Steyr-Daimler-Puch was assigned the task of developing a family of light and heavy armoredrailway reconnaissance vehicles in the winter of 1943.

The schweren Schienenpanzerspahzug(heavy armored scout train) shown here came in two basic forms, an Artilleriewagen(artillery car) fitted with a surplus turret from older model PzKpfw IV tanks with a short 75mm gun, and a Kommandowagen(command car) to carry infantry and the command element of the train; aproposed flak version never entered production.



Each Eisenbahnpanzerzug(railroad armored train) sSp.would have been deployed with 12 of these self-propelled vehicles: two Flak, four artillery, and six command vehicles. plus supporting control wagons and other equipment.

These units could operate as a single train, but were intended to be operated independently orin small groups depending on the mission.

Sixteen of these units were planned but only six were formed starting in May 1944, numbered 201 (sSp.) to 206 (sSp.) and became operational from November 1944 to April 1945. Steyr was also assigned to develop a Panzerjager-Treibwagen(roughly, "tank destroyer car") armored rail-cruiser configured like the Soviet MBV D-2 that had been captured and employed since the summer of 1941.

They were armed with two turrets from the PzKpfw IV Ausf H, and production began in December 1944 with five planned, numbered from 51 to 55. Only three were completed, too late for combat deployment.

Panzertriebwagen Nr.16 was a unique design, beginning in 1942 as an armored version ofthe WR550D14 diesel locomotive. The original SP 42 scheme was to fit special armored cars forward and aft for 20mm Flak 38 antiaircraft cannon. In December 1942 the program shifted to the creation of an armored rail-cruiser fitted with artillery turrets at either end, armed with captured Soviet Putilov 76.2mm Mod. 02/30 field guns.

It was deployed in the summer of 1944, supplemented by a pair of Panzerj채gerwagenon either end with Soviet T-34 turrets on flatcars. It was used for patrols in southwestern Poland through the end of 1944, and finally retreated after the January 1945 Soviet offensive, being captured in the final days of the war by the Soviet
Sixty-First Army. It served after the war with the Polish People's Army in anti partisan operations in southeastern Poland and was finally withdrawn from service in the late 1960s.

The British Expeditionary Force that landed in France in 1939 was a fully mechanized formation. Perhaps the loss of about 90,000 vehicles in France was a blessing to the British military transport organization as it cleared all the 'dead wood', and thus paved the way for fresh ideas. The chronic shortage of transport forced a further temporary introduction of impressment until specific types of vehicles could be produced in greater numbers. The Commonwealth with its many assets was given the orders to produce many of these urgently needed types. Canada made a contribution out of all proportion to the size of its small automotive industry with its series of all-wheel-drive tactical trucks ranging from 15-cwt 4 x 4 to 3-ton 6x6, produced with various types of cabs from 1940 to 1943. During the early period the Canadian chassis and cabs were built to Canadian designs but to British specifications. The early wooden bodies were later replaced by pressed steel bodies.

The invasion of Europe was soon in the minds of the Allied planners, and considerable thought was being given to supplying the vast armies that would make the attack across Europe into Germany. It would require a supply system of a magnitude never before envisaged, and the production of trucks would be at a premium for the next two to three years. The British truck industry thus began to produce its own four-wheel-drive vehicles, with such established names as Bedford, Ford, Karrier, Thornycroft and Albion being to the fore. Once the Allied assault had gained momentum the supply lines would soon be overstretched, and to help overcome this problem heavier 10-ton trucks were also put into production.

A brief Survey of Types

Just before the outbreak of war in 1939 the British army was in the process of intensive mechanization, and several classes of load capacity had been defined for 'B' vehicles. The second class was the 8-cwt truck which fulfilled such roles as the OS (General Service) and FFW (Fitted For Wireless). Such 8-cwt trucks with both 4x2 and 4x4 wheel arrangements were produced in considerable numbers from a period just before the war, but were eventually phased out of production in order to rationalize output and reduce the number of types in service. The 5-cwt and 15-cwt classes could carry out any duties that had been allocated to the 8-cwt class. These vehicles were manufactured by Ford, Morris and Humber. Similar in appearance, these vehicles had detachable well-type bodies with seating for three men (two facing offside and one nearside) and canvas tilts, though the wireless version had seating for two men only.

Together with the Ford 4x2 Heavy Utility, the Humber Heavy Utility Car was the basic staff and command car of the British army during World War II at all levels of command. Nicknamed the Humber 'Box', this was the only British built four-wheel drive utility car, and production began during May 1941, continuing for the duration of the war. Employed on a very wide scale, this staff car remained in service until the late 1950s.

The Morris Company produced a whole range of vehicles for the British army, one of the most successful being the Morris C8 Artillery Tractor (popularly known as the Quad). Introduced in 1939, this vehicle had four-wheel drive and was equipped with a 4-ton winch driven from the transfer case. It had a distinctive beetle-shaped body and usually a towed limber and 18- or 25-pdr gun/howitzer. As far as the army was concerned the vehicles built for gun-towing had to have the same characteristics as the horse-drawn gun carriage team which they replaced, such as good cross-country performance, seating for the gun crew, and adequate stowage space for equipment and ammunition.

During 1935 the War Office carried out trials with new lorry models, and the Bedford Truck Division of Vauxhall Motors Ltd submitted various prototype vehicles. One of these was a modification of the commercial 2-ton lorry with rear-wheel drive. Following the trials the vehicle was fitted with a new radiator and larger tyres. After further trials in 1936 the chassis was modified to increase the ground clearance and a new engine cooling system was incorporated. In 1937aspecial-totype Bedford WD prototype was produced on this chassis, rated at 15-cwt payload capacity. The most noticeable feature was the flat full-width bonnet necessitated by the extra-large air filter specified by the War Mechanisation Board. During 1938 a more powerful engine was used. An initial order for 2,000 Bedford 15-cwt Truck vehicles was placed in August 1939, the first 50 being constructed as special portée vehicles to carry the 2-pdr anti-tank gun. Originally, the vehicle had an open cab with folding windscreen and collapsible canvas tilt, but from 1943 an enclosed cab with side-doors, canvas top and perspex side screens was adopted. By the end of the war Bedford had produced a total of 250,000 vehicles, a large proportion of which were this model. The vehicle remained in service with the British army until the late 1950s. Although intended mainly as a workhorse for the infantry, the Bedford 15-cwt GS eventually became used by all arms including the Royal Navy and the RAF.

Bedford's involvement in four-wheel drive vehicles began in 1938, during the development stages of the square-nosed 15-cwt Bedford. It was suggested that the War Office be approached with permission to proceed with this design. Some degree of interest was expressed, but as no immediate requirement was envisaged the matter proceeded no further. Then Bedford decided to undertake private development on a low-priority basis with an eye to future military orders. After the outbreak of war the War Office issued orders for large quantities of 4 x 2 vehicles and also told Bedford to proceed with a prototype 4x4 3-ton general-service truck. In October 1939 a specification was approved, and on 1 February 1940 the first prototype was completed and was out on road tests. Within a month two more had joined it for extensive factory and military tests. The usual army tests were completed and the fitments for special tools installed, and drivers began training to operate this new truck. It had taken one year exactly from the first prototype to the first production vehicles, a commendable feat in a time of great stress and shortages. The Bedford QL was designed to use its four-wheel drive on rough terrain, but could disengage the front drive for use on hard roads to ease the wear on tires and gearbox, the change being effected by moving a lever on the secondary gearbox. Another feather in Bedford's cap (and a surprise one) was the lack of normal teething troubles during the QL's early use. It was only after about one year in service that the first sign of trouble occurred, and a rather peculiar one at that: a tendency for the vehicle to shudder when the brakes were applied slightly. These reports were followed up immediately, and it was found that only a small proportion of vehicles were showing this fault. After some time spent on investigation the fault was found to be simple, and the deep-treaded cross-country tires were replaced by normal road tires, whereupon the problem ceased.

The first production vehicle was the steel-bodied OLD issued to units of the Army Service Corps as a general carrier. From this model stemmed many variants, including the QLT 3-ton troop carrier with a modified and lengthened chassis to accommodate the extra long body to carry 29 troops and kit. The QLT was popularly known as the 'Drooper'. The QLR wireless house type was used by all arms of the signals. The truck featured an auxiliary generator, and other variants on this house type body were command, cipher office and mobile terminal carrier vehicles. A special requirement for use in the Western Desert was a 6-pdr portée, a vehicle designed to transport and fire a 6-pdr anti-tank gun from the body. It was necessary to modify the cab by cutting off the upper half and fitting a canvas top, and when this type became redundant the surviving vehicles were converted back to general-service types after being rebodied, The RAF was a major operator of, the Bedford QL, many being used as fuel tankers with swinging booms to refuel aircraft. Two experimental vehicles that never progressed beyond the prototype stage were the Giraffe and Bren. The Giraffe was designed for amphibious landings: all the major components were raised (along with the cab) on a special frame for deep wading. When fully elevated the vehicle's automotive parts were raised 2.13 m (7 ft) and the driver 3.05m (10ft). The vehicle was approved for production in the event that the waterproofing system then in use failed. The Bren was developed by the Ministry of Supply by taking a standard Bedford QLD and replacing the rear wheels with components from the Bren Gun Carrier, thus creating a halftrack. The aim of this scheme was to reduce rubber wear. The vehicle was considered adequate during tests, but the shortage of rubber did not materialize and the project was dropped.

To meet her urgent need for motor transport the UK turned to the Commonwealth for a degree of support, the major supplier to the UK from the Commonwealth being Canada. Canada herself, once on a war footing, had urgent need to supply her own armies with equipment as every transport vehicle then in service was of civil origin. During early 1937 Ford of Canada had been approached to produce 15-cwt trucks based on similar lines to those of British design. General Motors of Canada also participated. Ford's experimental vehicle was produced in no great haste at the Windsor plant, the pilot model being built up around a Ford V-8 chassis with wheels and tyres imported from England. When completed in 1937 the vehicle was tested at the then small army testing ground at Camp Petawawa, near Ottawa. On arrival it was discovered that the specification had changed to a four-wheel drive application. Nevertheless, the type gave a good account of itself, and the Canadian Military Pattern Chassis formed the basis of many 15-cwt and 8-cwt trucks. During early 1940 the standard pattern of Canadian truck began to emerge with four-wheel drive, and in July of 1940, after Dunkirk, the UK placed a preliminary order for 7,000 vehicles. By 1941 Canada was the Empire's main supplier of light and medium trucks.

Standardization was again of the utmost importance within a range of trucks including 8-cwt, 15- cwt, 30-cwt and 3-ton 4x4, 3-ton 6x4 and 3-ton 6x6 vehicles. Various Canadian cabs were produced through the different stages of development: the number 11 cab was identifiable by the radiator externally mounted to the bonnet; the number 12 cab had the radiator mounted inside the bonnet; the number 13 cab was a complete revision in design to allow more cab interior space and better placing of the foot pedals, and also had a forward sloping windscreen; and the number 43 was basically a number 13 with a soft top.

The 3-ton 4x4 became the mainstay of Canadian production, and was a reliable vehicle produced by both Ford and Chevrolet. The body variations were enormous and can only be touched briefly within this text. All models were produced in the general service role, some with timber and some with all-pressed-steel bodies, and other types included water and petrol tankers, mobile gun carriages, wireless house bodies, machinery vehicles (various types from 15-cwt mounted welding units to 6x6 fully - equipped workshops), office bodies, ambulances and other medical requirement vehicles, and breakdown and recovery vehicles. Canada also supplied many conventional types from all the large manufacturers, fitted with military tires/wheels and bodies. Over 900,000 Canadian vehicles were produced within the five-year period. The Australian commitment was not on so grand a scale, the majority of production trucks being in the light range. Most of the medium to heavy trucks were supplied in kit or chassis and cab form, usually from Canada, to which locally-built bodies were added. Some of the conventional trucks supplied were used in halftrack conversions, but this never progressed beyond the experimental stage. All Canadian Fords were reassembled at the Ford subsidiary plant at Geelong, in Victoria State some 48 km (30 miles) west of Melbourne.

The AEC Matador 4x4 tractor first appeared in 1939, and was built to a War Office specification to tow 4.5-in (114-mm), 5.5-m (140-mm) and 6-in (152-mm) howitzers. The requirement was for a four-wheel tractor with seating for the crew and ammunition stowage. The early production vehicles had a cab roof of different shape to that of later production trucks, the latter having a circular hatch for air observation; when not in use this was covered by a small canvas sheet. The basic design of the cab was very simple and robust, being built on a wooden frame with steel sheets. The body was of conventional timber construction with a drop tailboard and a side door for use by the gun crew. Special runners were fitted to the floor to allow shells to be moved to the rear tailgate for unloading. The Matador was powered by a 6-cylinder 7.58-litre AEC engine producing 71 kW (95 bhp), allowing a top speed of 58 km/h (36 mph). For pulling purposes (for example extracting guns from mud) a 7-ton winch was fitted with 76 m (250 ft) of wire rope. The Matador was used in most theatres of the war. In the desert it proved to be extremely popular with the gun crews for its reliability, and photographic evidence shows that some had the tops of the cabs cut down to door level. Matadors were also pressed into service in the desert to tow transporter trailers because of the lack of proper tractors for this purpose. Total production of Matadors was 8,612. The RAF was also a major user of this vehicle, 400 being supplied in various offerings. The General Load Carrier had a special all-steel body with drop down sides and tailgate to facilitate easy loading, and the support posts could also be removed, Special flat platform trucks were also supplied to transport heavy equipment such as dumpers and compressors. An armoured command post was also built on this chassis, called the Dorchester, in which accommodation was provided internally for high- or low-powered radio transmitting and receiving equipment, and an external penthouse could be erected. As these vehicles were considered prime targets they were carefully disguised to look like general-service trucks. Approximately 175 Matadors were built in 1942 as self-propelled gun carriages and comprised a 6-pdr anti-tank gun mounted in an armoured box. The cab and body were also armoured. Other variants included power equipment 20 kVA, power equipment 50 kVA, air-traffic control, and an experimental 25-pdr portée.

The last did not progress beyond the prototype stage. The last of the Matadors were auctioned off in the mid-1970s, this late disposal date proving the sound strength and reliability of these trucks.

Designed as a heavy load carrier, the Leyland Hippo 6x4 10-ton truck entered military service in 1944 and eventually proved its worth hauling supplies during the closing stages of the Allied advance across North West Europe. The huge bodies on these trucks had a well-type floor incorporating the wheel arches, this giving a lower loading height, an important element in the war days as fork-lift trucks were few and much loading was accomplished by hand. Steel hoops and a canvas tilt gave weather protection to the stores carried. The Hippo Mk 1 initial version was based on a pre-war commercial type with an open cab with canvas tilt and fixed windscreen, while the Hippo Mk 2 had an all-steel cab. The Hippo Mk 2 had single rear wheels, whilst the Hippo Mk 2A had dual wheels fitted with 10- 50-22 tires. The difficulty experienced with the Mk 2A was the need to carry two spare wheels, one for the front and one for the rear. It is perhaps quite amazing to see these trucks still in service in the 1980s. Besides the general service vehicle, many were fitted with large van type bodies, and several expandable body types were built, albeit of similar design. The side panels were split horizontally, the upper half being raised to form extra roof area and the lower half forming extra floor space to provide additional freedom around machinery. The vehicles could also be linked together to form a consolidated workshop area. Van bodies included an auto-processing type for developing photographs, an enlarging and rectifying type for exposing original film onto new film, a printing type with a rotary offset printing machine, and a photo-mechanical type equipped with a rotary offset printer, work tables and plate racks. Entrance to all these bodies was through a single door in the rear. Because of the length of the body, the spare wheel had to be transferred from behind the cab and placed under the rear of the chassis.

A post-war fitting was the adoption of a 9092-litre (2,000-Imp gal) AVTUR refueller body and, with the rear body removed, of a Coles Mk 7 or Neal Type QMC crane.

Col. David Glantz in lecture quoted a Soviet officer saying "the two most common vehicles to be seen in the Red Army were the T-34 tank and the Studebaker truck".

The Studebaker US6 is a class of trucks manufactured by Studebaker during World War II, produced in the United States from 1941-1945 and in the Soviet Union beginning in 1942.

These had six-cylinder gasoline engines that attained 94 horsepower and were fitted with a five-speed transmission. Approximately 200,000 of the trucks were built, in thirteen different variations, including dump truck and tractor models. The most common wheel configurations were 6×6 and 6×4.

Large numbers of Lend-Lease Studebaker trucks were sent into the Soviet Union via the Persian Corridor. The Soviets found them a good platform for Katyusha rocket launchers, although it was not their prime use in the Soviet Union. It filled many roles in the RKKA, such as pulling artillery and was renowned for its ruggedness and reliability. The truck was affectionately known as the Studer by Soviet troops.

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The Tatra T111 was a truck produced in Czechoslovakia by the Tatra Company.

History

The T111 was developed and manufactured during WWII as heavy truck for use by the Wehrmacht. Production started in 1942 and continued for twenty years, ending in 1962 when it was replaced by the Tatra T138. Despite being built for the Nazi war machine, the vehicle ultimately played important role after the war ended. The Tatra T111 contributed significantly to the rebuilding effort during the postwar era, mainly in Eastern Europe and the USSR. To its chief designer however it brought the charges of treason and collaboration with Nazi regime after communists' takeover of Czechoslovakia and contributed to the imprisonment of Tatra design guru Hans Ledwinka.

Design and Technology

The design was based on the proven Tatra concept of a backbone tube chassis construction with swing half axles, a modular gearbox and differential assemblies. The main advantages of the central load carrying backbone tube are its high torsion and bend strength, which protects the truck body against load stresses. The secondary advantage is that it houses all important parts of the drive train. Due to its torsion stiffness and use of differentials locks the vehicle had an exceptional off-road capabilities. Of note was the ability to use a cranking handle to start the engine.

Engine

Model V910 - the first Tatra aircooled powerplant V12 75 degree V developed from Tatra V850 engine intended for use in Tatra 103 (Sd Kfz. 234 Puma).The engines had power output of 210 horsepower at 2250 RPM mainly for war use (An average life expectancy during combat for Wehrmacht was 6 hours.) which was later reduced to 180 hp at 1800 rpm to increase reliability.

Chassis

Central backbone tube, front and rear axles with independent swing half axles. Front axle suspended on quarter elliptic leaf springs, rear axles suspended on half elliptic longitunal leaf spring. The service brakes were air all-round drums, parking brake was mechanical acting on rear end of backbone tube output shaft via rotating drum.

* Front track = 2,080 mm (81.9 in)

* Rear track = 1,800 mm (70.9 in)

* Wheelbase = 4,175 mm (164.4 in)+1,200 mm (47.2 in)

* Road clearance = 300 mm (11.8 in)

Transmission

* Drive - 6x6 Selectable front wheels drive

* Main gearbox - 4+1 (1 and 2 gears synchronized)

gear ratios - 5.29, 2.78, 1.62, 1.00, R 5.91

Auxiliary gearbox - 2 speed

gear ratios - off-road - 4.52, highway - 1.82

* Differentials - ratio 3.19

* Clutch - 2x plate, dry

Bodywork

The cab originally used wood for its construction due to strategic unavailability of steel during the war, in later years the wooden frame was steel plated and the last models used an all steel cabin. The vehicle was capable of a top speed of approximately 65 km/h (40 mph). The maximum cargo capacity was 10.3 tonnes and it had the ability to tow up to 22 tonnes trailer.

Production

The Tatra T111 was in production for 20 years, with a total of approximately 34,000 units made. The T111 engine was widely used in the variety of other vehicles such as a heavy tractor T141, a railway car M 131, airport tugs and pontoon bridges used by the army. The engine was also "halved" to create an inline 6 cylinder version for the Praga V3s 6x6 light utility military truck and civilian Praga S5T light truck. T111 main product range was in flatbed, tipper, tanker and crane configuration.

Models

T111VVN military

T111VVN military

T111 R - Flatbed

T111 NR - Flatbed with auxiliary gearbox powered winch

T111 N Special - Flatbed with foldable sides , winch military specs

T111 S - Three way tipper with wooden sides

T111 S2 - All steel three way tipper heavy duty

T111 C - Tanker

T111 D - Bodybuilders chassis

Legacy

The Tatra T111 exploits at Siberia had earned its reputation and its legendary reliability contributed to its iconic status among those who had driven and lived in those conditions. The T111 concept and technology continued its evolution in following years with successful line of Tatra models.

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Blueprint

Calibre 35: Army Firetruck Opel Blitz . Great conversion!

During the thirties and forties it became necessary to have mobile fire fighting units available. Prototype TFL 15 is based on our Opel Blitz 3-ton chassis and was produced by various companies. Some of these vehicle had 4-wheel drive. The tank holds 2500 litres per minute. These vehicles, which were originally produced before the war can still be seen in service with only small changes added.

Opel "Blitz" (Kfz.305) (4 x 2) During World War Two the German Army adopted and intensively used many types of cargo truck, but without doubt the three-tone Opel "Blitz" was the most famous of all Wehrmacht vehicles. With more than 100,000 built, these trucks with the Blitz's characteristic lightning emblem on the radiator front panel became symbolic of Germany's conquests. Its tire tracks could be seen in the great city squares of Europe; in the fields of France and also in the endless sands of the African desert; and it even overcame the infamous Russian mud. These trucks had a reputation of hardiness and being easy to repair which made them a legend.

The story of the Opel "Blitz" began in the mid-1930s when the new German National Socialist government instigated a program of economic modernization with a clearly expressed militaristic direction. At this time the American General Motors concern had already owned the Opel factories for ten years and Opel had quickly become a major German car manufacturer, with a great family of different vehicle types. One of their most successful designs was the Opel "Blitz" S whose production started in 1936. When the 'Western dam' construction began, more than 10,000 trucks of different types were involved. It was the original competition for military cargo trucks and the result was that the Opel "Blitz" won. The Opel factory received a massive order for this new standard Wehrmacht vehicle.

The European conflict which started on September 1st, 1939, gathered pace with many fronts opening up, and obviously huge numbers of trucks were needed. Many thousands of civil Opel "Blitz" S produced before the war was drafted into army units. These civil trucks were brought up to army standard Kfz.305 - the official military designation for the Opel "Blitz". In all about 140 different army modifications were installed on the Opel "Blitz" chassis during the war years - they became radio cars, repair stations, fuel trucks, and even some exotic types like mobile laundries or printing-houses. Many other vehicles like staff buses or fire trucks were also based on the Blitz chassis.

From 1937 up to 1944 nearly 140,000 vehicles were built, among them 82,356 standard army Blitz S trucks, 14,122 with a long wheelbase and also 8,363 with a low-level base. In 1942 another famous manufacturers, Daimler Benz AG was involved in Opel "Blitz" license manufacture. Mercedes-built trucks were visually identical to the standard Blitz but had their own designation, Mercedes L701. License production started only in 1944, when the main Opel factory in Russelheim was destroyed by Royal Air Force bombing.

From the first days of war the Opel "Blitz" was very popular in the army. These trucks were integral to the organization of Panzer Divisions but unlike all other German trucks they used gasoline, and tanks used the same fuel. Ground pressure was low and the Blitz could overcome some obstacles which other types, even three-axle trucks, had problems with. Operation and repair in the field was very easy.

The Eastern campaign demonstrated another advantage of the Opel "Blitz", whose gasoline engine could be easily and simply started with boiled water in very cold weather conditions, when diesel-fuelled trucks typically failed. Large numbers of trucks of this type were taken into the Red Army as trophies, and if the condition of the vehicles was satisfactory, they were used without any problem. Some Opel "Blitz"es even took part in Russian-Japanese battles in eastern China in 1945.

This truck became a legend in the army and the absolute favorite among drivers. Some of them were convinced that Germany lost the war because the available quantity of Opel "Blitz"es was too little.

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32 Sd.Kfz. 7 halftracks were sold to the Brazilian Army in 1939, but only five were delivered in late 1941. They were only used between 1942 and 1945 because the defeat of Germany in May 1945 cut off the possible supply of vehicles and parts.

Weight: 9700kg

Crew: 12 men

Engine: Maybach HL 64 / 6-cylinder / 140hp

Speed: Road: 50km/h

Range: Road: 250km
Cross-Country: 120km

Fuel Capacity: 215 litres

Length: 6.85m

Width: 2.35-2.40m

Height: 2.62m

BY Major RICHARD W. ROAN USMC

Roebling's Amphibian: The Origin of the Assault Amphibian

The amphibian tractor played a decisive role in contributing to the United States Marine Corps' amphibious victories in World War II. In a letter sent from Okinawa in 1945 Marine Major General Roy S. Geiger called amphibian tractors, "the work horses of the Marine Corps." He went on to state, "Except for the 'amtracs' it would have been impossible for our troops to get ashore on Tarawa, Saipan, Guam or Pelelieu without taking severe, if not prohibitive losses." In 1944, then-Commandant of the Marine Corps, Lieutenant General Alexander A. Vandegrift wrote, "Our success in the bitter fighting at Tarawa was due in a considerable measure to the magnificent performance of the amphibian tractor."

Since World War II, the amphibian tractor, now known as the assault amphibian vehicle, has become a mainstay of the Marine Corps' amphibious arsenal and will remain in the vanguard of amphibious assaults well into the twenty-first century. Despite the assault amphibian vehicle's significant role in Marine Corps history and modern operations, the story of the origin of this venerable amphibian remains largely untold. The purpose of this study is to examine the earliest years of the assault amphibian vehicle and identify those factors that led to the vehicle's fortuitous introduction to the Fleet Marine Force in 1941.

This study of the origin of the Marine Corps' amphibian vehicle begins with a general overview of the Marine Corps' development of the amphibious doctrine during the two decades preceding World War II. The study then turns to the remarkable story of the eccentric inventor of the amphibian tractor, Donald Roebling. The diverse factors that influenced the pioneering efforts that led to Donald Roebling's achievement are reviewed. The narrative then concludes with a discussion of the joint efforts of the Marine Corps and Donald Roebling to produce the vehicle that would eventually spearhead the Marine Corps' march across the Pacific in World War II.

INTRODUCTION

The United States Marine Corps' assault amphibian vehicle stands today as the world's only seaworthy battlefield transport. There is no more obvious symbol of the Marine Corps' unique capability of maneuver on a battlefield including open sea, plunging surf and the entire spectrum of land terrain. The course of the United States' victorious march across the Pacific in World War II would have been decisively more difficult and prolonged without the assault amphibian vehicle's predecessor, the amphibian tractor. And, it is difficult to imagine a modern exercise of the Marine Corps' primary task of amphibious assault without the routine participation of assault amphibian vehicles. The assault amphibian vehicle has become a commonplace and reliable workhorse of amphibious operations. Yet, the history of the assault amphibian vehicle, particularly the vehicle's remarkable origin, remains largely untold.

The purpose of this study is to focus on the origin of the assault amphibian vehicle in an attempt to fill in the many gaps in the story of the earliest years of one of the Marine Corps' most venerable performers. It is hoped that this story will help to provide a special historical perspective that may contribute to the ongoing debate over the future of amphibious vehicles.

In addressing the origin of the Marine Corps' amphibian, a remarkable and unlikely tale unfolds. The factors leading to the arrival of the first amphibian tractors on the beaches of Guadalcanal in 1942 include some of the same developments that placed United States Marines, and not U.S. Army soldiers, in the vanguard of amphibious warfare. The Japanese seizure of central and southern Pacific islands at the close of World War I made Japan the primary focus of United States naval war planning and study. These efforts led to the recognition of the requirement to aggressively seize advanced bases for the United States Navy. Prior to this recognition the Navy's primary emphasis had been on the traditional task of defending the Navy's overseas facilities. The Japanese threat shifted the emphasis from defense to offense. At the same time, the United States Marines emerged from World War I searching for a meaningful and unique mission worthy of ensuring the Corps' continued institutional existence. Evolving from a decade of threatened army encroachment, skeletal budgets and vigorous, sometimes rancorous, Corps-wide conflict and debate, the unique mission of offensive amphibious warfare became the Marine Corps' proprietary domain and primary task. The newly focused Marine Corps spent the 193Os developing and practicing an amphibious doctrine that until the last months before World War II dangerously lacked the hardware to transform theory into reality.

Joining Japanese imperial expansion and the U.S. Marine Corps' proprietary acceptance and development of amphibious warfare as factors leading to the origin of the amphibian tractor was an enigmatic personality totally unrelated to the Pacific, the Marine Corps or the business of war. The story of the robust eccentric millionaire Donald Roebling, inventor of the amphibian tractor, adds one of the most unusual chapters to a Marine Corps' history full of unusual characters. Finally, the amphibian tractor would never have been conceived without the disastrous Florida hurricane of 1928. Japanese aggression, Marine Corps innovation born of institutional paranoia, an eccentric millionaire and a devastating hurricane; these were the diverse ingredients that joined to produce the Marine Corps' amphibian vehicle.

CHAPTER 1

Assault From The Sea

The Japanese threat in the Pacific and the U.S. Marine Corps could not have been further from Donald Roebling's thoughts as he handcrafted his first amphibian Alligator in 1935. Reobling's efforts were directed at creating a land-sea hybrid capable of negotiating swamps and flooded areas to rescue hurricane victims.1 Yet, when the Marine Corps fortuitously discovered Roebling's Alligator in 1937 it appeared as an unsolicited and hitherto unconceived solution to one of the most basic problems of the Corps' newly developed amphibious doctrine. Marine Corps thinkers had not seriously sought a truly amphibian vehicle like Roebling's Alligator. The emphasis of innovation and progress had been on the development of surf-capable landing boats.2 But, the unexpected arrival of Roebling's amphibian vehicle perfectly complemented the existing landing boats and provided an ideal tool to help support the Marine Corps' amphibious doctrine. This doctrine that awaited the addition of the Alligator in the late 1930s grew from two decades of U.S. Navy and Marine Corps historical and strategical innovation and evolution.

A new world order emerged from the First World War. The central European powers were defeated and the eyes of America shifted westward to the threat of Japanese expansion in the Pacific. Japan had seized Germany's central Pacific islands in the Marshalls, the Carolines and the Marianas and threatened territorial expansion in China, Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. Japanese expansion clearly challenged United States Pacific influence and threatened exposed American trade routes to China and the Philippines. By 1920, Japan had become the primary focus of United States Navy war planning.3

A Pacific Ocean war with Japan had been considered by the United States War Department prior to World War I in a contingency plan entitled War Plan ORANGE, one of a series of color coded global plans. By 1921 the Navy Department had thoroughly reviewed War Plan ORANGE and drafted a new plan for war with Japan that envisioned the Japanese using her island territories and a powerful new Navy to challenge the U.S. Navy in the Central Pacific. A key element of the new War Plan ORANGE was the recognition by Navy Department planners that the defeat of Japan would require the offensive seizure of island bases held by the Japanese as well as the more traditional task of defending the Navy's advanced Pacific bases. This shift from the exclusive consideration of defending naval bases to offensive seizure of new bases was a conceptual watershed that naturally suggested a significant new role for the Marine Corps. In January 1920 Chief of Naval Operations Robert E. Coontz advised the Marine Corps Commandant, Major General George Barnett, that War Plan ORANGE had become the primary target of Navy planning and suggested that the Marine Corps develop plans, programs and forces to support the plan for war with Japan. The Admiral urged General Barnett to focus particularly on the roles of advanced naval base seizure and defense.4 However, General Barnett was reluctant to throw his Marine Corps on the War Plan ORANGE bandwagon. Despite the Commandant's reservations the leaders of the U.S. Navy as well as a growing number of progressive Marine Corps officers continued to urge the Marine Corps' full participation in the advanced base issue, with particular emphasis on offensive amphibious operations.

Much like the amphibian tractor that would unexpectedly appear in 1937, the United States Marine Corps in 1920 was a solution waiting for a problem, an answer waiting for the right question. Upon General Barnett's end of tour as Commandant of the Marine Corps in June 1920, the progressive thinking John A. Lejeune assumed the Marine Corps' top post. General Lejeune was keenly attuned to the Marine Corps' traditional requirement to fight for institutional existence and believed that the development of unique (from the U.S. Army) capabilities and the assumption of a unique task or mission best addressed this requirement. This theme was expressed by Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak in his book, First To Fight as he wrote, "The continuous struggle for a viable existence fixed clearly one of the distinguishing characteristics of the Corps."5

General Lejeune saw the Marine Corps' service with the U.S. Fleet, and particularly the role of supporting War Plan ORANGE requirements for advanced naval base seizure and defense, as the key to ensuring the Corps' institutional survival. In 1922, Commandant Lejeune wrote to the General Board of the Navy concerning the Marine Corps' peacetime duties and wartime missions and asserted that, "the primary war mission of the Marine Corps is to supply a mobile force to accompany the fleet for operations on shore in support of the fleet." He called this wartime role the, "real justification for the continued existence of the Marine Corps."6 General Lejeune's views were contested by many of the Marine Corps' senior leaders, including the Commanding General of the Marine Corps' base at Quantico, Virginia, Brigadier General Smedley D. Butler. General Butler believed that the Marine Corps' future was best directed as far away from the Navy as possible.7 Throughout the decade of the 1920s (Lejeune was Commandant from 1920 to 1928) General Lejeune exercised his persuasive leadership to shift a growing number of Marine officers to his belief on the primacy of the mission of service with the Navy. He generated annual fleet landing exercises during the 1922 - 1925 period and gradually increased the emphasis on landing operations at the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico. The Commandant's efforts set the stage for the Marine Corps' development of the amphibious doctrine during the 1930s.

Among General Lejeune's many contributions to the development of the Marine Corps' role as the nation's arm of amphibious power was his inspiration of the eccentric prophet of amphibious warfare, Lieutenant Colonel Earl Hancock Ellis, USMC. Born in Luka, Kansas in 1880, Ellis graduated from high school and enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1900. His exceptional intelligence and professional zeal led to his commissioning as a second lieutenant in 1901. Remaining unmarried and totally immersed in his Marine Corps duties, Ellis soon gained a Corps-wide reputation as a brilliant staff officer and a driven workaholic. These qualities earned him the respect and protection of senior officers willing to overlook his alcoholism, fiery temper and impatience.8 Captain Ellis attended the Naval War College during the 1911 - 1912 term and was invited to remain as an instructor on the staff of the college. While serving at the Naval War College, he condensed a series of lectures into a paper entitled "Naval Bases; Location, Resources, Denial of Bases, Security of Advanced Bases." This 1913 study addressed one of Ellis' principle passions, the problems and techniques of offensive and defensive amphibious operations against the Japanese in their Pacific island strongholds. Ellis' paper helped to establish his reputation as one of the Corps' leading theorists. He joined a handful of progressive Marine Corps officers, including John H. Russell and Eli K. Cole, already noted for their pioneering work in operations with the fleet.

Major Ellis later served with distinction in France in World War I, receiving a Navy Cross for his duty with the 4^th Marine Brigade. In 1921, the recently appointed Commandant of the Marine Corps, John A. Lejeune, summoned Major Ellis to the newly formed Division of Operations and Training at the Marine Corps headquarters and tasked him to study and write about the Marine Corps' role in the Navy's War Plan ORANGE.10

Major Ellis' response to General Lejeune's assignment was a document that became a prophetic beacon for modern amphibious warfare doctrine. Revising his 1913 Naval War College study, Ellis concentrated on the tactics of seizing advanced coaling and repair stations for the Navy in the Japanese-held coral atolls and volcanic islets of the Caroline, Marshall and Mariana Islands. His conclusions marked a break with tradition in that no longer would the primary role of Marines be to defend advanced naval bases; instead Marines would attack and seize these bases from a determined enemy.11 The mission of the Marine Corps would be offensive amphibious operations.

As the result of the wholesale failure of the British amphibious campaign at Gallipoli in the Dardenalles during World War I, the majority of the world's military theorists largely discounted amphibious assaults as being too difficult, indeed almost impossible.12 Major Ellis confidently insisted that amphibious operations against the Japanese could be successful and provided the theoretical tactical blueprint for these operations. While he underestimated the fighting qualities of the Japanese soldier (he wrote, reflecting the values of his time, "Our advantages over the enemy will be those generally common to the Nordic races over the Oriental; higher individual intelligence, physique and endurance"),13 Ellis prophetically sketched the Marine Corps' Pacific island battles of World War II with uncanny accuracy. The product of Ellis' study, entitled "Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia, 1921" was accepted in total by General Lejeune, and later, the Navy Department. The study was approved as Operation Plan 712D, an annex to the Navy's War Plan ORANGE.14 Earl Ellis' far-sighted work would become the blueprint for the Marine Corps' amphibious warfare planners of the 1930s.

Shortly after completing his work for General Lejeune in 1922, Major Ellis' services were requested by the fledgling Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI). ONI earmarked Ellis to join a team being formed to spy on the Japanese in the Far East. The team members would be posing as participants in scientific and photographic expeditions. Earlier in his career, Ellis had performed intelligence work for the Marine Corps in Central America. General Lejeune granted Ellis a leave of absence to work for ONI and Ellis headed for the Pacific. Soon breaking away from ONI's control, Ellis made several failed personal attempts to penetrate the Japanese-held islands in the central Pacific via Australia, posing as a merchant for the Hughes Trading Company in New York. After being hospitalized in Yokohoma, Japan, in August 1922 for "severe nervousness" (probably alcoholism) and generating genuine concern from U.S. Navy and diplomatic officials because of his boasting and erratic behavior, Ellis disappeared sometime in the autumn of 1922. Earl Ellis mysteriously died at Parao in the Caroline Islands on 12 May 1923. Most authorities attributed his death to excessive alcoholism; some accused the Japanese in the Carolines of foul play. The U.S. Navy pharmacist mate sent to Parao to investigate and recover Ellis' remains, Lawrence Zembsch, was later killed along with his wife in an earthquake that devastated Yokohama, Japan, on 1 September 1923.15 In his history of the Marine Corps, Semper Fidelis, Allan R. Millett reports that Earl Ellis' mysterious death made him a, "martyr in the eyes of World War II Marines and gave his studies the historic glow of prophecy."16

It would be a mistake to assert that General Lejeune and Earl Ellis immediately and radically redirected the efforts of the Marine Corps toward amphibious warfare during the 1920s. More correctly, they provided the intellectual foundation for the fruition of the amphibious doctrine in the 1930s. The Marine Corps did, however, execute limited tests of Earl Ellis' theories during the 1920s. Under the progressive leadership of amphibious warfare pioneers Colonel Eli K. Cole, USMC, and Colonel Dion Williams, USMC, Marines participated in fleet landing maneuvers in the Caribbean during the years 1922 through 1924 and in Hawaii in 1925. These exercises were invaluable in providing an opportunity for most of the Corps' field grade officers (senior leaders during World War II) to experiment with amphibious tactics and equipment. Ironically, the primary benefit of these exercises was to demonstrate that Earl Ellis' amphibious concepts remained woefully theoretical and that the equipment of the day (particularly landing craft) fell short of the minimum requirements of amphibious assaults.17 By 1926, the Marine Corps' involvement in Haiti, China and Nicaragua consumed the energy and manpower of the Corps and postponed serious progress in the development of amphibious doctrine to the next decade.18

In 1933 the institutional existence of the Marine Corps was challenged by the U.S. Army under the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur. Like generations of soldiers before and after him, General MacArthur coveted the funds provided to the Marine Corps while questioning the need for a separate service whose land combat role appeared similar to that of the Army.19 Like General Lejeune before him, the Marine Corps' fifteenth Commandant, General Ben H. Fuller, responded by touting amphibious warfare as a unique and meaningful raison d'ĂŞtre for the Corps. Fuller was vigorously supported and encouraged by his assistant, General John H. Russell, a long-time visionary and proponent of amphibious warfare as the Marine Corps' primary mission. The result of this joust with the Army was the Navy General Board's first-time official recognition of the seizure and defense of advanced bases as the Marines' most important job. Equally important, General Russell successfully spearheaded the approval by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of the Navy of a new official designation for the Marine Corps' forces operating with the Navy fleet - the Fleet Marine Force.20 The Fleet Marine Force became a nominal reality on 7 December 1933 with Navy Department Order 241.21 With exactly eight years left before Japanese bombs would fall on Pearl Harbor, the Marine Corps had a basic amphibious theory (Ellis' plan) and a new name for its amphibious forces. But the Corps still lacked the detailed doctrine, specialized equipment and manpower to make the amphibious idea a reality.

Commencing in 1931, a special committee of staff members from the Marine Corps' Field Officers School at Quantico, Virginia, began work on a much needed manual addressing the doctrine of amphibious operations. Work on this ground-breaking manual proceeded slowly through late 1933 when progress was interrupted by the mobilization of the 7^th Marine Regiment for duty in Cuba. The mobilization brought the departure of several of the key officers on the manual writing committee. Major General James C. Breckinridge, USMC, then the Commanding General of the Quantico base, recommended to the Commandant that all instruction at Quantico's officer schools be discontinued and that the schools' staff and students join together and devote the entire 1933-1934 academic year to the production of a manual for landing operations. The Commandant agreed with General Breckinridge and classes were discontinued on 14 November 1933.

Banding together in a dynamic confluence of creativity and teamwork, the assembled officers of the Marine Corps Schools produced a landmark manual. Guided by many of Earl Ellis' prophetic concepts, they codified the basic doctrine, tactics and equipment of amphibious warfare into a document that, almost in its original form, continues to guide the amphibious doctrine of the modern Marine Corps. By June 1934, the "Tentative Manual for Landing Operations" was essentially complete. A mimeographed copy of the Tentative Manual was used as a training manual at the Marine Corps Schools during the 1934-1935 academic years. During subsequent years, the Tentative Manual experienced numerous minor revisions and was officially published as the "Landing Operations Doctrine, U.S. Navy 1938," in November 1938.22

By 1938 the Marine Corps had produced, in the "Tentative Manual for Landing Operations," a solid doctrinal manual for amphibious warfare. This manual supported the Corps' primary mission of amphibious warfare, approved by the Navy Department in 1933. But, the Marine Corps still lacked the basic amphibious tools to make the amphibious doctrine a reality. In 1935, the Marine Corps commenced a series of Fleet Landing Exercises (FLEX's) designed to test the theories of the newly codified amphibious doctrine as well as to provide practice in landing operations desperately needed by both the Navy and the Marine Corps. Each year from 1935 through 1941, elements of the Fleet Marine Force joined with a Navy task force to conduct landing operations in the Caribbean or the Pacific.

In the excellent review provided by Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith in several 1946 issues of The Marine Corps Gazette, General Smith documented the activities, lessons learned and deficiencies of the annual Fleet Landing Exercises of the 1935-1941 period. An obvious highlight of General Smith's review is his repeated emphasis on the major deficiency of the Marine Corps' amphibious capabilities - the shortage and total inadequacy of landing craft.23

By 1940, Andrew Higgins had provided a family of exceptionally capable personnel and vehicle transporting landing boats that began to partially alleviate the Marine Corps' landing craft problems. However, even the remarkably capable Higgins boats floundered in high surf, grounded on sand bars, avoided coral reefs and debarked their precious cargo of Marines at the point of greatest crisis, the water's edge. The Marine Corps clearly required truly amphibious vehicles or craft to successfully tackle the most obvious challenge of amphibious assaults - the uninterrupted transition from sea to land. Despite this widely recognized requirement, virtually no practical progress in the development of amphibious craft was made by the Marine Corps prior to the eve of World War II. There were two interesting experimental amphibian tanks, one American and one British, that were considered but rejected. In the 1924 fleet maneuvers at the Caribbean island of Culebra, the Marines tested a seven-ton amphibian tank, mounting a 75 millimeter gun, built by Walter Christie of the Sun Shipbuilding Company of Chester, Pennsylvania.24 Christie's tank was propelled in the water by two boat-type screws and had an odd suspension system consisting of both tracks and rubber tires. The vehicle had performed impressively in demonstrations on the Hudson and Potomac Rivers but proved to be unseaworthy and dangerous in the open sea and surf at Culebra. The Christie Tank was discarded by the Marine Corps and the concept was later sold to the Japanese.25 Walter Christie subsequently gained considerable repute for his innovative development of land tracked vehicle suspension systems. In 1931 the British War Office tested an amphibian vehicle similar to the Christie Tank. The Vickers-Armstrong Light Amphibious Tank weighed 2.17 tons and mounted a 30 caliber machine gun. The British amphibian was reliable and relatively fast on land (27 mph) but slow (3.7 mph) and unsteady in the water. It was rejected by the British and never tested by the United States but purchased and successfully developed by the Soviet Union as a river-crossing amphibian.26 The Vickers-Armstrong Tank was the forerunner of the Soviet World War II T-37 and modern PT-76 amphibious tanks.

The failure of the Christie Amphibian Tank and the Vickers-Armstrong Light Amphibious Tank to meet the need of the Marine Corps for a truly seaworthy and versatile amphibian vehicle left a void that persisted almost to the final days preceding World War II. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s the Marine Corps' development of a true amphibian lagged as the result of scarce military funding and more vigorous interest in the development of landing boats, amphibious ships and modernization of the Corps' basic land fighting weapons. While conflict with Japan appeared increasingly imminent as war ignited in Europe in 1939, the Marine Corps still lacked a suitable amphibian vehicle to support the amphibious doctrine it had developed over the previous two decades.

By the end of the 1930s the United States Marine Corps had claimed a solid foundation of institutional longevity with the official acceptance and development of the amphibious mission. Through the pioneering efforts of John A. Lejeune, Earl H. Ellis, John H. Russell and a generation of young officers serving at the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico, the Marine Corps faced the threat of amphibious war in the Pacific with a clear, detailed and valid amphibious doctrine. The Fleet Landing Exercises of the late 1930s prepared thousands of Marines and sailors for the unique challenges of attacking and defeating a determined enemy from the sea. But, without decisive and rapid advances in the tools of amphibious warfare, particularly amphibious landing craft, the Pacific war against the Japanese promised to be supremely difficult.

CHAPTER 2

Donald Roebling's Alligator

There could be no more unlikely Marine Corps hero than Donald Roebling. The rotund, eccentric inventor of the amphibian tractor is rightly credited for making a decisive contribution to his nation's victory in World War II. Yet his creative success was achieved totally beyond any military influence. For this reason, Donald Roebling's gift of the amphibian tractor to the Marine Corps just in time to spearhead the Corps' amphibious assaults in the Pacific is often, and quite correctly, attributed to fortuity, fate, or blind luck. But Donald Roebling's invention was a product of a uniquely American experience. Donald Roebling and his Alligator were progenies of eighteenth-century immigration, the boom of American industrialism, entrepreneurial capitalism, and Yankee ingenuity. The fortunate meeting of Roebling's Alligator and the war-bound United States Marine Corps was a uniquely American accident.

John Augustus Roebling, Donald Roebling's great grandfather, immigrated to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania from Muhlhausen, Prussia in 1831. Born in Prussia in 1806 and educated as a civil engineer at the Royal Polytechnic Institute in Berlin, John Roebling soon gained employment as an engineer with the state of Pennsylvania. He rapidly built a reputation for dependability, industriousness, and brilliant engineering innovation. By the early 1840s, Roebling had embarked on a career as one of America's pioneer builders of suspension bridges. Among others, he designed and built highway bridges over the Monongahela River in Pittsburgh and the Ohio River in Cincinnati as well as America's first cable suspension railroad bridge over the Niagara River. John Roebling's landmark contribution to the science of bridge building was his invention of high strength steel wire. In 1848 he moved his family to Trenton, New Jersey, and built a factory for the production of steel wire and other steel products. Roebling became famous as the "father of the modern era of the great suspension bridge," and represented the epitome of the confident, enlightened American engineer. In 1869, Roebling, assisted by his son, Washington A. Roebling, commenced his most challenging project, the Brooklyn Bridge. In June of 1869, John Roebling's foot was crushed when he was struck by a ferryboat while surveying the Brooklyn Bridge site. Tragically, he died several weeks later of tetanus as the result of the freak accident.

Washington Augustus Roebling, Donald Roebling's grandfather, was born in Saxonburg, Pennsylvania in 1837. He graduated from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute in Troy, New York, in 1857 and became his father's principal assistant. In 1861 he enlisted as a private in the Union army. He soon gained a commission as an officer and served most of the Civil War as a colonel of engineers under Irvin McDowell. Throughout the rest of his life, Washington Roebling enjoyed being called "The Colonel." Upon the death of John A. Roebling, Washington Roebling assumed the leadership of the Brooklyn Bridge project. He completed the bridge in 1883 and is credited as the "Builder of the Brooklyn Bridge." During the 1870s, Washington Roebling built his father's Trenton wire rope manufacturing plant into an industrial giant. The company, by then called John A. Roebling's Sons, became the foundation of the fabulous wealth of the Roebling family.

Washington Roebling built a new factory for the expanding company eight miles south of Trenton on the Delaware River and established a model town around the factory. The town of Roebling, New Jersey, remains today as a symbol of the height of American industrialism.1

John A. Roebling II, Donald Roebling's father, was Washington Roebling's most trusted son and assistant. He was born in 1867 and, like his father, was trained as an engineer at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. Near the turn of the century, Washington Roebling's health failed (the elder Roebling suffered from severe decompression sickness, "the bends", resulting from extensive underground work while building the caissons for the Brooklyn Bridge) and John assumed direction of the Roebling family's financial interests.2

The wartime contribution of the Roebling family during World War I foreshadowed the decisive role that Donald Roebling would play in winning the Second World War. In November 1915, the John A. Roebling's Sons plant in Trenton suffered two fires in one week with damages valued at over $1,000,000. The fires followed months of threats from prominent Germans that American industrial plants would be crippled. Immediately after the Roebling plant fires, an American German-language newspaper, the Brooklyn Frei-Presse, ran the headline, "RENDERED HARMLESS - Factory Building of Roebling Company Reduced to Ashes - Was Used to Produce Wire for the Allies." Actually, John A. Roebling's Sons' production capacity was only briefly handicapped by the fires. The company soon geared up and expanded to play a major role in the fight against German submarines. During the war, the Roebling Company produced over 95 million feet of steel rope and coupling devices to build submarine nets for American and European harbors and the framework for the 1918 North Sea Mine Barrage. The North Sea Mine Barrage was credited with destroying at least twenty-three U-Boats and putting an end to the menace of German subs. In 1931, the German biographer, Wilhelm Anener, wrote of the Roebling participation in the defeat of Germany, "To us it appears tragic fate that this emigrant's cleavage of nationality exerts its effect long after his time. With Roebling the Father- land not only lost an engineering genius and a great industrialist; but that which he created has worked damagingly against Germany in that war materials in enormous quantities have been produced."3

By the end of World War I, John A. Roebling II had concentrated his efforts on banking and the management of the Roebling family fortune, leaving the leadership of the John A. Roebling's Sons plants to other family members. John and his wife, Margaret, built a sprawling estate called the Boulderwood Mansion in Bernardsville, New Jersey, only thirty miles west of John's office complex in New York City. He also built a lovely winter home in Lake Placid, Florida, thirty-five miles northwest of Lake Okeechobee in the Florida Everglades.4 By the 1920s, John A. Roebling II had become a nationally noted financier, entrepreneur, philanthropist, and humanitarian.

John Roebling's son, Donald, would never be accused of being a conformist. Throughout his life Donald Roebling, the creator of the amphibian tractor, would walk a singular path of sublime eccentricity. Donald Roebling was born in New York City on 15 November 1908. Young Roebling, strong-willed, temperamental, and overweight, spent his childhood in the luxury of his parents' Bernardsville, New Jersey, mansion. Shipped off to the Stuyvesant Prep School in Warrenton, Virginia, he demonstrated little scholastic aptitude and, upon graduation, chose not to follow the Ivy League college routine of his wealthy peers. In August 1927, the nineteen year old Roebling enrolled in the Bliss Electrical Academy in Washington, D.C. In April 1928, he was asked to leave the Bliss Academy as the result of conflicts with his teachers.5

Finding life with his parents in New Jersey difficult, the restless Donald Roebling travelled to Clearwater, Florida, in 1929 to live with his cousin, Margaret MacIlrane. A year later, the twenty-two year old Roebling, undoubtedly subsidized by his father, established the Roebling Construction Company, a business specializing in the building of luxury homes. In 1930, Donald Roebling purchased a choice seven-acre tract of beachfront property in Clearwater. Inspired by his fiancĂŠe, Florence Spottiswood Parker of East Orange, New Jersey, he built a fifteen-room English Tudor mansion with a large outdoor pool and surrounding gardens. The mansion, awkwardly named Spottis Woode after Miss Parker, was of fortress proportions and strength and for decades was considered to be the largest, best built single-family dwelling on Florida's West Coast.6 Near the mansion, Roebling constructed an expensively outfitted machine shop to satisfy his personal passion for tinkering. This machine shop and the nearby swimming pool and Gulf of Mexico would be the birthplace of Donald Roebling's first amphibian vehicle, the Alligator.

Once established in his new Florida home, Donald Roebling and his bride (he married Florence Parker in October 1932) set-tled into a pleasant life of wealth and leisure. Roebling loosely managed his construction company while devoting himself to his hobbies: stamp collection, HAM radio operation, and mechanical tinkering. He quickly gained local repute for his eccentricities, particularly his unusual physical appearance. Roebling was addicted to candy and other sweets and his extraordinary physique featured over 400 pounds of body weight primarily concentrated in his enormous buttocks and thighs. Roebling was so large that the local cinema created a special seat for the wealthy patron by removing the armrest from two normal seats. In the early 1930s, the rich and eccentric Donald Roebling could not have been more removed from the world of the United States Marine Corps. He was a most unlikely candidate to play a pivotal role in the momentous years of worldwide conflict that lay ahead.

The initial catalyst for the chain of events that led to Donald Roebling's invention of the amphibian Alligator was an act of nature, the Great Lake Okeechobee Hurricane of 1928.7 As noted earlier, Donald Roebling's father, the financier John A. Roebling II, owned a lavish winter retreat in Lake Placid, Florida, just thirty-five miles northwest of Lake Okeechobee.

Lake Okeechobee, 730 square miles of largely swampy water in the central Florida Everglades, lies forty miles inland from West Palm Beach, Florida. Throughout the 1920s, unscrupulous Miami real estate speculators aggressively developed new towns on the banks of Lake Okeechobee, promising the new residents, mostly northerners, that the traditional flood control problems of the region had been solved.8 On 16 September 1928, a monster hurricane packing 128 m.p.h. winds crashed into the eastern Florida coastline at West Palm Beach and rushed inland toward Lake Okeechobee. Already, the same hurricane had left 600 people dead in Guadeloupe and 300 people dead and 200,000 homeless in Puerto Rico. The storm swept across Lake Okeechobee and drowned the newly established lakefront hamlets. The boom towns of Belle Glade, Pelican Bay, and Clewiston were demolished. 1,836 area residents were drowned. Some particularly unfortunate folks were killed by fatal water moccasin bites as the snakes and the people struggled to reach the same trees and housetops.9 Nearly all the loss of life and the $25,000,000 in damages occurred in the Lake Okeechobee area.10

At the time of the hurricane a group of John A. Roebling's employees were working at Roebling's estate at Lake Placid. These men formed a team and for several days following the hurricane assisted in rescue efforts in the nearby Lake Okeechobee towns. Most likely because of the participation of his own workers in the relief effort as well as concern over his own Florida property, John A. Roebling became keenly interested in the disaster. When his team of workers returned from their mission they reported on the details of the rescue operation. They highlighted the fact that many victims drowned in the hours and days following the hurricane because rescuers could not traverse the miles of flooded, muddy morass created by the storm. One of the men suggested that a vehicle or boat that could travel on land and through mud, and also negotiate deep water, would have helped immeasurably. They all agreed that hundreds of lives could have been saved if only the rescuers had been given the means to reach the victims in time.

John A. Roebling, humanitarian, financier, and shrewd businessman, recognized the need, and perhaps a potentially lucrative market, for a land and water dual capability rescue vehicle.11 Fourteen years before Marine amphibian tractors would first crash through the surf at Guadalcanal, the concept of an amphibian vehicle rose out of the hurricane flooded swamps of Lake Okeechobee.

John Roebling's son, Donald, became the agent for transforming the idea of an amphibious rescue vehicle into reality. It remains unclear when or how the senior Roebling first suggested the amphibian concept to Donald. But by early 1932 the twenty-three year old Donald Roebling had completed his mansion in Clearwater and possessed both the means and the time to address a serious project. John Roebling clearly recognized the requirement to set his eccentric and hitherto unproductive son to work on a useful and possibly profitable activity. He challenged his mechanically gifted son to build a reliable and commercially useful amphibious rescue vehicle, a vehicle that, in his words, "would bridge the gap between where a boat grounded and a car flooded out."12 He offered to pay all the design, development, and production costs and the father-son deal was sealed with a handshake. Donald Roebling accepted his father's challenge with gusto. The amphibious vehicle became the primary focus of young Roebling's creative energy for the next eight years.

By January 1933, Donald Roebling had his amphibious vehicle production project in full gear. He hired Earl De Bolt, Warren Cottrell, and S.A. Williams as his technical staff and set them to work in his personal machine shop at Spottis Woode, his Clear-water estate.13 From the outset of the project, Roebling focused on the two major problems of building a durable and versatile amphibious rescue vehicle. First, the vehicle had to be light enough to provide safe buoyancy in the water yet sturdy enough for rugged land use. And second, the propulsion systems for water and land could not be so complicated or space-consuming as to render the vehicle useless. Donald Roebling's innovative approach to these problems provided the conceptual point of departure that resulted in the success of his vehicle where previous attempts at amphibious vehicles had failed. He answered the weight problem with a relatively new product, aluminum. Aluminum was much lighter than steel yet provided adequate strength and rigidity for land operations. The second problem, the issue of dual propulsion, was addressed with truly revolutionary imagination. Roebling proposed to devise a single propulsion system for both land and water rather than trying to somehow simplify and coordinate two separate propulsion systems. The result was Roebling's creation of a paddle-wheel track sys-tem, a commercial crawler type tractor track affixed with cleats that would work much like the paddles of a paddle-wheel boat when the vehicle was waterborne.

Roebling's innovations solved the most basic duality problems of his amphibious vehicle but created new problems of their own. Because aluminum was a new material, the technology of working with aluminum was undeveloped. Metalworking tools proved ineffective on the soft aluminum and traditional methods of steel welding and riveting were not applicable. Roebling's crew pioneered aluminum working methods as they designed new shapes for aluminum rivets and discovered that woodworking machinery was far superior to metalworking tools in manipulating the soft metal.14 The cleated paddle-wheel tracks were equally troublesome. While the track system on Roebling's first 1935 prototype produced 25 m.p.h. on land, it was heavy and flimsy and quickly broke apart on rough terrain. And the straight paddle-wheel cleats, set straight across the track, were extremely inefficient in the water, producing only 2.3 m.p.h. in the water in the 1935 prototype.15 These track problems would require two more years of modification and experimentation before the vehicle could approach an acceptable level of reliability.

Donald Roebling's original goal was to produce a useful amphibious rescue vehicle in time for the 1933 hurricane season, less then a year after he commenced the project.16 He soon discovered that this goal was unrealistically optimistic. Finally, by 1935, Roebling and his team loaded their first vehicle aboard a flatbed truck to take it beyond the confines of Spottis Woode for serious testing. So far, the vehicle had seen only the rigors of Roebling's driveway and swimming pool. The next proving ground would be a small lake nearby where Roebling had built a work shed for housing and repairing his vehicles. Donald Roebling and his men proudly called their invention the "Alligator." All of Roebling's subsequent models of amphibious vehicles would retain this apropos label. Later, generations of amphibian tractor and assault amphibian Marines would proudly claim the Alligator as their unit mascot and symbol.

As previously noted, Donald Roebling's original 1935 Alligator was somewhat of a disappointment. The vehicle weighed 14,350 pounds, was 24 feet long, and was powered by a 92-horsepower Chrysler engine. It would achieve 25 m.p.h. on land, but the weak tracks invariably broke within just a few miles. And the biggest disappointment of all was the Alligator's 2.3 m.p.h. speed and lack of maneuverability in the water. Still, Donald Roebling offered to sell his original model to both the U.S. Coast Guard and the American Red Cross. Neither agency accepted his offer.17

Unwillingly to concede defeat, Donald Roebling stripped his first Alligator, Model I, down to the ground and vigorously pushed forward to the task of building an improved version, Model II. In the many rebuilds of his Alligator, Roebling's free-wheeling engineering philosophy encouraged maximum innovation and creativity. Few blueprints or engineering drawings were made during the development phase (1933-1937) of the first four models Click here to view image of the Alligator.18 Donald Roebling and his team of technicians preferred the workshop to the drawing board. They used commercially available materials, hardware, machinery, and engines whenever possible while focusing their creative energies on making the vehicle simple and rugged.

The Model II Alligator was completed in April 1936. This vehicle was a vast improvement over the Model I. The new Alligator weighed 13,110 pounds, 2,240 pounds less than the Model I, and was equipped with a lighter 85-horsepower Ford V8 automobile engine. The Model II travelled at 18 m.p.h. on land, 6 m.p.h. slower than the Model I, but its 5.45 m.p.h. water speed more than doubled the performance of the Model I. The improved water performance of the Model II was produced primarily by Donald Roebling's idea of changing the paddle-wheel cleats to a diagonal setting across the track. The new cleat angle also helped to increase stability and steerabillty in the water.19 The Model II Alligator demonstrated the mechanism's vast potential for improvement and motivated the Roebling team to continue the quest for a truly practical amphibious rescue vehicle. Almost as soon as the Model II was built and tested, it was torn apart to begin work on the Model III.

The Model III Alligator was finished and tested in September 1936. It was 310 pounds lighter (12,800 pounds) than the Model II and went slightly faster on both land and sea. But the Model III was still plagued with the same inefficient suspension system that handicapped the original Model I. The tracks continued to break after minimal land use and the Model III developed the troublesome tendency to get hung up on the bank when entering or Click here to view image exiting the water.20 A new track system had to be found before the Alligator could reliably save lives in Florida's hurricanes.

Finally in 1937, Donald Roebling and his dedicated assistants produced an Alligator that came close to their expectations. The Model IV Alligator was four feet shorter in length than the earlier models, thus reducing the length and weight of the tracks. And, most significantly, Roebling installed a totally new suspension system. His new system featured roller bearings built into the chain track rather than bogie wheels, and fixed idler blocks to replace idler wheels. This new suspension system was lighter, much more durable, and produced smoother performance on embankments than previous models. In the Model IV Alligator Roebling also replaced the straight paddle-wheel cleats with curved cleats, producing enhanced water speed and maneuverability. It was the diagonally affixed curved cleat and paddle-wheel principle that produced the Alligator's only patent.

Several years later, at the height of World War II, Donald Roebling patriotically turned over his patent, No. 2138207, with- out fee, to the government.21 The 1937 Model IV Alligator was lighter, faster in the water, more reliable on land, and more maneuverable than any of its predecessors. The new Alligator weighed only 8,700 pounds (5,650 pounds less than the 1935 Model I) and had a water speed of 8.6 m.p.h. and a land speed of 18 m.p.h.22

Donald Roebling saw the Model IV Alligator as having real commercial potential. He decided not to tear down this 1937 version of the Alligator like he had earlier models. He retained the Model IV and commenced work on building a second copy. He billed his father $100,000 for the first Model IV Alligator. This fee covered the costs of the four years of development and experimentation that produced the Model IV.23 The second copy was a bargain; it eventually cost Donald's father only $18,000 (the Alligator's distant descendant, the AAVP7A1, was produced in 1982 at approximately $815,000 per copy).

By the time Donald Roebling produced his Model IV Alligator in 1937, he had spent four years swimming his odd inventions conspicuously around St. Joseph Sound in the Gulf of Mexico, Clearwater Bay, and in the lakes and swamps of the Clearwater area. The sporadic interest of the local press blossomed in the autumn of 1937 with the arrival of reporters and photographers from Life magazine. The resulting national publicity was a dream-come-true for Donald Roebling. A two-page picture story entitled "Roebling's Alligator for Florida Rescues" was featured in the Science and Industry section of Life's 4 October 1937 issue. Of particular note, the Life article praised the Alligator's versatile amphibious qualities, its ability to crash through mangrove swamps, "grinding whole trees and shrubs to matchwood," its 40-man capacity, its impressive land and water speeds and its $10,000 production price.24 As a matter of historical perspective, the superlative language of the Life magazine article underscores the truly innovative and revolutionary quality of Donald Roebling's achievement. The Alligator was the world's first truly successful amphibious vehicle.

The Life magazine article undoubtedly gave John A. Roebling II, Donald Roebling, and his team of assistants good reason for celebration. The article would surely produce willing customers for their Alligator and a long awaited payoff for their labors. They could not have imagined that their first customers would be United States Marines.

CHAPTER 3

The Marine Corps' Amphibian

The Life magazine article telling the story of Donald Roebling's amazing Alligator became the messenger of good fortune for a Marine Corps desperately short of the tools of amphibious warfare. The 4 October 1937 Life magazine article gained the attention of Rear Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, Commander, Battle- ships, Battle Force, U.S. Fleet in San Diego, California. At a cocktail party Rear Admiral Kalbfus picked up the Life magazine and showed the Roebling article to Major General Louis McCarty Little, the Commanding General of the Fleet Marine Force, then located in San Diego. Major General Little was greatly excited by Donald Roebling's strange invention and mailed a copy of the magazine article to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Major General Thomas Holcomb, in Washington, D.C.1

The Marine Corps' remarkable fortuity of finding the Alligator in the pages of a popular magazine came none too soon. The same Life magazine issue that contained Donald Roebling's Alligator also contained a shocking pictorial essay on the Japanese aerial bombing of the Chinese city of Shanghai on 28 August 1934. In four short years, Japanese bombs would devastate the U.S. Fleet at Pearl Harbor. And in less than five years, amphibian tractors would help the U.S. Marines whip the Japanese on Guadalcanal.

On 4 January 1938, the Marine Corps Commandant, Major General Thomas Holcomb, forwarded the Life magazine article he had received from Major General Little to the Marine Corps Equipment Board at the Marine Corps' Quantico, Virginia, base. He directed Brigadier General Frederick L. Bradman, the President of the Equipment Board, to evaluate Donald Roebling's Alligator and make a recommendation on the vehicle's use by the Marine Corps.2 Over the course of the next twenty-four months the Alligator negotiated a labyrinth of military committees and boards and almost became a victim of the timeless governmental maladies of bureaucratic negativism and insufficient funding. Except for the personal advocacy and zeal of a few dedicated Marine Corps officers, the Marine Corps' chance to add the amphibian tractor to their amphibious team may have been lost.

During January 1938, General Bradman routed the Life magazine article to the several committees of the Equipment Board for comments and recommendations. After viewing the photograph of the Alligator provided in the Life article, the Committee on Transportation and Tanks concluded that the vehicle did "not appear suitable for Marine Corps purposes ashore" and strongly recommended against "its adoption by the Marine Corps for use in operations ashore."3 The main problems noted were the Alligator's light armor and unproven suspension system. The Marine Corps' Committee on Boats of the War Plans Section agreed with the Transportation and Tanks Committee that the vehicle had "no particular use once it reached the beach," but conceded that a few Alligators could have some limited use in small unopposed flanking or covering force operations. The Committee on Boats concluded that the Alligator issue should be dropped by the Marine Corps and turned over to the Navy.4 Luckily, General Bradman directed further inquiry into the Alligator before the issue was passed to the Navy and forgotten.

On 3 February 1938, the Marine Corps Equipment Board sent a letter to Donald Roebling requesting detailed information on the Alligator. Within five days, Roebling enthusiastically responded to all of the Marine Corps' questions. After describing his vehicle with obvious pride and some exaggeration, he noted that "the Alligator may be inspected and we will be glad to demonstrate it to you at any time."5 Donald Roebling's positive and timely response impressed the members of the Equipment Board and on 28 February 1938, General Bradman wrote to the Commandant of the Marine Corps requesting authority to dispatch a member of the Equipment Board to Clearwater to personally inspect the Alligator. Two weeks later, Major John Kaluf was enroute to Florida.6

Major Kaluf's visit with Donald Roebling marked a significant turning point in the Marine Corps' attitude towards the Alligator. Kaluf meticulously inspected the vehicle and observed its operation at sea, through the surf and in mangrove swamps. He took 400 feet of 16 mm movie film of the Alligator in action and personally drove the Alligator at sea and on land.7 He immediately saw that the Alligator was a revolutionary vehicle that represented the essence of what the Marine Corps was striving to do: project military power from the sea to the land in a smooth transition. Major Kaluf became a zealous believer in the Alligator concept and helped to keep it alive until it became a reality. Kaluf's glowing report on the Alligator led the Commandant of the Marine Corps, on 18 May 1938, to formally request funds from the Chief of Naval Operations to purchase one Alligator for testing under military conditions. The tests would take place during the Fleet Landing Exercises scheduled for the winter of 1939 (FLEX No. 5).8 On 28 June 1938, the Commandant received a disappointing response from the Chief of Naval Operations. The Navy agreed that Alligators would be of some value to the Marine Corps but the limited funds available for landing craft would continue to be solely devoted to the development of the Navy's landing boats.9

Meanwhile, Donald Roebling had been hard at work modifying his Model IV Alligator to satisfy the comments and recommendations made during Major Kaluf's inspection back in March. In January 1939 Donald Roebling sent photographs and a general description of his improved vehicle to the Marine Corps Equipment Board. The Commandant of the Marine Corps as well as leading members of the Equipment Board recognized the importance of maintaining Mr. Roebling's enthusiasm and cooperation despite the fact that the Navy had, at least for awhile, declined to fund the Alligator. Major Kaluf again visited Clearwater in February 1939 to review Roebling's latest work and sustain the good will that the Marine Corps had been able to cultivate with the eccentric inventor.10 Although the $18,000 price tag for the updated Alligator caused Kaluf some alarm, his report following this second visit echoed the enthusiasm of his first report. In this second report he made the following interesting comment concerning Donald Roebling's attitude toward cooperating with the Marine Corps:

"For the benefit of any officers who have any future dealings with Mr. Roebling... it should be explained that the designer, Donald Roebling, and his father, John Roebling, who furnished the necessary funds, are very wealthy people and are not developing this amphibian to make money and cannot be approached on a profit basis. Any additional income would probably be an embarrassment to them. Unlike the ordinary manufacturer who has something he is anxious to sell, they can be appealed to only on the basis of patriotic or humanitarian motives as far as this amphibian is concerned."11

In October 1939, Donald Roebling was visited by a three-officer committee headed by Brigadier General Emile P. Moses, USMC (the new President of the Marine Corps Equipment Board). The committee came to inspect the Alligator and assure Mr. Roebling of the military's continuing vigorous interest in his invention.

Following General Moses' visit to Clearwater and his subsequent glowing report on the Alligator, a second effort was made to convince the Navy to relinquish the money to buy a pilot vehicle. This time the Navy finally coughed up the requisite $24,492 for one Alligator. Donald Roebling received his contract in April 1940 and the Marine Corps acquired its first amphibian vehicle in November 1940.12 Click here too view image

The Alligator that Donald Roebling delivered to the Marine Corps in October 1940 featured many military modifications resulting from the visits of Major Kaluf and Brigadier General Moses. The 1940 Alligator was powered by a 120-horsepower Lincoln-Zephyer engine with a Ford standard transmission.13 It could achieve 29 m.p.h. on land and 9.72 m.p.h. in the water.

The vehicle weighed 7,700 pounds (1,000 pounds less than the 1937 Model IV Alligator) and had a cargo capacity of 7,000 pounds. As advertised in a glossy promotional leaflet produced by Roebling in 1940, "in the open sea, or when landing on a beach through the surf the Alligator is more seaworthy than a normal boat of com- parable size. It will not sink, even with its 7,000 pound cargo compartment full of water; nor will it capsize in a dive into deep water off a six-foot seawall." 14

On 18 October 1940, at Clearwater, Flor