production version featured a redesigned turret that lacked the hexagonal shape of the V2 turret, and which incorporated the commander's cupola positioned flush with the surface of the turret's left-hand side. In addition, the Model D mounted a modified 7.5cm KwK 42 L/70 gun that sported a double-baffle muzzle brake. In terms of secondary armament, the tank mounted one 7.92mm MG 34 machine gun co-axially in the right of the turret mantlet, plus a hull machine gun that fired through a letterbox mount in the sloping hull glacis plate. The vehicle carried 79 rounds for the main gun and 4200 rounds for its machine guns. Finally, the tank mounted a set of three smoke-grenade launchers on the front of each turret side for close-range defence.

The Model D Panther had armour similar to the V2, except that the frontal glacis plate was 80mm thick and sloped at 55 degrees, while the hull side plates were 40mm thick and set at 40 degrees. The tank mounted the 650bhp Maybach HL210 P30 engine and the seven-speed AK 7-200 transmission used in the V2. Thanks to the additional armour protection, the Model D weighed 44.8 tonnes, slightly heavier than the already overweight V2 prototype. Nevertheless, the vehicle's torsion bar suspension, which was based on eight pairs of interleaved rubber-tyred road wheels, still delivered an acceptable ground pressure figure of 0.735kg/cm2. The tank's by-road fuel consumption was 2.8 litres per kilometre which, given its 720 litre fuel tanks, enabled it to achieve a maximum operational range of 250km by road, yet just 100km off road. In terms of communications equipment, the Model D mounted the standard German tank device, the Fu 5. This consisted of a 10-watt transmitter with ultra-short wavelength receiver, operating in the frequency band 27.2-33.4MHz, that used a two-metre rod antenna fitted onto the vehicle's rear hull decking.

These first four Panthers underwent extensive tests at Grafenwöhr and Kummersdorf during late January and early February 1943, to be joined by further vehicles over the next few weeks. However, these tests - carried out by the crews of two new armoured units, the 51st and 52nd Panzer Battalions - revealed numerous minor design faults, as well as shoddy standards of manufacture. The gun, for example, could not be elevated or depressed to the specified degrees, while the corners of the turret often struck the closed driver's and radio operator's hatches on the hull roof. Furthermore, the vehicle's final drive chains tended to break, its transmission frequently broke down, its motors often caught fire and its fuel pumps regularly failed. The unseemly haste to rush the vehicle into general production had resulted, inevitably, in myriad teething problems.

During February 1943, despite these problems, MAN delivered a further 11 completed Panthers to the proving grounds, while Daimler-Benz completed its first six Panthers and MNH one further vehicle. By 28 February 1943, therefore, the Germans had delivered 22 Model D tanks to the two new Panther battalions. Thereafter, newly produced Panthers featured a fixed radius steering gear instead of the clutch-brake steering gear fitted in the first 22 Panthers. During March, Daimler-Benz, MAN, and MNH delivered 58 Model D Panthers to the Army, while Henschel completed its first ten tanks, so that by the end of the month the Germans had 90 such tanks on strength. But as yet the Germans had not passed a single Model D tank as combat-ready since the early trials had identified 45 modifications that needed to be made before the tank could be used in battle. At this time, the High Command believed that the Panther would make a decisive contribution to the strategic victory that the planned German summer 1943 offensive in the East was expected to achieve. During early April, however, the Army concluded that before this could happen it had to rebuild its completed Panthers to rectify the faults identified during the early field trials.

The Germans, however, remained anxious that the modification work should not slow down the rate of completion of the part-assembled Panther tanks already on the production lines. Consequently, the four firms then producing Panthers did not take back the 90 vehicles already completed for modification work, but instead continued manufacturing Model D vehicles according to the original design despite its known faults. Only after 160 incomplete tanks had been finished would the Germans send them to the DEMAG factory at Falkensee for postproduction modification work. In the interim, the 90 tanks already delivered would remain with the 51st and 52nd Panzer Battalions for training purposes and would only be dispatched to Falkensee for modification once the subsequent 160 completed Panthers had been rebuilt at DEMAG. The rebuilding work undertaken by the latter firm during April and May included major modifications to the engine compartment, adjustment to the steering gears, suspension, final drives and transmission. Although the German firms completed these remaining 160 Panthers essentially to the original design, they did at least make one modification to them. From April 1943 the factories outfitted new vehicles with thin Schürzen armoured side skirts to protect the relatively vulnerable tracks and hull sides from Soviet anti-tank rifles.

By early May, frenzied German production had delivered the first batch of 250 Model D tanks to the proving grounds. In all subsequent construction, from vehicle 251 onwards, the assembly plants outfitted new Panthers with the 700bhp Maybach HL230 P30 engine instead of the original HL210. While this added power did not increase the overall speed of the Model D Panther, it did improve acceleration and cross-country performance; above all, it eased the excessive strain frequently imposed on HL210-equipped tanks and thus went some way to improving the mechanical reliability of the tank.

Despite the extensive DEMAG rebuild programme, further field trials undertaken during May with the first 250 Panthers continued to reveal serious problems. Consequently, from June new HL230-engined tanks underwent further modification, while existing vehicles were modified at Grafenwöhr. One of these alterations involved strengthening the tank's over-strained road wheels by fitting additional rivets between the existing 16 rim bolts. In addition, these vehicles underwent further alterations to their transmissions. Meanwhile, back at the factories, some of the new HL230-engined tanks completed during this month emerged without the characteristic set of three smoke-grenade launchers on each side of the turret, although Henschel-manufactured tanks still had them into June. The factories discontinued this feature because field trials had shown that surprise attacks by enemy small-arms fire often inadvertently triggered the smoke grenades when "the vehicle still had its hatches open, and the smoke soon incapacitated the crew. By 31 May, the Army had received 250 HL210-engined and 118 HL230-engined Model D tanks. However, many Panthers remained non-operational either because of the faults identified above or because they were being rebuilt and thus could not be deployed at the front for the imminent German summer offensive. Indeed, it was not until further modification work had been completed in late June, that the Germans managed to redeploy 200 Panthers to the Soviet Union for the now much-delayed German Citadel offensive.

Steyr-Daimler-Puch was assigned the task of developing a family of light and heavy armoredrailway reconnaissance vehicles in the winter of 1943.

The schweren Schienenpanzerspahzug(heavy armored scout train) shown here came in two basic forms, an Artilleriewagen(artillery car) fitted with a surplus turret from older model PzKpfw IV tanks with a short 75mm gun, and a Kommandowagen(command car) to carry infantry and the command element of the train; aproposed flak version never entered production.



Each Eisenbahnpanzerzug(railroad armored train) sSp.would have been deployed with 12 of these self-propelled vehicles: two Flak, four artillery, and six command vehicles. plus supporting control wagons and other equipment.

These units could operate as a single train, but were intended to be operated independently orin small groups depending on the mission.

Sixteen of these units were planned but only six were formed starting in May 1944, numbered 201 (sSp.) to 206 (sSp.) and became operational from November 1944 to April 1945. Steyr was also assigned to develop a Panzerjager-Treibwagen(roughly, "tank destroyer car") armored rail-cruiser configured like the Soviet MBV D-2 that had been captured and employed since the summer of 1941.

They were armed with two turrets from the PzKpfw IV Ausf H, and production began in December 1944 with five planned, numbered from 51 to 55. Only three were completed, too late for combat deployment.

Panzertriebwagen Nr.16 was a unique design, beginning in 1942 as an armored version ofthe WR550D14 diesel locomotive. The original SP 42 scheme was to fit special armored cars forward and aft for 20mm Flak 38 antiaircraft cannon. In December 1942 the program shifted to the creation of an armored rail-cruiser fitted with artillery turrets at either end, armed with captured Soviet Putilov 76.2mm Mod. 02/30 field guns.

It was deployed in the summer of 1944, supplemented by a pair of Panzerj채gerwagenon either end with Soviet T-34 turrets on flatcars. It was used for patrols in southwestern Poland through the end of 1944, and finally retreated after the January 1945 Soviet offensive, being captured in the final days of the war by the Soviet
Sixty-First Army. It served after the war with the Polish People's Army in anti partisan operations in southeastern Poland and was finally withdrawn from service in the late 1960s.

The US tanks with which a number of British as well as the US armoured formations were equipped were principally the M4 Sherman medium tanks. These tanks owed much of their origin to the use by the German armoured forces of the Pz.Kpfw.IV with its 75mm gun, from which the US Army drew the very sensible conclusion that it required a medium tank with a gun of the same calibre. A month before this conclusion was reached in June 1940, the US Army had only 464 tanks. What is more, the latest and most powerful of them was the prototype of the M2A1 medium tank, a peculiar 21 ton vehicle with a 37mm gun in a two-man turret and no less than six machine guns in the hull. Two of these were fixed in the front plate for firing forward by the driver and the other four were in small sponsons at each corner of the superstructure, which made the M2A1 almost a throw-back to the original British tanks of 1916. However, the M2A1 had a sound chassis, which could be used as the basis of a new medium tank. In view of the urgent need for it, it was decided that it would take too long to produce a new tank with a 75mm gun mounted in a turret. Instead, the gun was mounted in the hull, for which a prototype fortuitously existed in the form of the experimental T5E2 medium tank built in 1939. The configuration of the resulting M3 medium tank left a good deal to be desired but it could be produced quickly and it proved effective when first used by British tank units in Libya in 1942.

In the meantime the prototype of a second medium tank, mechanically similar to the M3 but with a turret-mounted 75mm gun, was completed in September 1941 and began to be produced in February 1942 as the Medium Tank M4. By July 1945. when the last of them were built, 49 234 tanks of this type were produced, which almost equalled the total number of T-34 tanks that were produced by then.

As they were produced, the M4 medium tanks became the principal equipment of the US as well as British and then also of the recreated French armoured formations. Their general layout was similar to that of the Pz.Kpfw.IV and their 75mm guns were comparable to the 76.2mm guns of the T-34 but they were inferior in their armour piercing capability to the long 75mm guns with which Pz.Kpfw.IV was rearmed by the time the M4 appeared in the field in 1942. The M4 only caught up with the Pz.Kpfw.IV in gun power when an improved version was produced at the beginning of 1944 with a long-barrelled 76mm gun. However, by the time the rearmed M4 came into service new German as well as Soviet tanks were already armed with more powerful guns. Nevertheless, a few months before the Anglo-American landings in Normandy in June 1944 it was still considered in the United States that two thirds of the M4 tanks should remain armed with the 75mm gun. But once the fighting in Normandy started the inadequate performance of the 75 mm gun, particularly against the frontal armour of enemy tanks, because too obvious to be ignored.

The complacency which existed until then about the armament of the M4 tanks was largely due to the view held by the command of the US Army Ground Forces that it was not the function of tanks to fight enemy tanks and that the role of armoured formations was one of exploitation and pursuit. This view resembled the contemporary attitude of the British Army to the role of armoured formations and the damage it caused to the development of US tanks was ensured by the creation of separate units of tank destroyers "especially designed for offensive action against hostile armored forces".

The tank destroyers were more heavily armed than the contemporary tanks and in the eyes of the commander of the Army Ground Forces, Lt. General L J McNair and their other proponents, they eliminated, or at least reduced, the need for tanks to be equally heavily armed. This view was an illusion, as tanks still had to fight enemy tanks and therefore needed to be armed for it. In consequence, the attitude of the Army Ground Forces stood in the way of arming tanks with guns sufficiently powerful to fight enemy tanks and the creation of the Tank Destroyer Force caused a dispersion of development effort and of the forces in the field.

Some consideration was given in 1942 and 1943 to arming the M4 with a more powerful, 90mm gun but this possibility was abandoned in 1944 in favour of a new tank, the M26 Pershing. This tank was the outcome of a somewhat diffuse chain of developments which started in 1942 with the design of a new medium T20 tank with a 76mm gun and involved the construction of several other experimental tanks with 76 and then 90mm guns. One of the latter was finally approved in December 1944 and a small pre-production batch of what was to be adopted as the Pershing was sent to Europe to see action shortly before the war ended.

The 41 ton Pershing represented a considerable advance on the M4 mechanically and it was also more heavily armoured and armed with a more powerful 90mm gun. But its armour and armament did not represent any significant advance on the German Tiger I, which was introduced more than two years earlier. Thus at the end of the Second World War, both the US and the British Army were still well behind the German Army in the gun-power of their tanks. But the doctrines which were largely responsible for this had become discredited and it was generally being recognised that tanks must be well armed to fulfill their potential as a mobile source of fire power effective against a wide range of battlefield targets, including enemy tanks.

New designs and improved versions of the existing vehicles developed in response to the appearance of the T-34 and KV not only made German tanks more than a match for the Soviet tanks in terms of gun-power but also put them well ahead of British and US tanks. So far as British tanks were concerned, the 40mm guns of the early cruiser tanks, from the Mark I to the Mark VI Crusader, and of the Matilda infantry tank, were superior in terms of armour penetration to the 37mm gun of the original Pz.Kpfw.III and almost equal to its short 50mm gun.

However, no attempt was made in Britain to develop a tank with a larger calibre dual-purpose gun like that of the Pz.Kpfw.IV. What was developed were only close support versions of the cruiser and infantry tanks armed with 76.2mm howitzers, which were limited-purpose weapons with no armour piercing capability and which were in no way comparable to the dual-purpose guns of similar calibre mounted at the time in Soviet as well as German tanks.

A larger, 57mm gun was mounted in 1942 in the Crusader HI cruiser tank and Churchill III and IV infantry tanks. Its armour-piercing capabilities were considerably greater than those of the 40mm gun and almost the same as those of the long 75mm with which Pz.Kpfw.IV had been rearmed by then. But it was still inferior to the latter, and other 75 or 76mm guns, so far as high explosive shells were concerned. Moreover, there was no British tank with a more powerful gun that could match the 88mm gun of the Tiger, which had appeared in 1942.

In fact, cruiser and infantry tanks continued to have exactly the same main armament, in spite of the considerable differences in their weight. This meant that the heavier, infantry tanks could not play a role equivalent to that of the heavy tanks of the German and Soviet armies, which were not merely more heavily armoured than the medium tanks but which were also armed with much more powerful guns. As it was, they were never expected to be a more powerfully armed complement to the cruiser tanks. Instead, they were intended to form a separate category of tanks for close cooperation with the infantry and for this purpose they were much more heavily armoured than the cruiser tanks but not more heavily armed. Thus, as a contemporary War Office publication put it, "The main difference between the infantry and cruiser tanks lies in the thickness of armour".

The concentration on armour protection in the development of the infantry tanks paid off at first in the case of the Matilda, which enjoyed a high degree of immunity when it was used in 1940 and 1941 in Africa against ill-equipped Italian forces. But, based as it was on armour protection, its success was cut short, like that of the Soviet KV, by the appearance of more effective anti-tank weapons. Thereafter it had to rely more on its armament and in this respect it was no better than the contemporary cruiser tanks. The same was true of its successor, the Churchill infantry tank, whose armour was progressively increased to a maximum of as much as 152mm but which, in spite of it, did not distinguish itself as a fighting vehicle.

In 1943 it was finally recognised that tank guns should not only be armour-piercing weapons but dual-purpose guns capable of delivering effective high explosive fire as well as perforating the armour of enemy tanks. Thus the final, 40 ton version of the Churchill and the 28 ton Cromwell cruiser tank were both armed with medium velocity 75mm guns. But when these tanks went into action in 1944 their armament was two years behind that of the Pz.Kpfw.IV and three behind that of the T-34. Moreover, they were no longer powerful enough to fight effectively the latest types of the opposing tanks, such as the Panther or, even more, the Tiger.

The official attitude towards this situation was that "the tank is designed with the primary object of destroying or neutralizing enemy unarmoured troops". This may have been true during the First World War but the view implied by this statement that tanks should not normally fight enemy tanks was no longer realistic when both sides were using tanks on a large scale and fighting them could not be avoided. Nevertheless, such views persisted and so did the policy, of which they were an expression, of developing and using the two separate categories of infantry and cruiser tanks.

This policy was, in fact, the root cause of the inadequate attention given to the gun-power of British tanks and of their shortcomings during the Second World War. How serious these shortcomings were is indicated by the fact that, in spite of the relatively large number of tanks produced in Britain, in 1943 and 1944 British armoured formations had to be equipped to a large extent with US built tanks. Yet in 1941 British tank output was already considerably higher than the German and at its peak of 8611 in 1942 it was more than double the latter.

The KV was obviously produced in much smaller numbers than the T-34 and it proved to be far less important. It had armour up to 75 instead of 45mm thick and a three-, instead of a two-man turret but this resulted in its weight being 42.5 tons while its main armament was exactly the same as that of the T-34. Its thicker armour was intended to make the KV capable of attacking enemy positions in the face of contemporary anti-tank weapons and, in fact, initially provided it with a high degree of immunity. But its immunity was bound to be short lived and, as more effective anti-tank weapons appeared, the KV lost whatever advantage it had over the T-34. The continued use of the KV was briefly justified in 1943 when it was rearmed with an 85mm gun. But shortly afterwards the same gun was also mounted in the T-34 and. as there was little sense in producing two different tanks with the same main armament, the KV-85 was abandoned. In its place came the 46 ton IS-2, or Stalin, heavy tank. This tank was similar to the KV but had thicker armour of up to 120mm on the hull front, partly because it dispensed with the hull machine gunner of the KV. However, the most important difference between it and the KV was its much more powerful, 122mm gun.

Although the IS-2 was relatively heavy, it was not used like most earlier heavy tanks as a specialised assault or breakthrough tank. Instead, it was used primarily to support the medium T-34 tanks with its long-range gun and in particular to destroy enemy heavy tanks. In fact, it was developed to a large extent to counter the German Tiger heavy tank which had appeared by the end of 1942.

The Tiger was, in turn, one of the German responses to the appearance of new Soviet tanks in 1941 and in particular of the T-34. At the time the German Army had no heavy tanks, except for a few experimental vehicles. However, once the new Russian tanks were encountered the German High Command realised the need for tanks more powerful than the existing Pz.Kpfw.IV. In consequence two new tanks were hurriedly developed. One was the 56 ton Tiger, whose design incorporated some features of one of the earlier experimental tanks but which was armed with a tank version of the 88mm anti-aircraft gun that had already proved highly effective as an anti-tank weapon. The other was a new medium tank which became the Panther, a 43 ton vehicle armed with a 70 calibre long, high velocity 75mm gun. The Panther began to be produced in January 1943 and, together with the Tiger, gave the German tank units a qualitative superiority over the Russian tank units. But both tanks were produced on a relatively small scale, the total production of the original Tiger I amounting to 1354 and that of the Panthers to 5976. In consequence, there were not enough Panthers to reequip the Panzer divisions completely with them and the Tigers were generally held back in independent battalions.

Both tanks had the same general layout as Pz.Kpfw.IV and five-man crews but apart from having much more powerful armament and thicker armour they were much more advanced mechanically. As a result of its combination of characteristics the Panther came to be regarded as the best medium tank of the 1943-45 period while the second version of the Tiger became the most powerful tank to be used during the Second World War. Thus, Tiger II was armed with a higher performance 88mm gun which was 71 calibres long and which could pierce considerably thicker armour than the 122mm gun of the IS-2. It was also heavily armoured, its frontal hull armour being 150mm thick, although this contributed to its weight of 68 tons, which made it the heaviest tank used during the war. But the total production of Tiger II amounted to only 489 vehicles.

In the meantime, while the Tiger and the Panther were being developed, the existing German tanks were belatedly armed with more powerful guns. In particular, Pz.Kpfw.IV was armed in 1942 with more powerful 75mm guns, first 43 and then 48 calibres long, instead of the short barrelled gun of 24 calibres, which had been used in German tanks since the Grosstraktoren of 1929. In contrast, the Soviet Army armed its tanks with progressively longer barrelled and, therefore, higher velocity 76.2mm guns. Thus the early Russian tanks, including some of the BT, were armed with guns only 16.5 calibres long but the final versions of the BT and T-28 medium tank were armed with guns 26 calibres long while the original versions of the T-34 and KV had guns of 41.2 calibres. However, when the Pz.Kpfw.IV was finally rearmed with the 75mm L/48 gun the latter proved to have an armour piercing capability considerably greater than that of the Russian 76.2mm guns of 41.2 calibres and as good as that of the 85mm gun with which the T-34 was eventually armed.

The armament of the most numerous German tank during 1941 and 1942, the Pz.Kpfw.III, was also improved. The Pz.Kpfw.III was conceived as a light tank to be used alongside the medium Pz.Kpfw.IV. However, it had the same general layout, five-man crew and almost the same weight as the Pz-Kpfw.IV, which was extravagant in relation to its original armament of a 37mm gun. After the 1940 campaign in France it was rearmed with a 50mm gun 42 calibres long, which at short range could penetrate more armour than the short barrelled 75mm gun of the contemporary Pz.Kpfw.IV. However, its performance proved inadequate against the frontal armour of the Russian T-34. In consequence it was rearmed again, being fitted in 1942 with a 50mm gun 60 calibres long, the armour piercing performance of which was at least comparable to that of the Soviet 76.2mm tank guns of 41.2 calibres. In the end it was armed with the same 24 calibre 75mm gun as the original Pz.Kpfw.IV. This should have been done from the start and might have led to the merger of the two types into a single battle tank that could have been produced more efficiently and employed more effectively.

As it was, Pz.Kpfw.III was best used when its chassis became the basis of the turretless Sturmgeschiitz. The latter was conceived as an assault gun for infantry support but in 1942 it was rearmed with the same long-barrelled 75 mm gun as the Pz.Kpfw.IV. This turned it not only into a tank destroyer but also into a very effective turretless tank and it was used as such by the Panzer divisions when there was a shortage of turreted tanks. Ultimately the number of Sturmgeschiitz built on the Pz.Kpfw.III chassis amounted to 9409, which was more than the total production of any German tank.

In contrast to their ineffective employment, the development of Soviet tanks proved very successful. Its greatest achievement was the T-34 medium tank, which was developed from the basis of the BT. In particular, T-34 followed the example set as early as 1933 by some of the BT-5 and was armed with a 76.2mm gun. It also followed the final version of the BT series, the BT-7M or BT-8, in being powered by a newly developed V-2 tank diesel. In addition, the T-34 benefited from the experience gained during the Spanish Civil War with the BT-5, which showed that its maximum thickness of armour of 15mm on the turret and 22mm on the hull front was inadequate. Moreover, the T-34 finally dispensed with the unnecessary complication of being able to run on the road wheels without tracks as well as with them, which the BT tanks inherited from Christie. But, very sensibly, the T-34 retained the Christie-type independent suspension.

All the features incorporated in the T-34 were originally embodied in the T-32 experimental tank built in 1939, prototypes of the T-34 itself being built in 1940. Production followed quickly and in May 1941, on the eve of the German invasion, there were already 967 T-34s. Compared with 517 Pz.Kpfw.IV the T-34 was not only more numerous but was superior in terms of fire power and mobility. It also had superior protection, even though the thickness of the Pz.Kpfw.IV armour had increased to a maximum of 50 to 60mm. raising its weight to 21 tons against 26.3 tons of the T-34.

After most of the older tanks were lost in 1941, the T-34s became the basic Soviet tanks in 1941 and 1942, when they were usually assigned by battalions or brigades to infantry divisions. Subsequently they were used increasingly within the framework of tank and mechanised corps, which were recreated in 1942. To meet the demand for it, the T-34 was produced on a very large scale. In fact, throughout the whole of the war its annual rate of production exceeded that of all the German tanks taken together, attaining a peak of 15812 in 1943, and by the end of June 1945 its production reached a total of 53497 tanks.

In addition to the T-34, the Soviet Union also produced the KV heavy tank and also some light tanks, although these no longer counted. The KV was designed in 1938 and was wisely selected in preference to two heavy tanks with two turrets, the T-100 and the SMK, which showed that the concept of multi-turreted tanks was still alive at the time in the Soviet Union as it was in Britain. Production of the KV started in 1940 with the result that 508 were available in May 1941 and by the time it came to an end in 1943 it amounted to more than 4700 tanks.

As a result of the differences in attitude, policy and design which existed prior to it, when the Second World War broke out in September 1939 the tanks of the various armies differed considerably in their characteristics and in their intended method of employment. In consequence, when they were put to test their performance varied a great deal.

At the time French tanks numbered 2677 and by the time the German offensive against France began in May 1940 their number had risen to more than 3500, excluding some 1500 Renault FT which were still being used in various ways and a small number of modern tanks in French overseas territories. However, of this impressive total 2665 were the Renault R-35 and similar light tanks which were designed only for close infantry support and most of which were dispersed by battalions over a wide front. In consequence, they proved ineffective against the German armoured forces which were concentrated over a narrow front and moved rapidly. The outcome of this was to discredit the concept of infantry support on which the R-35 and similar tanks were based.

The other French tanks, the medium S-35 and the heavy B-l, were well armoured and, by contemporary standards, well armed with 47mm guns as well as short 75mm guns in the case of the B-l. Moreover, they were concentrated respectively, in the Divisions Legeres Mecaniques and the Divisions Cuirassees. But these divisions were also unprepared for the kind of mobile operations which the German armoured formations conducted and they were not deployed very effectively.

On 1 September, 1939, the total number of German tanks amounted to 3195, but of this 1445 were the light, machine gun armed Pz.Kpfw.I and only 211 were Pz.Kpfw.IV. However, in their opening campaign against Poland they did not meet any serious tank opposition. On the eve of the 1940 offensive against France there were still only 280 Pz.Kpfw.IV out of a total of 3379, although this now included 710 tanks armed with 37mm guns, among which were ex-Czech Pz.Kpfw.35t and 38t as well as Pz.Kpfw.III. Most German tanks were not therefore very powerfully armed. The striking successes achieved in 1940 in France by the German armoured forces were consequently due to the way the tanks were employed rather than to their characteristics. Thus, all 2574 tanks that were actually deployed were concentrated in the ten Panzer divisions which the German Army had at the time and nine of these were concentrated on a narrow front.

The Panzer divisions were even more successful in relation to the opposing forces in 1941 when seventeen of them, with a total of about 3350 tanks, spearheaded the German invasion of the Soviet Union. The total number of Soviet tanks at the time has been generally estimated at about 24000, which was not only four times as many as the total number of German tanks but more than the number of tanks in the whole of the world outside the Soviet Union. Seventy five per cent of this total consisted of T-26 and BT tanks, both of which the Soviet Army regarded as light tanks. However, they were far better armed than other contemporary light tanks, including those which represented 37 per cent of the German tanks, and the BT was generally comparable to other 'light-medium' tanks. The large number of Soviet tanks was somewhat less formidable than it might appear because many of them were in a poor state, which has been reflected in claims that 73 per cent of the older types were in need of overhaul. Moreover, Soviet tank forces were in considerable disarray as a result of two reversals of policy. The first was a 1939 decision to abolish the tank corps, which until then contained a significant number of Soviet tanks, and to use tanks by brigades for infantry support. The second was a decision taken in July 1940, following the striking success of the German Panzer divisions in France, to reform mechanised corps on a large scale. But this decision was only partly implemented by the time the German forces attacked in June 1941. In addition, the Soviet tank forces were badly employed and as a result of it all they were almost annihilated, losing, according to German records, 17500 tanks.

Borodino

The correct and incorrect ways to build a sangar. In an ideal situation sandbags would be used to anchor the rocks and racks placed at random intervals along the parapet to break the line and conceal anyone looking over the top. Sandbags are positioned on the parapet to reduce the risk of fragments from rocks chipped by small-arms fire.