Posted on February 23 2010 at 08:24 AM
By: Garrick He
First seen in late 1987, the Wuhan 351 is a modified Romeo Class
(Type 033G) (SSG), designated ES5G, converted as a trials
anti-ship missile platform. The project was probably inspired by
the Cold War era conventional-powered Russian Juliette class
cruise missile submarine. The Wuhan 351's structure consist of
six missile launcher tubes which are built into the casing
abreast the conning tower and elevated to fire. To provide target
acquisition an additional radar mast (Snoop Tray) is mounted
between the two periscopes. It uses Pike Jaw or Hercules, hull
mounted, search and attack, medium frequency sonar.
The Wuhan 351's primary weapon system consist of 6 missile
launchers, 3x launchers on either side of the conning tower. Each
of those watertight launcher tubes carries a single C-801
anti-ship missile. The C-801 incorporates technologies such as
inertial cruise, active radar homing sea-skimmer with 40 km (22
nautical miles) range at 0.9 Mach. The C-801 may soon be replaced
by C-802. The secondary weapon system consist of 8x 533mm torpedo
tubes with 14 torpedoes or 28 mines. The submarine has to surface
to fire missiles, although trials are reported to implement an
encapsulated missile which can be launched from the torpedo tube
while submerged. Based in the North Sea Fleet and reported still
doing trials in 1999. Clearly there is no intention to fit this
type of missile tube in other classes.
* Displacement: 1,650 tons surfaced and 2,100 tons
submerged
* Dimensions: 76.6 x 6.7 x 5.2 meters
* Speed: 13 knots submerged, 15 knots surfaced and 10 knots
snorting
* Endurance: 9 knots at 14,000 nm surface. 4 knots at 330 nm
submerged (batteries)
* Propulsion: Twin shafts. Diesel-electric drive.
* Engines: 2x Type 37D diesel engines at 4,000 hp each. 2x PG
series electric motors at 2,700 hp each. 2x creep motors at 100
hp each.
* Crew complement: 10 officers and 44 Enlisted.
* Armaments: 8x 533mm torpedo tubes. Six bow mounted and two are
stern mounted. 14 torpedoes or 28 mines.
* Missiles: 6x C-801 anti-ship missiles in watertight launcher
tubes.
Posted on January 31 2010 at 11:35 PM
USS Flier a Gato-class submarine, was the only ship of the United States Navy to be named for the flier, a round sunfish widely known in the United States.
Her keel was laid down 30 October 1942 by Electric Boat Company of Groton, Connecticut. She was launched on 11 July 1943 (sponsored by Mrs. A. S. Pierce), and commissioned on 18 October 1943 with Lieutenant Commander John D. Crowley in command.
Flier put in to Fremantle, Australia, to refit between 5 July
and 2 August 1944, then sailed on her second war patrol, bound
for the coast of Indochina via the Lombok Strait, Macassar
Strait and Balabac Strait. At about 2200 on 12 August, as she
transited Balabac Strait on the surface, she struck a naval
mine. Traveling at 18 knots (33 km/h), she disintegrated and
sank in less than a minute, but several of her crew managed to
escape.
Treading water in the darkness, the survivors took muster by
shouting out their names. Fourteen had survived, meaning that
72 officers and men had gone down with Flier.
Although they knew that they were only three miles from land,
they could not orient themselves in the overcast night.
Commander Crowley directed the survivors to tread water until
they could determine direction.
Moonrise was five hours later. By the time it became light enough to see a small island, six more of the crew died and the sea had become choppy. Unable to keep the survivors together, Commander Crowley ordered Lieutenant Liddell, Ensign Jacobson, RTC Howell, FCR2 Tremaine, QM3 Russo, MoMM3 Baumgart, and MoMM3 Miller to each make their own way to the beach. At about 1600 on 13 August, eighteen hours after the explosion, seven survivors met on Mantangula Island; Miller was unaccounted for.
The theory that the Flier hit a mine remains the most compelling explanation for its loss. According to Jacobson, the Flier crew initially tended to dismiss this idea because they knew that other U.S. submarines had recently passed through the area. Also, the Flier’s sonar did not indicate the presence of any mines. However, the use of frequency modulation sonar to detect mines was still in the developmental stage in mid-1944. Based on work done at the University of California War Research Laboratory in San Diego, Charles Lockwood informed Christie in late July that during recent trials, submarines had been able to pick up dummy mines at 450 yards. But the equipment was not regularly installed in submarines until 1945.
Japanese records confirm the presence of mines in Balabac Strait. Soon after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese submarines I-123 and I-124, two of Japan’s four Kirai Sen–type vessels used for mine laying, were deployed in the vicinity of the Philippines. Their task included placing forty mines in Balabac Strait on 8 December 1941; they would later drop mines off Darwin, Australia, as well. The Japanese mines, known as type 88, carried 400 pounds of explosive and could arm in depths of more than 1,000 feet.
The I-124 was sunk off Darwin on 20 January 1942 in a combined attack by the Australian minesweeper Deloraine and the U.S. destroyer Edsall. Given that the submarine sank in only forty feet of water, American divers were able to recover Japanese codebooks from the wreck—a significant breakthrough for Allied cryptanalysts. Seven months later, on 29 August, the I-123 was spotted by an Allied aircraft in the vicinity of Guadalcanal and attacked by the destroyer-minelayer USS Gamble. Following a depth charge attack, the submarine sank with all hands.14 But the I-123 and I-124 had already planted the seeds of their revenge.
Whether the Flier was brought down by a mine laid early in the war or one placed later is unclear. According to Eugene McGee, it is more likely that the Flier struck one of the 600 deep-sea contact mines laid in March 1944. The Japanese minelayer Tsugaru, attached to the Third Southern Expeditionary Force, departed Palau on 24 March to carry out operations in the Balabac Strait area. It was laying type 93, model 1 mines, which could be placed in water up to 3,500 feet deep and could be set to explode at depths up to 230 feet. Each mine was housed in a floating case and anchored below the surface by a cable attached to the seabed. This type of mine presented a menace that the U.S. Navy was apparently unaware of at the time. The navy believed that moored mines were ineffective in water more than 600 feet deep. Coincidentally, the Tsugaru also found a watery grave. The same USS Darter that later grounded on Bombay Shoal torpedoed the Tsugaru on 29 June 1944 in the Molucca Sea, about 720 miles from Balabac Strait.
As a weapon of war, one of the advantages of mines was their relatively low cost; they were sometimes referred to as the “poor man’s navy.” Their effectiveness, however, was questionable. It is estimated that the Japanese deployed more than 50,000 mines in the western Pacific, but some of their best “hits” were their own ships. According to one claim, submarines of the U.S. Seventh Fleet deployed about 600 mines that sank or damaged more than fifty ships. According to W. J. Holmes, however, fewer than thirty of those ships were Japanese. In any case, mines offered other tactical advantages. They deterred enemy ships from entering certain waters, delayed shipping by compelling vessels to use alternative routes, and caused the diversion of ships and manpower for minesweeping operations. In fact, the Imperial Japanese Navy employed some 350 craft and 25,000 men for minesweeping in 1945. The mining of coastal waters could also force ships into deeper water, where they were more vulnerable to attack by submarines.
The question of how many U.S. submarines became the victims of Japanese mines is also open to much conjecture. Active measures known as deperming and degaussing were taken to make submarines less susceptible to magnetic mines and torpedoes. Deperming reduced the magnetism that ships acquired during construction; it was first employed in November 1940 on the submarine Sailfish. In addition, submarines regularly went through the process of degaussing to neutralize their magnetic signature.19 These measures may have been effective, but there were other types of mines that did not require a magnetic field to detonate.
Beginning in 1944 the Japanese increasingly relied on mines as an antisubmarine measure. It was not uncommon for American submarines on patrol to come across mines floating on the surface, torn from their moorings by storms. Although the Geneva conventions stipulated that unmoored mines were supposed to automatically disarm themselves, experience proved that this often was not the case. Submarine crews usually tried to explode these floating mines by shooting at them with the deck guns or small arms. During two patrols of the USS Atule, for example, the crew spotted fifty-two mines and managed to destroy forty-four. This could be dangerous work. The crew of the USS Dace was unable to detonate most of the mines they encountered, but when they did succeed in exploding one using the 20 mm gun, the shrapnel reached the deck. Floating mines remained a hazard well after the war and were blamed for damaging or sinking hundreds of ships. In fact, initial speculation was that the Russian submarine Kursk had hit a World War II mine, causing it to sink in August 2000.
In addition to the Flier, it is commonly believed that as many as ten other American submarines were sunk by mines during World War II: USS Runner, USS Pompano, USS Capelin, USS Scorpion, USS Robalo, USS Escolar, USS Albacore, USS Swordfish, USS Kete, and USS Bonefish.21 Of these, the evidence for the sinking of the Albacore is most conclusive. A Japanese patrol boat witnessed the submarine’s death throes on 7 November 1944 after the Albacore struck a mine while running submerged near Esan Misaki, off the south coast of Hokkaido. Such eyewitness accounts were a rarity, however. The presumed loss of the Scorpion to a mine in February 1944 was based mainly on captured Japanese records documenting the presence of extensive minefields where the submarine went missing. Interestingly, the Scorpion’s postwar nuclear namesake would also disappear under mysterious circumstances in 1968.
Along with the dearth of survivors and other witnesses, one of the things that makes the cause of a submarine’s loss so difficult to pin down is the sheer number of things that might go wrong. Even without the threat of enemy action, the potential for human error and equipment failure was enormous. For instance, on 11 September 1944 the USS Crevalle was nearly lost when it surfaced at high speed with its main vents open. This was a fairly common practice that allowed the submarine to dive again quickly if enemy aircraft were spotted. In this case, though, the Crevalle’s stern planes were jammed in the dive position. Seawater swamped through the upper hatch, and the submarine headed toward the bottom. Only the self-sacrifice of the officer on the bridge, Lieutenant Howard James Blind, who managed to close the conning tower hatch, prevented that dive from being the Crevalle’s last.
Later that same month, the USS Narwhal found itself in a similar predicament. While evading an enemy plane, the Narwhal hurtled into a runaway dive when the stern planes seized up. The submarine’s downward momentum was finally stopped at 300 feet after blowing all the main ballast and backing the engines at emergency speed. Such out-of-control dives—so-called Nantucket sleigh rides—occurred with alarming regularity. Many submariners had similar near-death experiences.
Of the presumed victims of enemy mines, the fate of the USS Robalo is especially pertinent to the loss of the Flier. Although the details were unknown at the time, the Robalo was lost two miles off the west coast of Palawan Island near Balabac Strait on 26 July 1944, only a few weeks before the sinking of the Flier. Earlier, while on its second war patrol, the Robalo had already suffered an experience similar to that of the Crevalle and the Narwhal. In that incident, a Japanese plane dropped a bomb off the Robalo’s port side as it dived for cover. The submarine’s main induction began flooding, and the Robalo plunged out of control to 350 feet before regaining equilibrium.
The Robalo departed Fremantle for its third war patrol on 22 June 1944. While traveling from Pearl Harbor to Fremantle, the Flier apparently crossed paths with the Robalo on 30 June. At about 3:00 a.m. the Flier’s radar picked up a craft at 7,500 yards, and the crew went to battle stations. On closer inspection the radar operator became convinced that the vessel was an American submarine, and later information led to the conclusion that it had been the USS Robalo.
The last message from the Robalo was received on 2 July, when it reported sighting a Japanese battleship with escorts. Eventually it would be learned that the Robalo sank on 26 July, with the loss of seventy-four men. Four of the crew managed to swim two miles to the west coast of Palawan Island. They made their way through the jungle only to be captured by Japanese military police and taken to the infamous Puerto Princesa prison camp. On 2 August the Robalo survivors threw a note from their cell to a prison work detail. The note, which included their names and the Robalo’s designation number (SS-273), eventually ended up in the hands of guerrillas. On 15 August the four men from the Robalo were put on a Japanese patrol boat or destroyer, after which their fate is uncertain.The Robalo crewmen believed that their submarine had gone down as a result of a battery explosion. Most commentators, however, believe that it is more likely that the Robalo struck a mine. The fates of both the Robalo and the Flier support this theory.
Contrary to most other submarine disasters, there was only one officer among the Robalo’s survivors, Ensign Samuel L. Tucker. The skipper, Manning M. Kimmel, had been given command of the Robalo on 29 March 1944. He was the eldest son of Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, who, as commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet in 1941, had received much of the blame for the devastation at Pearl Harbor. At President Franklin Roosevelt’s direction, Admiral Kimmel had been relieved of all naval duties on 17 December 1941 and replaced by Admiral Chester Nimitz. Some, including Ralph Christie, thought that his father’s notoriety prompted Manning Kimmel to be overly aggressive in his submarine patrols. After confirmation of the Robalo’s loss, Christie wrote to Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid and noted in a postscript: “We had the impression that Manning was a little extra aggressive because of his Dad’s P.H. experience. In fact, I warned him not to ‘press.’” In the end, though, it was probably not Kimmel’s aggression or recklessness that sank the Robalo but simply bad luck.
Posted on December 16 2009 at 01:38 AM
From humble beginnings, submarines quickly evolved into the most sophisticated and powerful weapons of war ever devised. Whether patiently stalking their prey in two World Wars or carrying devastating nuclear missiles as a deterrent in the Cold War, these hunters of the deep have played an often unseen but crucial role in the conflicts of the 20th century. From the unexpectedly small to the terrifyingly huge, this program features some of the most innovative and ambitious weapon systems of the past 100 years. Based on scientific analyses, expert opinion, audience polls and technical comparison, we construct a five-point matrix to rank the TOP TEN SUBMARINES of all time.
Posted on December 13 2009 at 06:12 AM
The largest class of Imperial Navy submarine was the 20-boat B1 Type. 1-35 is the subject of this profile. The B1 Type epitomized the Imperial Navy's large scout submarines with a long-range, aircraft-handling capability, and heavy armament. The B1 Type kept the catapult forward as on earlier aircraft handling submarines, but the hangar was faired into the conning tower, improving underwater performance. 1-35 was completed in August 1942 and had a fairly typical career. She conducted several supply missions to Kiska Island in the Aleutians before being rammed and sunk by destroyer USS Frazier (00-607) on November 23, 1943 off Tarawa in the Gilbert Islands.
Posted on December 13 2009 at 06:11 AM
All Imperial Navy submarines were originally painted in a dark gray, typically with several markings. The hull number was carried on both sides of the conning tower, either painted on or placed on a canvas marker that could be removed to obscure the boat's identity. This was often accompanied by a representation of the Japanese national ensign. On May 6, 1942, 1-8 was mistakenly bombed by a Japanese aircraft off Kwajalein Island. After this, double white bands were painted on the decks of Japanese submarines as a recognition symbol.
The Imperial Navy did not utilize a well-developed system of warship camouflage during the Pacific War, but some submarines did carry camouflage measures. The Japanese believed that darker colors were harder to spot underwater and in lower visibility; accordingly, many boats were painted in an overall black scheme at the start of the war. A variation was to paint the boat's upper surfaces black, leaving the horizontal surfaces gray. Some boats employed a disruptive camouflage pattern using unknown dark colors over the original gray. Any such camouflage was instituted by the local commander.
During the war, the effectiveness of the Imperial Navy's submarine camouflage schemes was questioned, and the use of black reviewed. The "Submarine Hull Camouflage Experiment" was carried out by units attached to the Submarine School at Kure between December 1944 and March 1945. Ten older submarines participated in the study together with reconnaissance aircraft. Using paint transferred from the Germans, the Imperial Navy tested the effectiveness of the German light gray with four other colors - the standard Japanese black and gray, and two experimental colors, No.2 and No.5.
The results indicated that black was the most ineffective while the boat was surfaced, but the most effective when submerged. The German light gray was found to be ineffective in the waters off Japan. Color NO.2 (light gray with a blue-gray additive) proved the best on a surfaced submarine. However, after all this effort, it is unclear if the results of this test were applied to the Imperial Navy's surviving submarines for the last months of the war.
Posted on August 17 2008 at 03:41 AM
Model of the Surcouf at the MusĂŠe national de la Marine
Most navies were unduly impressed by the U-cruisers, and set about designing their own in the postwar years. Predictably, none of the designs justified their cost, but the British X.I (two twin 13.5cm- [5.2in-] gun mountings), the American Argonaut (V.4), Narwhal (V.5) and Nautilus (V.6) with two single 15.2cm (6in) each, and the French Surcouf (a twin 20.3cm [8in] turret) set new records. The Royal Navy found the X.I a great disappointment, and looked at more interesting uses for its three 'M' class. M.2 was converted to launch and recover a small Parnall Peto floatplane, while M.3 became a minelayer.
The French opposed any limit on submarine numbers at the Washington Naval Disarmament Conference in 1921-2. Some influential senior officers led by Admiral Daveluy, tried to prove that submarines could replace surface fleets entirely. With the support of the influential chairman of the Naval Estimates Committee, M de Kerguezec, they proposed a fleet of 200 to 250 submarines. The French Navy's rebuttal of this doctrine makes interesting reading. The alleged cheapness of the submarine was illusory, and ton-for-ton they were as expensive as battleships. They also required a large number of highly skilled people to build, operate and maintain them. Furthermore, their complexity gave them a shorter operational life - a submarine with worn-out systems is unsafe to dive.
The Surcouf
The French also attempted to use aircraft on board submarines but met with very limited success. Their one and only successful attempt to launch submarine-borne aircraft was on the giant 2,800-ton Surcouf, the pride of the French submarine service. Built in 1929, Surcouf was the second largest submarine in the world, the first being Britain's 3,050-ton British X-1. A match for many surface warships, Surcouf had twin turret-mounted, 8-inch guns and formidable torpedo armament. Her biggest drawbacks were that she was too large and too slow at diving. That meant she was only at her best when on convoy duty and when her scout seaplane, the Besson MB 411-AFN, was flying ahead, looking for enemy warships and submarines.
She was seized by the Royal Navy personnel on July 3, 1940; 3 British personnel and a French seaman die in scuffles on board the submarine.
In December 1941 the French Vice Admiral Emil Henri Muselier, Commander in Chief of the Free French Naval Force and Merchant Marine, arrives in Halifax, Nova Scotia, to inspect the submarine Surcouf and the corvettes Mimosa, Aconit and Alysse which are stationed here on escort duty. In London, French Brigadier General Charles-Andr De Gaulle, Commander-in-Chief Free French Forces, orders Muselier to prepare a Free French Naval Force in Halifax to begin preparations for the liberation of the French islands of Saint Pierre and Miquelon in the Atlantic Ocean about 19 miles (30 kilometers) off the southeastern coast of Newfoundland. Muselier notifies the Canadians and the American Embassy in Ottawa, Ontario, of his orders. Washington attempts to halt the mission and Canada announces its intention to land its own troops on the islands to prevent Axis use of the island's radio transmitter. De Gaulle again orders the expedition to proceed and Saint Pierre and Miquelon are duly liberated by the Free French on 24 December 1941.
Surcouf's seaplane hangar was built as an integral part of the conning tower, and launch and recovery were achieved by using a crane after the submarine had stopped its engines. Tests continued until 1942, when, on the night of February 19, Surcouf disappeared with all hands. She was thought to have sunk after colliding with the American freighter Thompson Lykes while en route to the Panama Canal. [1] There were no aircraft on board at the time.
[1] Fate of the Surcouf
On 18 February 1942, Surcouf was lost with all hands. An official joint U.S. and Free French report stated that she left Bermuda on 12 February and was accidentally rammed and sunk by the American freighter Thompson Lykes off the north coast of Panama near the Panama Canal. The report states that the accident was due to both vessels running at night with no lights because of the menace of German U-boats. A later French investigation commission stated that the Surcouf had been sunk by US planes in the morning of the 18th in a "friendly fire" accident in the same area.
After colliding with Thompson Lykes and sustaining a long split in her port saddle tank, Surcouf's captain, Georges Blaison, thought he'd been rammed, and dove to around 100 meters when Lykes circled back to check for survivors.
French Investigation
All Surcouf's crew were aboard, including the British watch
officer who yelled a single word in English--"Help!"--just before
impact; and the sub's pressure hull was intact.
After Lykes resumed her trek north to Charleston, SC, Blaison
surfaced to check for damage; although Surcouf had lost most of
the fuel from her port saddle, she could still keep way on.
Surcouf made for Colon at half speed, and was less than 50 miles
from the east end of the Panama Canal when dawn broke on the 19th
of February.
Three OS2U patrol planes out of Coco Solo spotted Surcouf on the
surface, not showing colors and heading for the Canal; she failed
to answer her challenge. The patrol assumed her to be hostile,
and proceeded to bomb her. Unable to submerge in less than 2 1/2
minutes, she took several direct hits and went down with all
hands.
Career (France)
Ordered: December 1927
Launched: 18 October 1929
Commissioned: May 1934
Struck: 6 December 1943
Fate: Sunk
General characteristics
Displacement: 3,250 tons surfaced
4,304 tons submerged
2,880 tons dead
Length: 110 m (361 ft)
Beam: 9 m (29 ft 6 in)
Draught: 7.25 m (23.8 ft)
Propulsion: surfaced: two Sulzer diesel engines 7,600 hp submerged: two electric motors 3400 hp two propellers
Speed: 18.5 knots (34.3 km/h) surfaced 10 knots (20 km/h) submerged
Range: 18,500 kilometres (10,000 nautical miles) at 10 knots (20 km/h) surfaced
12,600 kilometres (6,800 nautical miles) at 13.5 knots (25.0 km/h) surfaced
130 kilometres (70 nautical miles) at 4.5 knots (8.3 km/h) submerged
110 kilometres (60 nautical miles) at 5 knots (9 km/h) submerged
Endurance: 90 days
Test depth: 80 m (250 ft)
Boats and landing craft carried: 1 motorboat in watertight deck well
Capacity: 280 tons
Complement: eight officers 110 men
Armament: two 203mm/50 Modèle 1924 guns twin turret
two 37 mm anti-aircraft cannon
four 13.2 mm anti-aircraft machineguns
eight 550 mm torpedo tubes (14 torpedoes carried)
four 400 mm torpedo tubes (eight torpedoes carried)
Aircraft carried: one Besson MB.411 float plane
At the time of her launch in 1927, the U.S. had two V-class subs that were longer--the Barracuda at 371 feet LOA, and the Narwhal at 381.
Posted on January 10 2008 at 05:54 AM
German strategic naval planners knew that in order to sustain any U-boat offense in distant shores, the operational boats would need to re-supplied and replenished. Except for a handful of friendly ports, the Axis powers did not share the privilege as the Allied forces in having friendly foreign bases in which they could re-supply and replenish. As a result, a supply U-tanker design was proposed in 1934, which role was to conduct U-boat replenishment at sea. This led to the Type IV design, a 2,500 ton supply U-boat, but tonnage restrictions of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement restricted Germany’s submarine tonnage to 45 percent of the Royal Navy. Since operational U-boats were the priority, the Type IV design was dropped.
It was not until September 8 1939 that the project was revived when Donitz raised a request to construct three supply U-boats with a tonnage of 2,000 tons each. The supply boat was required to have good storage capacity and a suitable upper deck for the transfer of stores.
The engineers based their design on the existing much larger Type IXD, but shortened it and gave it a much wider upper deck. The hull was also deeper and constructed of thicker pressure hull, giving it deeper diving capabilities than the Type VII and IX. To maximize storage capacity, it had no torpedo attack capability but was fitted with anti-aircraft weapons for self-defense. Two 37mm cannons were fitted, one forward and one aft of the bridge and a single 20mm on a platform aft. The Type XIV shared many components with the Type VIIC and the bridge was identical to the Type IX.
Because of their role as supply U-Boats, the Type XIV was nicknamed "milk-cows" (milchkuh). They acted as force multipliers wherein a network of supply U-Boats would replenish operational boats with the much needed torpedoes, food, fuel, and other provisions. They also carried a doctor onboard and a bakery which could provide freshly baked bread. In effect, the Type XIVs enabled operational boats to remain much longer in their patrol zones, significantly increasing their presence.
A total of ten Type XIVs were built from an original order of 24 boats. Eleven were cancelled and a further three were nearly complete when their orders too were cancelled in mid-1944. The Allies knew the threat posed by these supply boats and made a determined effort to wipe them out. All ten boats were sunk. By necessity, the large Type IX was pressed into service as supply boats.
Replenishment at sea suffered from two major shortcomings.
First, a great deal of radio traffic was required to set up a
rendezvous. These messages were frequently intercepted using
either HFDF or by decrypting their communications. By mid 1943,
virtually all planned rendezvous were known well in advance by
the Allies. Second, the replenishment exercise was time consuming
and had to be done on the surface. The replenishing boats were
especially vulnerable as it could not dive to evade enemy
attacks. The Allies, particularly the Americans used this to
their fullest advantage which resulted in the complete
destruction of the supply boats.
Operational History
Of the 24 boats ordered, ten Type XIVs entered operational service. Seven had conducted successful re-supply missions while three were sunk on their first mission. The first Type XIV was U-459 (Georg von Wilamovitz-Moellendorff), commissioned in November 1941 and made her first patrol in April 1942. The last Type XIV was U-490 (Wilhelm Gerlach), commissioned on March 1943 and sunk on June 12 1944 during her first sortie. The supply boats paid a high price with none surviving the war.
Operational summary of the ten boats :-
U-459 – Commissioned: Nov 15 1941 Fate:
Sunk Date: Jul 24 1943
(Kptlt. Georg von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff)
After having carry out five successful re-supply missions, she was on her way for her sixth mission when British aircraft found and attacked her in the Bay of Biscay. The British Wellington was shot down, but it crash landed on the U-boat’s deck. The crew cleared the wreckage which included unexploded depth charges. The depth charges had shallow settings and exploded beneath the boat, seriously damaging it. Unable to dive, a second attack from a Wellington sealed her fate. Scuttling charges were set and the captain saluted his crew and went down with his boat. 19 dead and 41 survivors.
U-460 – Commissioned: Dec 24 1941 Fate:
Sunk Date: Oct 4 1943
(Kptlt. Ebe Schnoor)
She had carried out five successful re-supply missions.
During her sixth re-supply mission North of the Azores, the U-460
was surprised by aircraft from the USS Card along with three
other boats; the U-264 which had just taken on fuel, the U-422
and U-455 awaiting its turn.
The first attack damaged U-460 hampering her ability to dive.
Anticipating more aircraft attack, the U-264 and U-422 stayed on
the surface to defend the tanker. The ensuing duel saw twelve
aircraft pitted against three boats. The U-460 and U-422 was sunk
while the U-264 got away. 62 dead and 2 survivors.
U-461 – Commissioned: Jan 30 1942 Fate:
Sunk Date: Jul 30 1943
(Oblnt. Hinrich-Oscar Bernbeck)
She had carried out five successful re-supply missions. On her sixth mission, a group of four U-boats the U-461, U-462, U-504 and U-550 were crossing the Bay of Biscay in an attempt to break through into the Atlantic. The pack was attacked by a task force which sank three of the four boats. Only the U-550 escaped. The U-461 was sank by Australian aircraft. 53 dead and 15 survivors.
U-462 – Commissioned: Mar 5 1942 Fate:
Sunk Date: Jul 30 1943
(Oblt. Bruno Vowe)
The U-462 was part of the Gruppe Monsun Pack. She had
carried out two successful re-supply missions and on her outbound
journey to refuel the Gruppe Monsun boats, she was surprised and
attacked by aircraft along with U-461 (see above), U-504 and
U-550.
The aircraft attack had left her unable to dive, while the
warships of the 2nd Escort Group closed in for the kill. The
captain ordered for the boat to be scuttled. 1 dead and 64
survivors.
U-463 – Commissioned: Apr 2 1942 Fate:
Sunk Date: May 16 1943
(KrvKpt. Leo Wolfbauer)
She had carried out four successful re-supply missions but was sunk on the fifth in the Bay of Biscay. A single British Halifax attacked with depth charges with the loss of all hands onboard. 57 dead.
U-464 – Commissioned: Apr 30 1942 Fate:
Sunk Date: Aug 20 1942
(Kptlt. Otto Harms)
The U-464 was sunk on her first patrol by US Navy Catalina aircraft off Newfoundland, southeast of Iceland. She was scuttled with 2 dead and 52 survivors.
U-487 – Commissioned: Dec 21 1942 Fate:
Sunk Date: Jul 13 1943
(Oblt. Helmut Metz)
U-487 had conducted two very successful re-supply missions
when it needed to replenish her own stores. U-160, a large
outbound Type IXC was ordered to rendezvous with U-487 and
transfer to her all the fuel and provisions she could spare and
then return to base.
The Allies intercepted the radio messages and sent five Avenger
and several Wildcat aircraft from the USS Core. Allied pilots
reported seeing the crew sunbathing on deck when the surprise
attack began. One Wildcat was shot down but the U-487 ultimately
lost the battle. 31 dead and 33 survivors.
U-488 – Commissioned: Feb 1 1943 Fate:
Sunk Date: Apr 26 1943
(Ltnt. Erwin Bartke)
The U-488 carried out two very successful re-supply missions. During its third mission in the mid-Atlantic, after having re-supplied five boats, it was found and sunk by depth charges from four US destroyer escorts. All hands were lost. 64 dead.
U-489 – Commissioned: Mar 8 1943 Fate:
Sunk Date: Aug 4 1943
(Ltnt. Adalbert Schmandt)
During her first patrol, the U-489 successfully fended off an attack by a RAF Hudson on August 3 1943. But on the following day, she was attacked by a Canadian Sunderland aircraft. The aircraft was shot down with six survivors fished out of the sea. But the U-boat had sustained serious damage herself and had to be scuttled. 1 dead and 58 survivors.
U-490 – Commissioned: Mar 27 1943 Fate:
Sunk Date: Jun 12 1944
(Oblt. Wilhelm Gerlach)
U-490 was the last of the supply U-boats and after the appalling loses of this class, a new approach was taken to refuel while submerged. The U-490 was fitted with special underwater refueling equipment and after testing for a year, she finally sailed to take up station at the Indian Ocean. On Jun 12 1944, during the outbound journey, she was detected and attacked by a US escort carrier and three of her destroyer escorts. She was sunk southwest of the Azores, but all 60 of her crew survived.
A further three nearing completion were cancelled in mid-1944 with the remaining eleven never launched.
Technical Specification
Type XIV
Role: Supply U-Boat
Displacement
Surfaced: 1668 tons
Submerged: 1932 tons
Dimensions
Length
Beam
Draught
220ft (67.1m)
30.7ft (9.4m)
21.4ft (6.5m)
Top
speed
Surfaced: 14.4 knots
Submerged: 6.2 knots
Maximum
range
Surfaced at 12kt: 9300nm
Submerged at 4kt: 55nm Crush depth 787ft (240m)
Engines
Diesel Electric
3200hp Diesel
750hp electric motor
Weapons
Guns
2 x 37mm Flak
1 x 20mm Flak
Officers and crew 6 + 47 = 53
Total ordered 24 (10 built)
First launch November 1941
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